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HUMANISM

As a Way of Life

By J. George Frederick

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HUMANISM AS A WAY OF LIFE

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BY

J. GEORGE FREDERICK

Author of "What is Your Emotional Age?"
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PREFACE

In the opinion of the author, this is a moment of very great importance in the field of ideas. It is the moment when, swinging loose from two enslaving extremes, after many centuries of careening, the human mind is at last finding some balance. It is now building its own organized philosophy of life that fits human beings and human lives, instead of being pressed uncomfortably into ready-made molds, or being provided with an open order to "let impulse be its guide," which is only another way of spelling chaos.

There is today a vastly larger number than ever before of people of some intelligence, and these people are now more or less definitely reaching an adulthood in their way of life. They have before them, as never before human beings have had, a wide and complete series of cycles of recorded human thought and experience from almost every possible angle. As a consequence of this sophistication, of this ripening of human thinking, they are finished with myths or believing implicitly in supernatural things. They are equally finished with the negative alternative of believing in nothing and merely drifting. After a trial of both they have an intuitive feeling that each of these points of view is "incompetent and irrelevant" to the dignity, the nature and the possibilities of man. They sense that all during these many centuries we have been teetering violently and destructively between extremes, in our blind groping, and that now is the time—after humanity has touched the

apogee of both these extremes and found them wanting—to stabilize ourselves nearer the middle, where the maximum of truth undoubtedly lies.

Accordingly, people are hungry as never before to achieve a sound philosophy of life; to end bewilderment, confusion, cross-purposes, excesses, despair, enslavement, futility and loss of personal power and happiness, as well as the clouding over of love. They cry for leaders, but they want none of the sanctified leaders of medieval superstition nor the cynical leaders of blind chaos. They want leaders who have *a sense of the whole,* who can integrate common wisdom into an orderly philosophy, who have a capacity to stand steadily upon their own feet, knowing the worst about man, knowing the vastness of a world which has many universes, some of them 16 million light years away, and yet not feeling inferior; knowing life and literature and science, and yet also knowing how to enjoy life, shape it and live it harmoniously, healthily, productively, with a tempered optimism and a sense of human dignity and destiny.

Humanism is the broad generic name for the obvious answer to this longing. Humanism is no one man's doctrine; it is larger than the bounds of its leaders, Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard, and Paul Elmer More of Princeton; and it is of course greater also than the bounds of this book. It is a modern spirit and attitude upon which many minds are converging, while at the same time differences remain. These differences, however, are far less important than the fundamental basis of humanism, upon which there is little disagreement.

It is not the object of the author of this book to debate the pros and cons of humanism, but to present a humanist's

way of life, a humanist's philosophy rounded out and made concrete.

Far too many humanists who write have concentrated their attention upon fine metaphysical or literary hair-splitting in debate with opponents of humanism, instead of presenting the humanistic philosophy in greater detail and simplicity in order that the public might more intelligently choose values and obtain greater light. Indeed the debates between humanists and "anti-humanists" have created nothing short of an intellectual scandal by their undergraduate heat and recrimination in argument. The public has stood by utterly bewildered, and it has also been irritated by the failure to stick to the important issues, to such an extent that sneers and jeers have freely been hurled at the debaters. The absurdity of the furore in the name of humanism has sometimes approached that of the classic debate of the early Christian fathers over how many angels could dance on the point of a needle. In the meantime the human need for guidance toward a way of life has been neglected.

The people of today are acutely aware of their need of an adequate modern philosophy of life. From undergraduates to the middle-aged they are seeking it; they are probing for it. They want honest and serious thinking on the subject. They are looking for no primrose path of "escape" into any moonlit, shadowy bower of pseudo-science or cult or sect. They want no more fairy tales; they are ready for truth, but not hasty-pudding truth, three-dimension truth, or repulsive, deceptive close-up of truth which discloses only its incidental warts and diseases. They want, really, to "see life steadily and see it whole" as Matthew Arnold, a great humanist, put it. The Middle Ages were obviously a debauch of mystic other-worldliness at the expense of the human; and we are only now at the edge of

this debauch. The Renaissance and Rousseau swung the emphasis toward the other extreme of free-flowing naturism, the exaltation of every appetite and desire without form or pattern. This period reached its climax only recently in utter futility, license, despair and drift; the lowest impulse, the most unsocial egoism being made as "sacred" as the supernaturalist ever made the soul sacred. The incontestable direction of the new movement, both logical and inevitable, is toward the middle position—humanism. All the hair-splitting and metaphysical disputation in the world cannot ignore this obvious fact, which is already engraved upon our times. Humanism as a philosophy is here to stay and is growing rapidly, whether or not the name humanism is invoked to describe it. There are thousands of humanists who do not know the name. Unless a better name be forthcoming why not retain it? It has a noble, even if chequered, heritage.

It seems exceedingly logical to the author that just at this juncture there should be a book by a practising humanist who would, however inadequately, body forth the various aspects of humanism as an actual way of life; as a satisfactory practical attitude toward daily life; and at the same time would set the humanistic philosophy in its true perspective in a brief and simple way. This is the task to which the author has addressed himself, and he is fully conscious of the dangers and pitfalls of his task, and of his failure to escape all of them. The book is addressed not to critics and controversialists of humanism, but to the average person of literate understanding who cares nothing about taking sides in a debate, but does care greatly about finding a sound ground for a philosophy which is adequate to life and does not affront his intelligence.

Such a philosophy of humanism has been impending for

many centuries. The impact of religion bent it badly in one direction, and then the impact of science bent it badly in the opposite direction. Unable to hold its own during the first vigorous onslaught of both forces, it is now succeeding in welding something of both forces and straightening itself firmly. It is compounded of both forces; each of which, alone, is inhuman in its naked extremity. The texture of man's mind is now far more firm, and the scope of his experience far more complete, so that he is ready to give a more definitely measured and proportioned place in his mind to the forces which in the past have tended to obsess and overwhelm him. He is ready for a mature and balanced philosophy of life which he can live, and which will not be at war with him, or lay him low.

To the author it appears likely that for the next five hundred years mankind will be at work shaping and refining the philosophy of humanism and making it the guiding star of mankind; achieving at last that complete human dignity and freedom which during all these centuries have striven so hard and so tragically for release.

J. George Frederick.

New York, 1930.

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HUMANISM AS A WAY OF LIFE

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I

Why There is Much Confusion of Philosophy of Life

Humboldt, in a conversation with Arago in 1812, made a prophecy. "I despise mankind in all its strata: I foresee that our descendants will be still far unhappier than we are."

This prophecy has come doubly true. What Humboldt said is reiterated today, only in more words, by Aldous Huxley and Joseph Wood Krutch. Mankind of late decades has been very unhappy indeed; so unhappy that "a gentle cynicism and pitying despair" has been announced as the most appropriate attitude possible for an educated man of today. More than that, the "despising of man" has become, to many, the necessary and logical outcome of a highly modern conception of man's mind, such as, for instance, "Behaviorism" fosters. If man is only pure mechanism and chemistry, meaninglessly reacting—like so many

oxygen and hydrogen atoms rotating endlessly between sea, cloud, raindrop and river—then there is nothing amiss in despising human beings, as one despises the dust that swirls around one's automobile. It is obvious that in the past century man has been pressed down from a kind of Deity itself all the way to a point where he is a mere common cipher, or zero. From meaning everything he has been brought to mean nothing. "Man's indefeasible dignity," to use Kant's phrase, has become man's calculated indignity. Thus is the scene laid and the cue given for the entry of a philosophy that knits the raveled sleeve of human care, that restores meaning to man, without affront to intelligence. Can it longer be delayed?

1. Old Illusions and Standards.—The past hundred years have constituted a century which might well be called The Century of Man's Deflation. It may be that Humboldt, catching sight of man's entry, then about to take place, into the fatal Bluebeard closet of science, realized what a terrifying experience it was going to be, what a price man was going to pay for shattering his illusions with the hard flint axe of his reason. Even in the so-called "shepherd of Arcady" age, before science and the machine, men were not very happy, but it cannot be denied that they had gorgeously caparisoned illusions, well-organized, authoritative philosophies of life, and working systems of discipline. It is illuminating to list the principal types of these:

(1) obedience to clan, chief, overlord, king or other autocrat
(2) obedience to priest, pope, god, Almighty One, Allseeing Eye
(3) obedience to heavy-handed parent, family or patriarchal system
(4) obedience to social caste, village or neighborhood social standard
(5) the dominance of special ignorance, fear, prejudice, tradition
(6) the general inhibitions underlying the philosophy of the time and the age.

All of these represented points of view—ready-made, insinuating, if not compulsory philosophies of life; and in the absence of much travel and study these were so protected from criticism or comparison that vast numbers of people never knew any other philosophies. The people of a village of Scotch Presbyterians, a century ago for instance, who rarely if ever went anywhere else, scarcely imagined the existence of even another sect of religion, to say nothing of another philosophy of life in which there was no hell or eternal damnation, and no "revealed" religion. If they did hear about another philosophy of life, it was often described to them as of a terrible and heathenish outlook, ruinous even to read about. The young Mormon of Salt Lake City, years ago, undoubtedly heard about people other than Mormons living far away, but they doubtless seemed to him as Voodoo worshipers seem to us today: followers of strange and pitiably ignorant philosophies. It has been the practice for many centuries to make even the reading of books about other philosophies a pollution and a fearsome thing, likely to cast the spell of evil and misfortune upon the reader. The extraordinary determination of churchmen of the Middle Ages to keep classical books out of the hands of people (succeeding so well that most people never suspected the existence of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates and other great philosophers), and the equally notorious industry of the Spanish priests in destroying the books of the Mayans, resulting in obscuring perhaps forever a great American cultural era, are examples of the militant protection flung about particular systems of philosophy, superstition and illusion. This is not the place to describe the long, bloody fight which was made to break down these militant protections, by individuals who had glimpses of other philosophies. These indi-

viduals, realizing, in the words of Diderot, that the first step towards a sound philosophy is incredulity, often paid with their lives merely for disbelieving in the prevailing philosophy. It is thus the fact that humanism first took form when the Greek classics were rediscovered in the Middle Ages, when individuals bold enough to dare to read and consider them at last insisted upon a genuine comparison between philosophies.

Only then did it become possible—*for a few*—to *choose between* philosophies and thus to cease being intellectual galley slaves. It is a harrowing tale to follow the persecutions of those men who, at all cost, removed their intellectual shackles. The burning of Bruno at the stake, the glowing of whose hot thirst for new knowledge "not all the snows of the Caucasus could quench," and the cowing and threatening of Galileo for harboring the notion that the world was round, showed instinctive realization that other philosophical concepts were swimming into man's ken and sounding the knell of compulsory philosophies. The courage of such men is exemplified in Spinoza, who, while still in his teens, had to submit to lying prostrate before the door of the synagogue and being walked upon, *literally*, by the congregation, because he questioned the prevailing philosophy and dared dream of a unity of God and Nature: the most brilliantly daring philosophic conception that had been formulated since the Greek philosophers. Many men died in those days for the right merely to think a philosophy contrary to the prevailing one.

2. Freedom to Create New Illusions.—After men had won the right to dissent, a great era came upon the world, an era of unrestrained philosophizing. When once the dams had burst, the waters spread. The three or four centuries before the nineteenth were hotbeds for new illusion. In

place of One Great Illusion, whatever it locally happened to be, people began to spawn philosophies as fish spawn eggs. No one has ever catalogued quite all the sects, the cults, the doctrines, the subdivisions of doctrines and philosophies which from the end of the Dark Ages to Aimee McPherson's Angelus Temple in Los Angeles have put forth their tendrils and flourished or died in the period of 1500 to 1914. Doubtless nobody ever will. The story of their flourishing is the story of an incredible application of energy and dreams. As early as the Fifteenth Century, when the world was only beginning to be free from a tyrannical papacy, Bacon could say that "the greatest vicissitude of things amongst men is the vicissitude of sects and religions," and Sir Thomas Browne could remark that persecution was an indirect way to plant religions. Planting new religions and new philosophies became the order of the day; the more persecution, the more religions and philosophies and standards. Like explosions of atoms, these groups began to separate from the main bodies and seek spheres where they could function undisturbed and unmolested. The great drama of intrigue in Europe and the shaking off of fetters began; and then commenced also the great colonizing trek to new lands, where particular philosophies could be put into practice unmolested. Particularly, of course, was this true of the northern peoples, less conformists than the Latin races. Quaker, Puritan, Calvinist crossed the ocean, and later Germans, French and others; to be followed later by non-religious seekers after economic Utopias.

Philosophically and psychologically considered, the era represented a gigantic expansion of ego of a people in whom it had been suppressed for many, many centuries. The coming of print and education and the opportunity to choose

a philosophy instead of having one forced upon it, had given to the human mind a value and a zest which it had never before possessed. It is one of the seldom spoken-of tragedies of the human race that for over a thousand years, in the Dark Ages, the common people, ordinary men and women, were blotted out of history to a large degree. They represented so much human "automata," virtually without spokesmen and without place in the human chronicle, for they had no philosophy and no mind except what was minted for them by their masters. They lived a life infinitely crude and pitiful, and to think was to be damned. It is sometimes presumed that they were happy in this state of ignorance and herded philosophy, but this is a misreading of human psychology, as their tremendous joy in release showed when once the leaden weight of imposed authority was removed from them. "A mind quite vacant is a mind distressed," as Cowper has pointed out; and not a mind happy in its ignorance and conformity. The "Merry England" tradition, glossed over with the romance of Maypoles and feastings and mummer's music, is a mirage of distance, an operatic scene-painter's conjurings. Black bread, peas, fern roots and bark for food, wisps of straw for clothing, thatched huts with bare earthen floors in which vermin crawled in twenty year-old coverings of rushes—this was humanity's lot. Disease was rampant in consequence, and the cart ever creaked with bodies on the way to Tower Hill or Smithfield or Tyburn. Such was the life of the common man, old at forty. Half naked, chanting wild measures, or reciting the Latin catechism—words they knew not the meaning of—these were the simple, tragic annals of the common folk before they had a chance to rise to the dignity of personality; i.e., the dignity of possessing the very crudest first elements of a philosophy of life which they could

call their own. In a day when a majority of the members of the English Parliament could not read or write, what chance was there for a self-chosen philosophy of life for the ordinary man?

But how different less than a century later! The defeat of the Spanish Armada opened the seas to English merchants. Great companies were formed in 1553 and 1600 to trade in foreign lands, bringing in the new riches of commerce and world relationships. With better-nourished flesh, and better clothing, with more literacy and printed books, and with less religious rigor, the slumbering minds of men awoke to a consciousness of power, adventure and a destiny other than that of fodder for cannon and priest. The suppressed egos of men were emboldened and heartened to set up more philosophies of their own. Even the monks dared, like Rabelais, to acclaim the Greek and Roman classics, urge humanism and dissent. From that time forth, there was a rapid multiplication of philosophies, a constant subdivision of the world into a greater and greater number of philosophies, sects and concepts of man. Practically all of them, however, continued, in some form or other, to keep man enthroned as of high dignity and destiny, and granted him free will and choice. Indeed because this sense of freedom was so new, it became a cult in itself, for which men were ready to die—and did in the French Revolution and elsewhere. Man became exceedingly conscious of his political rights as a human being; began to have opinions and philosophies, and, alas, began to weave new vagaries and fantasies to take the place of declining supernaturalism. Rousseau and others inflated the ego of man as never before, not only with new political ideas (which were to have their reflection in our American political system) but also philosophically; bringing to a fo-

cus the *naturism* philosophy. This was in a sense the final exultant triumph of man, as it proclaimed man's *intrinsically good* personality, against the theologians who had so long said man was *intrinsically bad*. It had "a chip on its shoulder"—going to extremes in *things* earthly, against the long obsession over *things heavenly*. Man's era of power was in full cry.

Until the Century of Man's Deflation! This began in the nineteenth century and continued to a climax of deflation in recent years; a climax that pressed from all philosophies the dignity of man, as wine is pressed from grapes, leaving only a sour mash; a "grim-visaged comfortless despair," as Gray phrases it; a phantasmagoria of soulless mechanics.

3. How Science Deflated Man.—We have called science the fatal Bluebeard closet, into which man has been drawn irresistibly by precisely the same innate quality which incarcerated Bluebeard's wives—*curiosity*. It is a perfect analogy, for once given an inkling of the existence of a Bluebeard closet, man is constituted precisely as was the Bluebeard wife—he demands that more and more of the "deadly" mysteries be constantly disclosed, and he labors mightily toward that end. It is this mood which is now upon man, and has been for over a century. It is so all-powerful that it is entirely reshaping man's character. It was, as Professor Irving Babbitt coins the phrase, "*the entry into life of an element of vital novelty*." This is nothing less than the "*insatiable curiosity*" of which Walter Lippmann speaks as the greatest historic attribute of humanism. Science began its deadly deflation of man with a skill which the Fundamentalists are perfectly right in regarding as "diabolical," for if you believe in a deep-laid, Satanic plot, as they do, nothing could be more subtle. The Bluebeard closet device is thoroughly diabolical, if you consider that

science is a Bluebeard, a murderous monster and a devil instead of a benefactor.

It is interesting to catalog the slow steps by which science has accomplished man's deflation, so perfectly that even some learned college professors today rail bitterly at science; that many writers call it a Frankenstein about to devour man; that great scientists write apologies for science, and bishops propose a fifteen-year holiday from further scientific effort. These steps we may catalog somewhat as follows:

(1) The dawning spirit of skepticism and inquiry (which is the soul of science) rejects single revealed authority, and religion becomes divided into many sects, which seek new pioneer spheres for isolation, and thus are compelled to engross themselves in material things. (Puritans, Quakers, Calvinists, Huguenots, Mennonites, Lutherans, Shakers, etc., who came to America).

(2) The practical compulsion to invent, in order to ameliorate the exigencies of particularly hard necessity in new and primitive surroundings; thus focusing enormous attention upon the conquering of environment, and providing a "vital sense of novelty" or thrill at the sense of power; all of which incites more and more curiosity to explore further the Bluebeard closet of scientific fact.

(3) The development of literacy and education, printing and interchange of knowledge, which results finally in the organization of knowledge, until, as in the Darwin theory of evolution, in the Freudian studies in psychology, in the astronomical and chemical advances, and finally in the recent climax of Einstein's formula uniting the laws of gravity and electricity, all sciences are inter-knit and consolidated upon a mechanistic plane. The machinery of inert matter, of man, of stars, of mind, is laid bare as in a blue-print, with man's vaunted free will tapering off to a vanishing point.

(4) The gargantuan development of machine processes, cities, power, buildings, plants, chemistry, electricity, corporations, mergers, world-wide organization, until man constantly fades into a smaller and smaller ratio of importance, in comparison with his creations, and he begins to feel a sense of oppression from them.

(5) The decay of religions, the decay of one authority after another, the earlier sophistication of young people, the inadequacy and exposure of the weaknesses of old philosophies and ways of life, old political forms, catchwords and beliefs; the decline of old decorums, illusions, social forms, and discovery of the pedestrian origin of man's cherished impulses, instincts and emotions.

(6) The coming to certain limited groups and circles of people, of cynicism, despair, chaos, sense of futility, defeat, meaninglessness; and the loss of the sense of worth-whileness, drive, hope, ambition, progress, love, idealism and work.

We are thus back, after a full swing around the circle, to the original *static* condition; back to the old sense of hopelessness, after having moved through a most momentous *dynamic* period. We cannot fail to observe that this dynamic period occurred during the time when man was not thoroughly deflated, and at the same time was not thoroughly bound to a precise and authoritative philosophy of life. Evidently it is when man feels himself most important that he accomplishes most. This seems to forecast the main theme of this book, namely, that the keynote humanistic precept, *the golden mean*, the middle ground away from extremes, is the most generally useful and effective instrument for human purposes. Obviously it is oppressive and stultifying to live under a rigid authority and ready-made philosophy, but apparently it is equally dispiriting to range restlessly and undecisively over many philosophies leading chaotically, like a mystic maze, to philosophic negation and futility. Amiel in his famous *Journal Intime* sounded the depths of futility over half a century ago, as Aldous Huxley, James Joyce and Theodore Dreiser sound them today.

Nevertheless we cannot disown our own reason. Science, quite adequately to all clear minds, has deflated man from his old status. It has, as a result of the six conditions or

developments we have just enumerated, shown man rather conclusively these things:

(1) that quite possibly he is a mere cosmic accident or incident, an organism existing fortuitously and perilously upon one of the minor suns in a minor part of one of a vast number of galactic systems of stars floating in incredibly vast space;

(2) that man has evolved after millions of years of painful travail from microscopic bits of inert matter, along with many other organisms which he startlingly resembles;

(3) that his feelings and impulses, even to a large extent his will and his aspirations, obey iron laws of mechanics and mathematics, and that to an almost complete extent he is a puppet of chance and an unknowable fate, with no traceable, knowable sign of being part of any intelligent Plan;

(4) that "progress" in such a situation has many aspects of illusion, and that therefore we must rip off the veils of even this seemingly innocent and hopeful preoccupation, because we now know too much about the mortality of cultures and civilizations. Babylon, Egypt, Greece, Rome, all these and many other cultures, have been born, have risen to great heights and died quite like so many elephants in a jungle. We know also the vast power of man's animal instincts and their nearness to the surface of man's pretentious but thin veneers of culture—a power of sheer brute animal force which has now a terrible possible ally in science and so-called "progress" itself, as the disillusioning World War so miserably demonstrated.

4. The Strain of Deflation.—It is only necessary thus to list the major items of deflation, as above, to realize what the consequences of deflation must be; also to understand sympathetically that some minds cannot even endure to think coolly about these consequences. It becomes obvious that not only has life been deflated, but it has been peeled alive, scorched and nearly asphyxiated, by an acid in which the human spirit shrivels and almost dies. It is the murder of emotion at the precocious hand of intellect, to be followed shortly by the suicide of the murderer. It is a grue-

some death-process, and the death-rattle already sounds in the throat of bankrupted human philosophy, when we give the full valuation claimed for them to the items above enumerated.

The mental strain and the spiritual chaos resulting from such deflation and from the modern confusion of philosophy are not to be regarded lightly. That half-childlike relation which mankind had so long held toward God, and that agreeable sense of security and of eternal worth as a soul to be cherished in the bosom of a father, were to a large degree necessary to the stability and happiness of the masses of men. As Dr. Beatrice Hinkle says in *The Re-creating of the Individual*, "the childish conceptions and faith are scorned and mocked and we see scores of serious people trying to live as though the loss did not affect them, but all the while the pessimistic refrain grows louder. . . . The scorning of the beliefs man has created and held is a scorning of himself, and the significance of their loss is the significance of any disturbing and painful experience. The realization of their loss has come suddenly to many."

The loss does seriously affect people, and it is not stretching the truth to say that the rapidly increasing number of insane and criminals, and the general decline of all responsible standards, are due to the widespread breakdown in philosophy of life.

5. The Consequences of Deflation.—*Even so, the death-like consequences of human deflation should be bravely scanned*, as we search with our brains, the best light we humans know, amid the ruins for the lost philosopher's stone. To revert at this critical juncture to old self-deluding myth and fantasy-building by retreating from the hard realities which the light of our minds discloses would be craven cowardice.

The net consequences of the Century of Man's Deflation may, then, be sketched somewhat as follows:

(1) We are too adult for miracles and fairy tales which permit us to inflate our importance and escape from reality; too knowing, most of us, to trust the manufactured myths by which life is given a sugar-coated meaning. *We can stand the truth;* we *want* the truth, even if it destroys us.

(2) We must be prepared to see, as the perfectly logical consequences of deflation, the break-up of all kinds of restraints and disciplines—parental, religious, moral and self—because they lose their meaning, significance and importance when the philosophy is one of despair and conviction of the meaninglessness of human existence.

(3) We must expect that, as this attitude gathers momentum and reaches the masses in general, there will be a definite slowing down of all ambitions and interests and desires; a reduction in the tempo of civilization, an increase in crime and ruthlessness, a decline of the arts and sciences, and in all likelihood the ultimate defeat of our culture by another culture, which, like the Huns descending upon the declining Roman empire, will conquer because it will be operated by more powerful and effective emotional "drives," based on a more virile philosophy of life. Despair and conviction of the meaninglessness of life are not virile philosophies.

(4) We must expect—as Mr. Kutch has clearly set forth, and as certain groups in existence now exemplify—that love as an extremely powerful driving force will collapse and thus aid mightily in taking the salt and tang and savor out of life, not to speak of the spirituality. We must also expect a rapid decline in family life and the birthrate, and a rise in suicides, insanity and abnormality.

(5) We must expect that since curiosity will be the most prominent remaining driving force, science will increasingly obsess us, and that we shall unquestionably—*if humanism is not introduced as a balance*—tend more and more toward specialization and dehumanization. Lord Birkenhead in his new book * has described us as we may be 100 years hence. Children will be born without parents (by ectogenesis); we shall be ruled by experts in all phases of life;

* "The World in 2030," Lord Birkenhead; Hodder and Stoughton, London.

trading and industry will be professionalized in great units; agriculture will be abolished; food will be in standardized synthetic form; party politics will give way to routine, trained civil professional administrators; and old people will be kept alive by science until they are 120 years of age. The proportion of old people to the total will thus be much larger than at present.

These are realistic, cool appraisals of the outlook we have at the present time, and assuredly it is not an inviting one. Humboldt's 1812 prediction of future unhappiness might be made today of our own future descendants, simply by multiplying the degree of unhappiness. Doubtless these descendants a hundred years hence can increase still further the dose of unhappiness which they will, in turn, predict for their descendants! The Century of Man's Deflation seems doomed to a dreary succession of further deflations until man may wearily exterminate himself. "Determinism" will have triumphed.

II

Humanism as the Great Answer

Is it not clear, upon the face of it, that humanity will obstinately refuse to be caught in such a miserable cul de sac? Irrespective of the truth or falsity of the philosophy just described, *human nature is glandularly, mentally and spiritually unfitted to endure it.* Why? Because it represents a cruel and inhuman extreme, and the great mass withers under extremes of philosophy, just as it withers under extremes of temperature, or extremes of height or depth, and refuses to venture near them.

Of course the great mass is right. Humanity cannot teeter upon the edges of abysmal precipices, far up in oxygenless altitudes, even if a few adventurous individuals can. Moreover those individuals who teeter thus on spectacular crags and ledges of despair and deflation, and beckon to the populace below to follow, may safely be regarded as very irresponsible leaders. Still, they rightly may—and are—awarded plaudits for their daring and for

their accounts of their venturesome exploits, and they may be of service in guiding humanity a little further upward from the more lowly, level plains. There is distinctly a call for moderation and common sense and proportion. *At this point humanism as a philosophy makes its entry upon the scene.*

6. The Dangers of Insulation.—In the true humanist view *nothing human is alien*, not even the pessimisms and despairs of the philosophical alpinists who have visioned the eternal snows of man's loneliness and are chilled. We must therefore at the very outset urge that no prejudice be developed against those natures that have explored the icy arctic waste lands of human philosophy and are fatally frost-bitten. Nor should there be prejudice against those restless souls who have flown up to the last layer of the rarefied ether of thought, or even those who have dived to the bottom of seas of filth or degradation, or explored the last dim subterranean corridors of human instinct, passion, emotion and dream.

We dare not, if we would retain the stature of man, insulate ourselves from any record of human experience or close our minds against any authentic data of consciousness which represents a living, moving, advancing, scouting force in the universe. The glory and the dignity of man are best expressed in precisely the attitude of *spurning insulation*, spurning the closed mind; and indeed also in welcoming precisely such adventurings by odd members of humanity to test the limits and scope of our human cognizance. I am aware that some of those calling themselves humanists have turned rather too critically upon such vagabonds of the human spirit as Verlaine, Baudelaire, De Quincey, Whitman, Poe, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Huxley, D. H. Lawrence, Sherwood Anderson, Cabell, etc. But this repudia-

tion is far from necessary to any humanistic philosophy, even though it may be advisable to point out how unsound for humanity are the philosophies of these men. Professor Woodberry, himself a greatly loved humanist, has said that *there is always an ideality of human spirit in all of its works*; and when he said "all" he meant all.

We must not insulate ourselves against anything human. That is fundamental to any dignity for man, or to any hope for a philosophy that is worthy of that dignity. To argue that man must either insulate himself from knowledge with prejudices or myths or ignorance, or else fatally expose himself to the despair and cynicism of a philosophy of meaninglessness, is entirely to miss the saving middle ground, the golden mean, the sense of measure and proportion which is the foundation of humanism; the keystone of the arch of that humanistic philosophy which as now becomes clear, is the *truest* philosophy, as the Greeks well knew. It is the truest because it represents the central nucleus of value, even though it may extend friendly tentacles in all directions to test new experience. That philosophy is dead which has not such outstretching tentacles, such friendly relationships with individual philosphical adventure; that philosophy is dying which will not move the central nucleus to new positions when the tentacles have found and tested such superior positions. Humanistic philosophy is *live* philosophy, not inert insensibility.

As Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University says, "the insulated life is the selfish, self-centered, the narrow, and sooner or later the embittered life." If the common people have foolishly insulated themselves from life by myths and prejudices, so also have many of the semi-educated insulated themselves from the work-aday life of the world; despising religion, despising all but

some forms or cults of art, despising mechanism and science, despising industry, despising democracy, etc., while glorifying every impulse and appetite they had, unfiltered through any measure, undisciplined by any standard. Naturally, they are embittered today, for they have separated themselves disdainfully from the central nucleus of human values. They are limbs floating helplessly through space, fatally separated from their place on the humanistic trunk. As President Butler has further defined suicidal insulation:

"Narrowness of knowledge, narrowness of sympathy, narrowness of understanding, narrowness of conviction are the marks of the insulated life from which there is no escape save over the bridge which liberal education builds. That bridge leads to those fields of perennial wisdom which are the coveted resting place of the thoughtful in every age. It leaves behind that world of illusions which the insulated man calls facts, while so often entirely and blissfully unconscious of that world of realities which he derides as ideas.

"Seek in season and out of season for the path to that bridge over which you may pass happily and proudly from living to life. *There are comparatively few men and women alive in the world, although there are hundreds of millions of living human beings.*"

7. **Passing From Mere Living to Life.**—We have now surveyed the desolation of the Century of Man's Deflation, and know that we have no desire to live among its ruins, first because we are convinced that truth does not reside there, and second because to linger in such desolation would be a living death, even if truth did happen to claim its habitation there. We distinctly wish to build that bridge from mere living *to life*; also from a living death to life. We

see on the one side of us vast numbers of those sodden people who are not alive, and we see on the other side a small but somewhat well-advertised number of people who are suffering a living death of "disillusionment," "despair" and "futility." Both appear to wallow and even to luxuriate in their positions; and we can see that both offer miserably inadequate guides for humanity. Their philosophies are perfectly legitimate and even valuable data for study, but humanity wants a philosophy *nearer the bone of truth; nearer the needs of human life.*

Obviously, then, we must build a bridge between the two extremes, buttressing the left side against one extreme, and the right side against the other. With humanistic skill we may create a *central position* on this bridge by means of which either side can escape the cruel logic of extremes. Via this bridge traffic can move in two prophylactic directions and tend to cluster upon that central position, taking happy refuge there, with just pride in the crafts and arts of man which made the bridge possible. As the bee makes its honeycomb, the beaver its dam and the eagle its nest, so humans must construct the bridge necessary for them to pass from sheer organic existence and the cruelties of nature in the raw, over to the forms and patterns which are the highest stamps of the human genius. This task of compromising both with nature and with man's intuition in order to have a distinctive life is what the humanist considers of first importance.

The two extremes on either side of the humanist (supernaturalism and naturism) may significantly be tested by this principle of compromise. The one makes *every* compromise, the other *no* compromise; and the two extremes meet on the plane of intolerance and disbalance. Those masses who are "not alive," who merely exist as organisms

to eat, sleep, accumulate, propagate and placate their fears with ready-made superstitions (the supernaturalist or "fundamentalists" so-called), are easy compromisers, and have no intellectual standards or disciplines for their emotions, except to insulate them from ideas. They compromise every objective test; they make easy, superstitious answers to all problems that should challenge their minds; they do not permit their attention or interest to stray far from food and shelter, physical satisfactions and immediate, obvious, sensory facts or literal ideas. When they do let their minds stray, it is only to a fairyland contrived to pander to their emotional desires. Skepticism and the critical mind and the world of ideas are almost unknown to them.

On the other hand the extremists of the opposite variety, the naturists, are ridden by an inexorable critical urge and abhor any compromise. They vow they will follow truth, if necessary, out of the window into the abyss, and this is precisely what they do. Although having finite minds, they roam out into the far spaces. Deserting the limits of their specialized knowledge, deserting even the scientific method to which some profess allegiance, they make assumptions on a truly grand and infinite scale—but insist on pasting on them the label of that scientific method which they have, as a matter of fact, deserted. Disdainful of the silly brooms which the supernaturalists use to sweep back the great sea of ideas, these extremists boldly plunge in and drown themselves in this fathomless ocean of ideas, knowing no stroke with which to swim in it, and indeed distrustful of the compromise which the very act of swimming represents! The only reaction they will permit themselves is to make graceful gestures and cries of despair and futility as the vast waters engulf them. They go to their watery graves well satisfied at having made no com-

promises. And out of these gestures and cries they would fabricate a philosophy!

To those on the shore, alike unimpressed by those who would fatuously sweep back the oncoming sea by means of mystic rites, or those who would fatalistically drown in it, there seems an obvious middle course, a simple humanistic alternative, and that is *to build a boat to ride the sea.* The builders of such a boat will most certainly be compelled to take notice of common earthly facts and materials, as well as the world of abstract ideas. They will make a synthesis of them by combining these materials in a manner that will compromise with both of them; with the physical nature of wood, the power of water, the weather and the inexorability of the abstract law of gravity.

Precisely so, in principle, do we pass from living to life, via the humanistic philosophy, by bridge or boat, constructed by the arts and skills of man, bringing together both the world of pure idea and the world of immediate fact. In this construction there is a harmony attained between man's dignity, man's knowledge, man's hopes, man's dreams, man's needs, man's faculties, man's environment. And if into that boat we also built the compass of sound philosophy, there may be attained genuine direction toward realizable and stimulating goals; in other words "the good life."

8. The Middle Position of Humanism—Between Naturism and Supernaturalism.—With perhaps an excess of figurative speech we have seen what is, in principle, the present position in regard to a philosophy of life; seen how loudly it calls for terminating the intolerable dominance of extremes. We have purposely refrained from naming specific beliefs and specific philosophies because only in this way would it become most logically clear how much needed

is an *integrating* movement, a middle position which will draw strength from both extremes, adjust to a wide range of humanistic facts and ideas, and thus reach a higher standard of tested, workable truth.

There are others than humanists who see the destructive effects of the extremes. Hugh l'Anson Fausset, in his recent *The Proving of Psyche,* points out how the age-old tug-of-war between the "romantic" philosophy (which too selfishly indulges sensations and emotions) and the "classical" philosophy (which sets up too many restraints) is responsible for a vicious oscillation, or constant swinging of the pendulum from one to the other. *Thought encroaches on feeling,* with the result *that feeling strikes back at thought,* and so the ceaseless duel goes on. History is full of it; the face of human thought, art and religion is scarred with it.

Humanism, as a philosophy, shorn of some of its fringes, is a middle position, according to all the men who have espoused it, and according to all the great men who have lived it. It conceives itself as separating from the Fundamentalists or "supernaturalists," on the one hand, and from the "naturists" or "romanticists" on the other hand. But we must define these terms before we proceed further. By Fundamentalist or supernaturalist are meant all those people who, in any form, or with whatever subtlety, have set up a philosophy of life based on the pronouncements, laws, rites, regulations, or standards supposed to have been handed down arbitrarily by any unearthly, supernatural Creator or Supreme Being. This includes all sects and cults of "revealed" religion, and includes philosophies which claim certain infallible, fixed and mysterious truth, methods, morals, procedures or authority, held as "sacred." This is rather broad—but it does not include the agnostic or skeptical attitude, nor the conception of

God as an abstract principle of unity or intelligence ruling or guiding the universe by natural law.

By naturist or romanticist are meant all those who have built a certain unrestrained, completely self-indulgent philosophy upon the atheistic attitude in any form. Such an attitude starts by regarding the universe as a jungle of matter without order or unity or meaning; and man as a contemptuously unimportant chemical accident upon an infinitesimal planet spinning around a small sun in a minor galactic system of stars in one corner of a universe. The "naturists" include, like the supernaturalists, a large variety of cults and groups, from Romanticists to hard-boiled, unimaginative and cynical scientists. The Romanticists are lineal descendants of Jean Jacques Rousseau, who centuries ago set Europe agog by proclaiming sentimentally that man's every instinct, impulse and feeling are good, and that if man were allowed to follow them as spontaneously and unrestrainedly as the bee follows honey, man would expand into angelic goodness. He would do only good deeds and think only kind thoughts. Professor Irving Babbitt, famed protagonist of humanism, in his *Rousseau and Romanticism,* has grilled this naive naturistic philosophy to a brown turn. Man, most assuredly, does not become angelic under an absence of all restraints; this the world at large seems now ready to admit.

The more modern "naturists" show much greater subtlety than Rousseau. They have freely granted the animal baseness of many, if not most, human impulses—as indeed they are forced to do after the revelations of both experience and of the new psychology. Not even Cotton Mather or Jonathan Edwards—famous fire-and-brimstone preachers of New England—ever surpassed the psychoanalysts in showing man full of "original sin." They

depict man as a powerful baboon, with a baboon's appetites and impulses, rages and ruthlessness—held precariously in check only by a weak and inattentive censor, entirely incompetent to prevent the baboon from ordering the human brain and will around as if they were office boys. The "naturists" simply say, "Well, what of it?" and proceed on the Rousseau formula, urging man to "be himself" and to use no restraints and accept no limitations upon his impulses. They even take literary delight in listening in on what thoughts and words the baboon puts into the human brain, in an incoherent "stream of consciousness" by which they really mean *unconsciousness*.

Slowly, in one division after another, these naturists have acted as a spear head to break down old restraints, in conduct, in moderations of every sort, in public and private morals, in all forms of reverence, love, respect, nobility, patriotism or sentiment. This attack mounted in fervor until it became a rout in favor of absolute license, with only sneers and epithets for those who urged measure and proportion. A super-extreme of this view is to incline toward contempt and disbelief in everything as it is now constituted, and give allegiance only to some mythical state of perfection still to come. It is so easy to argue for an unborn but perfect Utopia!

Briefly sketched for our purposes here, these are the two specific extremes of philosophy. Altogether, as we have noted, they are equally undesirable. The true humanist, at this very point, shows his form, his superior poise and discrimination. *He sympathizes with both.* In each extreme he recognizes values which are precious. If he discovers that he is violently opposed or strongly attracted to either one of these two extremes, he may be sure that he is as yet an imperfect humanist, and perhaps will never

become one. Humanism, we must repeat, is a middle position, a wise filching of values, both from the naturist position on one side and from the supernatural position on the other.

They both have much to give to a poised humanist. The supernatural position can contribute a more genuine understanding of religion, which is a persistently abused word. So few people really comprehend that the central essence of religion is *attitude toward human importance and destiny; sense of human direction, human hope and dream, sense of communication with or understanding of the great forces of the universe.* Defined thus, there are no people, not even atheists, without religion. Religion is a living necessity and an ineradicable accompaniment of consciousness and life. The cursing gangster, the church-wrecking Russian Communist, the narrow, miserly profiteer, the Malay pirate, the painted Zulu and the cynical scientist—all have a religion or philosophy (their appraisal and faith in certain values, their outlook on life and destiny, whatever these may be). The supernaturalist has dealt with religion; he knows its mass needs, its comforts and its soothings, its assurances that man really matters in the universe. He knows its mechanisms and its alphabets of meaning, over the long centuries of man's use and abuse of it. *In all this there are certain real values to salvage.*

On the other hand, the naturist position has even more to contribute, for it has in it more that is consistent with a free and dynamic age. It can instil more courage to be ourselves, to attain individuality and personality by reducing *(but not abolishing)* our inhibitions. It can widen our perspectives and round out our experience, enlarge our human sympathy, insight and understanding. It can make us more humble when we contemplate the vastness of the

universe, and note our subjection to laws as science discloses them—but it need not demean us to a par with the mere dust and cinders of the stars.

These, and many more, are the values which the humanist *in the middle position* can take for himself from the lower and the higher positions on each side of him.

9. Common Sense as the Mediator Between Emotions and the Mind.—For reasons just outlined, it seems obvious to many of us that humanism is *the great answer* to the need of most of us for a philosophy of life. *It appeals to common sense;* and if we are in the habit of slurring common sense, let it be recalled that genius has also been analyzed by psychologists as in reality common sense, i.e., a high level of general intelligence—except possibly in the case of such genius as depends almost exclusively on the emotions. *The great need today is for a philosophy which satisfies the mind as well as the emotions;* for a philosophy that will end the mad oscillations from thought-predominance to feeling-predominance; that will marry the pair in a genuine union.

In fact the bankruptcy of old philosophies has been due largely to the conflict for dominance between the emotions and the mind. To the humanist this conflict is unnecessary and destructive. As human beings we have *both* emotions and a mind, and we want and need a philosophy which takes ample heed of both. Our new knowledge of psychology certainly gives us warning that any attempt at "pure" intellectualism is likely to result in nonsense, since the mind is ruled so definitely by emotion. Whereas the mind was once regarded as a masterly, godlike, independent thinking machine, it is now conclusively shown to us how glands, sex, instinct, inheritance and emotions so invariably color and warp and dominate our thinking. We *must* com-

promise with emotion in our thinking; but we *must* also make every endeavor to sift out, balance and neutralize emotional prejudice, fear, desire and bias from our mental operations if we are to attain truth. What then is left for us except to apply a humanistic technique? How else can a balance be obtained except by establishing an intermediary factor of liberalized, wide-perspectived, tolerant but disciplined common sense, a counterpoise which represents our *whole* need; which is but another way of saying our *humanistic* need!

The *general* humanistic target has now been set up; a general direction for human philosophy; the *middle position instead of the extremes,* has been indicated. If it does not seem a novel, elaborate or magical formula, that is because human beings seek radical change and strong contrasts. This love of strong contrast is precisely what has caused the pendulum to swing so violently. Those in an age of utter romantic license want to swing to the *opposite* extreme if they tire of their own extreme. To stop at a middle position always seems to them, at the time, to be too cautious or too tame. They secure a thrill out of their fast toboggan slide, over to the other side, so the romantic becomes the ascetic; or *vice versa.* The excess of motion always drives quickly toward extremism on the opposite side and starts a reaction once more in the other direction. In our day this oscillation has become so hectic that we do not wait for a new "era"—*each new generation* swings away from the extreme of the previous generation. There is a consequent deplorable lack of permanency of values.

We have weighed this insanity of mere motion and oscillation, and found it miserably wanting. We see the vast superiority of the middle position, or a near-middle position, since perfection and complete exactitude are not

human, and therefore not even desirable. We must not delude ourselves with an abstract figure of speech into believing that we can bring the pendulum to perfect rest in the middle position. That is death. But if perfect rest in a mathematically perfect middle is death by inanition, then violent oscillation is equally certain death by explosion and unbearable vibration. As a seer has said about the best choice of a mate, the pair must not be too different, nor too alike. In either case, destructive forces at once set to work. The humanistic position for the happiest and most fruitful marriage, as for the happiest and most fruitful philosophy, is the middle position.

The philosophies we have known have nearly all been marked by the absence of such equipoise. The intellectualists built Hegelian "absolutes" and Spencerian "altruisms" in the past and equally unhuman cults in the present. The supernaturalists limited both mind and emotion to an inhuman degree, for "heavenly" purposes, and were successful so long as the human mind was not energetic and restive. The pupils of Rousseau followed anywhere impulse led—but always in an earthly instead of a heavenly direction. The swings of the pendulum of philosophy have thus ever been from asceticism to indulgence, from distinctly intellectual to distinctly emotional, from supernatural to natural. It could never rest at either of these positions, because they were both unhuman, lacking equilibrium, lacking concordance with life. It was as if a man had tried to wear a suit of clothes many sizes too small for him, and then on being irked and uncomfortable had torn it off and gone defiantly naked, as his only other alternative. Common sense would suggest that a suit of clothes *which fitted him* be made. In this way humanistic common sense builds a philosophy that fits and that serves as a mediator between the mind and

the emotions, between dream and reality, between the abstract and the concrete—between the hope and the realizable. Humanism provides the great answer to man's first questioning. To his query, "Where is truth?" it replies, "*In an equipoise between man's nature and man's dream; between men's clay feet and men's gods.*" Even if man cannot strike this target with mathematical exactitude, nevertheless it *is* the target of truth for his aim, and it makes aimlessness forever an outlaw.

III

The "Inner Check" as a Key Principle

It should be clear to any one that if the all-important task, as we have seen, is to develop a philosophy of life which draws nearer to a middle position and avoids the meaningless insanity of extremes, then it is necessary for a human being to apply a kind of engineering control or rudder. You cannot stop violent fluctuation without a "governor." Until a "governor" mechanism was placed on a steam engine it ran wild and the invention was useless, as it tended to go so fast that it stalled itself and almost stopped altogether. The same old alternation of extremes!

The "inner check" is a name given by the leader of the humanists, Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard, to this necessary principle as it relates to man, and it is as good a term as any to distinguish that indispensable element of restraint and measure which must be present in any pattern representing anything but chaos.

10. Psychology Discovers the "Censor."—This re-

straint or "inner check" is no invented myth or stupid doctrine of fear, or Sunday-School superintendent's moral law. It is a scientific fact in life. Nature crudely instils it into all living things through the device of *fear* and the herd instinct, and only in this way does nature succeed in making any living patterns that have coherence and character. All savages and all peoples discover and use some law of measure and discipline of restraint. It is an indispensable condition of survival; but in man it has been developed far beyond anything nature knows, and it represents the tremendous separation of man from the rest of nature.

The psychoanalysts, in their remarkable delvings into the unexplored regions of the human mind, have found there in daily operation the principle of the governor or "censor" as they call it. The most graphic and simple method of describing it is this: imagine a ship in whose hold are confined many monsters, serpents and strange, even hideous, living things. They represent the unconscious or instinctive elements of life; brutish, selfish, unruly, horrific forces. They are striving with all their great strength to push open the hatchway on the deck, *where consciousness exists*, and to rule life from that vantage-point. Often they do escape for a short time and wreak great damage—murder, anger, bestiality or lesser expressions of the reactions of the lower nature. As a rule they are quickly recaptured and pushed down into the hold again. If they manage to overpower the forces on deck, then insanity ensues, and fears and wild oscillations reduce the human being to a pitiable state, actually lower than the animals.

Now, the guardian of that hatchway on that ship is naturally the crucial, key factor of its successful operation. Indeed the very existence of the hatchway, and the power and care with which it is guarded, represent some of the

most highly significant scientific facts in our new knowledge. There is no stronger argument for humanism than the fact that nature herself has established a rudimentary central control mediating between lower and higher. The humanist has sometimes been regarded as hostile to the findings of the new psychology, but this is an error. The humanist actually has reason to be grateful to the psychoanalysts *for producing more or less scientific proof of an inner check, or internal censor.* The inner check is an absolute key principle of the humanist's philosophy of life. He knows —as we know, in view of the two previous chapters—of what crucial importance it is, if we are not to have a miserable, insane chaos produced by an inattentive or absent censor at the hatchways on the human ship. The pythons and slimy monsters of unrestrained naturism will lock grips with the finest forces of our consciousness, and the ship will careen and teeter destructively from side to side with the struggle; will sink or arrive nowhere.

The human being becomes *inhuman* the moment the internal censor is vanquished. As Walter Lippmann says, Freud and his collaborators "are engaged in profound and painstaking research into the problem at the very heart of humanism," namely the matter of the "censor" or "inner check." The psychoanalysts, like some other scientists, sometimes make too sweeping claims for their findings, but on the whole they are of major importance to the humanist who wants to know the human mind and spirit in the light of truth rather than of dogma.

11. Understanding the "Tensions" of Life.—Apparently all life is a matter of *tension,* or strain between two points or two forces. This tension exists everywhere, between the negative and positive elements of electricity, between chemical atoms, between stars and their planets

and between entire parts of the universe. As Count Keyserling has pointed out, a state of tension even between two people in love is the inevitable and normal thing, *for love is a tension in itself.* As soon as there is no more tension of any kind or degree, there is no more love. There are three possible emotional attitudes: (1) attraction, (2) repulsion, (3) indifference. These are also the three possible magnetic or chemical attitudes, and thus the entire universe, from electron to star, appears constantly to be in a state of tension, with a very considerable degree of stability created and maintained by the balance of forces, but with change constantly going on as the conflicting tensions become too strong or too weak, and new rearrangements then take place.

The human being is no exception to these laws; indeed he is the highest known expression of them. He represents a vast congeries of tensions, most of which he knows nothing about. The tensions he feels most are at the very center of his consciousness; his relation to his environment, to other human beings, to his dreams, to his appetites, instincts and urges.

The "inner check" or internal censor are phrases which describe the direction of the flow of this tension. If the tension is between man's lower appetites, instincts and urges, and his dream of himself; or if it represents the oft-recurring duel *between emotion and reason,* then the inner check will operate either to relax and indulge his reason or to suppress his emotion, or *vice versa.* If you see another man berate his wife, and experience a feeling of taut muscles and gritting teeth, it means that you would like to step in and deliver an angry blow to the miscreant. But, instead of doing so, you have tightened down the hatchway; the instinctive angers and urges which pushed up fiercely

in you were given the "inner check." Reason overcame emotion; your imagination may have recalled to you in time the De Maupassant story of the man who interfered in such a situation, only to have the abused wife turn on him fiercely as he punished the brute husband for her sake!

Thus always exist states of tension between opposing forces within yourself, or between yourself as a unit and your environment or other individuals or your dreams. The tension is simply the pressure on the hatchway, downward and upward. Such tensions are perfectly healthy and absolutely inevitable; it is the quality and wisdom of the "inner check," the measure and flexibility of its control, which are all-important. The "inner check" is the real you; the real arbiter of your personality, your sanity, your worth; the real expression of your philosophy of life, the real factor in your development. Give us—if such a thing were possible!—a diagram of any person's "inner check," and we might readily undertake to provide a complete reading of all that he is or hopes to be; his age, his sex, the degree of his sanity, the measure of his mind, perhaps even his nationality, the color of his skin, the period of time he lived in. So crucial is the test of the "inner check." *It is a philosophy of life in action.*

12. **Direction and the "Inner Check."**—When Einstein proclaimed not long ago that he believed the factor of *direction* was going to provide him with the final key to his hoped-for crowning achievement, that of uniting the laws of gravity with those of electro-magnetism, and thus finally unifying all human knowledge, he gave high importance to a word which is also extremely significant in human philosophy.

The operation of an "inner check" is meaningless without a sense of direction. It would be mere "restraint for

restraint's sake," which is one of the epithets now swung against humanism by its critics. But this is nonsense, for the humanist recognizes fully that direction is the very reason for the existence and use of an "inner check." For millions of years nature in her slow evolutionary march upward operated her elementary "inner check," the fear mechanism, which she implanted as an instinct in all living things. This represented as much direction as there was, until man used his individual reason and the elaborate subtleties of human intuition. It was an unthinkably wasteful process, but it produced the *type*, however careless it was of the *individual*. Life on the plane below the human has very little if any sense of direction, because it is life on the instinctive or herd plane. *"Instincts have no aims,"* President Arthur E. Morgan of Antioch College says; and he adds:

"The object of an instinctive act is to satisfy a craving, not to promote a more distant aim. An animal eats by reflex, or to satisfy a craving for eating or for food, but not consciously to sustain life. Under uniform environment, long continued, as with sea fishes, adjustment may become so complete that instinct is a nearly perfect guide to action. In rapidly changing or complex environments, instinct may thwart ends it once served. With modern skill in cooking, appetite for food may destroy health. In present society, ungoverned sex instinct may bring race suicide. In the range and complexity of modern life, the herd instinct is a wholly inadequate guide to conduct. Unless directed and controlled by intelligence, it may be a terrific force for thwarting human purpose.

"Thoroughly understood and mastered, the herd instinct is a powerful aid to the fulfillment of human hopes. Followed blindly, it may wreck life; resisted blindly, we

fight needlessly against forces we should direct and use. If it is smothered in our own lives, we lose interest in social living and impede social endeavors.

"If we understand its power, its blindness, and its need for guidance by critical and reflective intelligence, we may escape being caught in its wild currents and may be helped to direct it so that it will energize our constructive efforts."

13. The Gulf Between Man and Other Living Things. —Thus we come upon the vital humanistic truth that man is now separated from the rest of nature by a vast gulf. He has developed a highly organized sense of direction, wholly exceptional in nature. It is operated by the will, the intuitions, the dreams of individuals who separate themselves from the herd, and after dreaming, lead the herd to follow in the direction they have dreamed. These dreams may be prophecy, intuition, revelation, song, story, picture, thought, research or works which are different from what the aimless herd has known. But not too different; hence the supreme importance of the humanistic law of measure and proportion. An Einstein in ancient Assyria would not only have been impossible but also utterly ineffective. History is full of the deeds of heroes, artists, singers, thinkers and doers, but there has always been a measurable distance, often a close one, between the leader and the herd, enabling mankind slowly to pyramid human knowledge. Thus man has acquired direction for his philosophies, and his herds have evolved into civilizations of an increasingly man-made character, with an ever-mounting degree of direction, and an increasing speed in following these directions. The American civilization of today, which, on the authority of André Siegfried, is rapidly spreading "the American Age" throughout the world, has a very decisive direction and a still more decisive speed.

These are plainly due to the amazing facility of intercommunication of every kind which we have developed, between leader and herd. The herd in America is notoriously easy to teach, within the limited lines of its general direction. Advertising, radio, newspaper and magazine, railways, telephone, automobile, airplane, all are startling multipliers of communication with the "herd." The gulf between man and other living things has thus become more utterly immeasurable and imponderable than ever.

This is the basis of the "dualism" which is one of the foundations of the humanistic philosophy; the basis of the idea that law *for "thing"* is not adequate as law *for man.* In man spirit and will and consciousness are enormously active and dynamic in an absolutely unique and complex form of organization. There is nothing in nature that microscope or telescope can find which is even remotely similar. It would appear possible and even probable that we represent the development of that particular tiny fraction of the matter of the universe, which—as Heisenberg and Compton have demonstrated—partially breaks away from "natural law" and exhibits independent will.

14. **The Creative Use of the "Inner Check."**—In any event, intuitively and practically speaking, we are co-creators in the universe, and not inert, dumb, driven matter. This being the case we undoubtedly contain within ourselves intuitively the power to shape and form, design and recreate; the very first necessities of which are that we as artists be greater than the clay upon which we work; and that we have the will to refrain, the sense of proportion necessary to apply measure—more here, less there; firm here, softer there. The "inner check" is the very badge and instrument of our supremacy over other objects in the world.

The "inner check" is not necessarily a prejudiced censor in the spirit of a human being, applying only arbitrary decorums, prudishly rejecting this, gleefully selecting that. The "inner check," rightly conceived in the true humanistic sense, is the creation of a truly individual pattern of character. Its rejections and acceptances may accord with a matrix of aesthetics and fastidiousness which admits of an almost infinite range of individual differences. It is the principle of selectivity and pattern that counts, not any particular arbitrary standard set-up. No man's "inner check" should be so weak and inactive that he drifts and overflows in any and every direction, indulgently experimenting every which way. He fares better when he places himself in a course set by conscious standards which have a valid humanistic relation to life, to his nature and needs, to society's needs, to his own intuition to tradition and racial experience, and to the philosophical wisdom of the ages.

When he fails he is often mere flotsam and jetsam upon a Sargasso sea. The humanist regards this as a philosophyless existence. He does not believe in what the naturists call the philosophy of experimentalism, trial and error, flux and change. As well believe, he says, in the efficacy of sailing orders to a captain which say, "Drift along, change your course often, try every wind and follow every mirage you see." The "experimental" view of life, which asks that the "inner check" be latched wide open in order to "see what happens," is like setting the ship on fire to see whether you are clever enough to put it out before the ship is destroyed along with you.

The humanist conception of the "inner check," however, is no stuffy, cautious, negative, mincing method of meeting life. It is *a creative instrument for growth,* as

Gilbert Murray makes clear, speaking of the internal censor:

"The most interesting thing that they—the psychologists—have proved is the actual existence of this Censor and all that his existence implies. The suppressions and disguises of which they speak so much are only his failures: *they form the fringe of a much greater and more effective activity, rejecting, conquering, sublimating, or compelling change.* And the very fact that a Censor within us does wish to reject certain things—however ineffectively he may sometimes do it—is of great psychological importance. It proves that there is, deeply implanted from time immemorial in man's nature, this instinctive determination *not to be content with oneself as one is,* but somehow to be cleaner and higher; to suppress and reduce to nothingness the sort of things that drag one down, and to concentrate attention and effort on the higher parts of one's being."

Professor Rufus M. Jones of Haverford College has said: "We are quite willing to be told that we are curiously carved pieces of the earth's crust, or strange dust-wreath vortexes, if we may add to the account *the something more which we know we are.* The whirling dust-wreaths of the street do not have longings. The bits of earth-crust which we throw about with our shovel do not yearn for what is not and then forthwith construct it."

It should be quite clear from this how the exercise of the "inner check" is indeed, as Professor Babbitt claims, *the supreme act of humanity;* the finest flower of man's achievement. It is, when used on important matters, man's first truly creative exercise of choice, his first act that is not a mere following of the herd or the mere reaction of fear. It is as noble a gesture, in principle, as the drinking of the hemlock by Socrates, or the acceptance of the cross by

Christ, or the steadfastness of Bruno in the flames. We are not here conceiving the "inner check" in the paltry light that some critics have tried to throw upon it—as a mere puritanical "no" to every impulse toward joy or passion or indecorum. We are conceiving it as it is meant by the humanist to be conceived—as the application of an individualized scale of measure and standard to the innumerable sensations, impulses, ideas and acts which crowd upon the internal censor in a mighty, engulfing flood. Whatever may be the nature of the choice or standard, *if it is truly a measure, applied with the principle of proportion, and with the exercise of restraint upon chaotic extremes,* then it is a humanistic "inner check" such as we are considering. It is man, individual man, carving his signature upon an act of creation; stamping his pattern upon life, giving forth his fiat and his decree, shaping his destiny consciously. In such a rôle, and in such a rôle alone, is man godlike. In any other rôle he is either a mere unit in a herd or a mere leaf upon the waves.

IV

What Shall be Final Authority?

The very statement of this question brings to the mind's eye the endless gallery of men's gods, from the Seeing Eye of the savage chief to Krishna, Shiva, the Sun gods, the Mountain gods, the bearded Jehovahs, the spirit of Manitou and the gods of thunder and lightning. God has "mounted the storm and walked upon the wind," as Pope said; or, as Plato put it, "God is truth and light his shadow." A philosophy of life may not need a God in the old sense of the term, but it needs *a final authority*. In this sense Voltaire was right when he said that if there were no God, it would be necessary to invent one. Without a point of reference, nothing can be located; but relativity warns us that we must not be too dogmatic about our points of reference.

How does the humanist philosophy approach this crucial question? Where does the humanist obtain his authority? The answer marks the crossroad where the humanist parts

company with a great many people, for, as has already been indicated, he chooses the middle one of the three roads, each of which beckon him at a crucial crossroad. He will not take (1) the strictly supernatural road, because he finds it attended with too much divinity, with too many roadside shrines, calling for too many arbitrary genuflections. Nor will he take (2) the naturistic road, because he finds it a hopeless one, winding and doubling back on itself in cryptic fashion, leading nowhere. He chooses (3) the humanistic road.

15. Science and Humanism.—The humanist means to get somewhere, and to do so he *puts trust in man.* The road he wants is made for man, not man for the road. The road is engineered by man for the use to which it will be put. It is solid underfoot instead of miry with too much theology. It is a fair, straight road, not a "flux and change" road, snaking all over the countryside at whim and will, only to lose itself. The humanists have surveyed this road, and their reference points of authority are science and intuition, with intuition ascendent, whenever science has only dispute to offer. Science is after all only a technique of certitude invented by man, and not a god to be worshiped. It is therefore silly for any intelligent person, humanist or otherwise, to argue against the well-authenticated findings of science, for he is merely repudiating his own reason. But science, as such, can make no pretensions in philosophy or meanings, or in destiny. It enables man with his spectroscope to discover helium gas in the sun twenty-five years before it is discovered on the earth, but it does not tell where helium came from or where it is going, or why it exists at all. It cannot answer man's question how to be happy or what values he shall choose or reject. It is certainly no final authority; it is only *a methodology.* The fact that man's

reason has unraveled the secrets of many of nature's combinations of atoms and contrived many cunning applications of nature's laws of matter is a splendid confirmation of the humanists' claim that man is very important and unique and has a high destiny. If a man makes a wonderful tool (science), the remarkable thing is not the tool *but the maker of the tool*, and the qualities he uses in the shaping of his creations.

Because the humanist objects to Science as God, hasty critics have called him antagonistic to science, but this is distinctly absurd. Humanism is critical only when we neglect the toolmaker in our obsession over the tool. It is antagonistic only to such claims for science as even cautious scientists themselves would repudiate; for true scientists are the acme of humility, knowing both by experience and by principle that today's scientific assertion may be rendered obsolete tomorrow, as witness the supposedly immutable laws of physics according to Isaac Newton, now basically altered by Albert Einstein. There is apparently no final authority, no everlasting certitude, even for the "scientific" findings of physics, chemistry or electricity.

Man's tool of reason, science, can only continue its labors in a true scientific spirit of humility and inquiry, led by the hand of human intuition and reason. How absurd then to look to "science" for final authority. It is only looking to man's organized reason; and greatly as we must cherish reason, we need more than reason for our final authority when logic and the laboratory have no more answers that are indisputable.

16. **Intuition as the Real Final Authority.**—Emotion, as well as reason, must be considered in the equation called for by an adequate philosophy of life. *But not undisciplined emotion.* Side by side on the throne of the human mind

sit two kings, emotion and reason. Like man and wife they are mutually complementary and necessary to each other's completion. It is as idle to argue which shall rule as to argue whether man or wife is the most important. Emotion which is undisciplined is as poor and dangerous a guide as reasoning which is illogical or biased. Both reason and emotion are of many degrees of power, penetration and complexity. On the side of emotion when disciplined, are rare qualities, such as imagination, intuition, insight. They are perhaps the most mysterious and remarkable of all human qualities, and the humanist believes that they set man above nature, together with human will and consciousness. The humanist does not feel that it is possible to explain them in terms of matter, and he insists that they be rated exceedingly high. *Indeed he insists upon intuition as the final authority, the final arbiter after other faculties have no more to offer to human need.*

The humanist will not squat down despairingly on his road when it comes to an end in a desert, and when science or reason have no more maps to offer. He insists on going on, following his intuition. Never would Columbus or Stanley or Vasca da Gama or Peary or Lindbergh or Byrd have arrived at their goals had they heeded reason only, for their intuitions were more valuable to them than their reason, highly though they rated reason, so far as it could go. Intuition is, naturally, a very subtle thing, since it is poised between man's nature and man's dreams. In simpler and more pastoral days it was called "the still, small voice," but that phrase has now only a moralistic meaning, whereas we are out after far bigger game in our humanistic philosophy than mere conformance to some fixed code of conduct. That is why Professor Babbitt says of the inner check that "the final appeal of the humanist is not to any historical

convention but to *intuition*." This is the only Almighty which the humanist recognizes—but certainly it is for this reason no enemy to any religion or convention or precept. In the words of Don Marquis—

> "For all of the creeds are false and all of the creeds are true
> And low at the shrines where my brothers bow, there
> will I bow, too;
> For no form of god, and no fashion
> Man has made in his desperate passion
> But is worthy some worship of mine;
> Not too hot with a gross belief
> Not yet too cold with pride
> I will bow me down where my brothers bow
> Humble, but open-eyed."

Not even the scientist can quarrel with the humanist when he sets up intuition as his final authority, since intuition does not endeavor to displace reason in matters which are within reason's capabilities. Professor Joseph Needham of Cambridge University in his new book *The Skeptical Biologist* says, "If the unification of experience be not possible to reason, it may be to intuition; and I have often thought that in this matter the means may be more important than the completed end."

The enlightened engineer, as a rule, takes much the same view. When he has exhausted all the mathematics and the technical knowledge possible to use upon a problem, the great engineer invariably says, "We will now throw aside our slide-rules and use our intuition, because the engineering of new or large projects, when you arrive at the borders of our exact knowledge, is an art as well as a science, and the engineer with the best intuition wins." Even the greatest mathematician, Einstein, says, "I am of the opinion that all the finer speculations in the realm of

science spring from a deep religious feeling. . . . The intuitive and constructive faculties must come into play whenever a body of scientific truth is concerned. To build it up and understand it you must bring into play the constructive faculties of the artist. . . . I find it of the highest importance to bring all the faculties of the understanding into coöperation: our sense of beauty and religious instincts, our moral leanings and tastes are all tributary forces in helping the reasoning faculty toward its highest achievements." Curiously enough, Einstein's new discovery of the unity of electricity and gravity was foreshadowed by the intuition of Faraday a century ago, as has recently been discovered. There is even some ground for believing that intuition may be a high form of reasoning, and, *vice versa*, reasoning a form of intuition.

At any rate the tolerant, the humanistic view, and at the same time the scientific view for the "open-eyed" humanist is not to substitute myth for knowledge or oppose emotion to fact. The humanist simply believes first of all in man and the qualities he finds in man, and he aims to harmonize these qualities with life and zestful, directioned living.

17. "Dualism" and the Tension Between Man and His Ideals.—A distinct and definite (though metaphysical) part of humanism as a philosophy of life is what is known as "dualism," which it prefers to the opposite view, "monism." These are terms philosophers use. The monist regards all nature as one mechanical system, with man and his spirit quite as definitely a part of it as a stone or an ape. Monism not only denies that anything separates man from the stone or the ape but also denies any form of mysticism, trust in intuition, or freedom of will for man.

Dualism is the opposite of this, asserting that man is

now unique in nature; that he has justification for claiming that he senses in some intuitive way something of the realities which lie beyond the curtain of human knowing at present. Dualism insists that the normal state for man is a condition of tension between his higher and lower nature, between his animal inheritance and his ideals or destiny or sense of eternal *worth*. It insists that man's place in the scheme of things is somehow high and noble, and his dignity and importance correspondingly great.

Monism, by identifying man with the merest dust and inert rock, divests man of dignity and special destiny. Dualism, on the other hand, sets up a noble relationship between man and the mysteries of the universe. Both the supernaturalist and the humanist are alike dualists. Man's high estate, under dualism, may be (as for the supernaturalists) a relationship between God and Man, or (as for the humanists) simply a relationship between man's spirit and whatever supreme intelligence or guiding principle there may be in the universe as yet unknown to man. In either case, the person espousing dualism guides his life by means of the tension he sets up between his nature and his ideals or mystic vision of himself in relation to a directive intelligence, or the Unknown. It may be a very slack tension, a mere theoretical point of reference, not given a great deal of objective attention; but in any event it serves very decidedly to set value and dignity and significance upon man. Even the "skeptic" or "agnostic" may share this dualism in effect, and accept the special dignity of man. This is the position of many men of science who have no faith in the concept of immortality, or God as usually conceived, or in any precepts of conduct supernaturally revealed. It is for these reasons that among humanists may be found men of all religions as well as agnostics, whereas

those who espouse monism cannot have any mysticism of any kind, or any faith in intuition, because everything in the universe is to them of *one* character, of a machine-like similarity. Dualism claims that there are *two* characters, that some Spirit or Idea or Value or God presides over the machinery of the universe, between which and man spans in some way a definite, even if gossamer, thread of connection.

Some of us humanists go further and say that whatever the ultimate truth may disclose as to whether monism or dualism is the fact, it is decisively to the interest and happiness of man to act, meanwhile, *on the assumption* that a moderate dualism is the truth. There is nothing unscientific in such an attitude; science is constantly using working hypotheses, but of course it does not attempt to regard them as fixed and final truth. The true open-eyed humanist refuses to set any finality upon such a matter, merely insisting that he has set up his intuition as his guide in the realms where science has no certainty to offer, and that his intuition clearly tells him that dualism is a logical and important attitude. As Paul Elmer More, one of the two renowned leaders of humanism, says, dualism appears to be "the inescapable and settled attribute of man's consciousness." He means that it is as natural as breathing for man to feel a special sense of kinship and connection with whatever Godlike essence or purpose there may be. All races of men everywhere have felt it, and the humanist does not believe that this is merely wishful thinking, or worshiping one's own desire, or "escape" psychology.

The humanist has seen even science advance itself with the use of intuition, and while he is perfectly willing to accept any indisputable (therefore scientific) explanation of life and the universe and human destiny, *if and when such*

indisputable data are found, he insists that, until such time, it is more in keeping with common sense to vitalize man's spirit with a dualism which gives him high dignity. He says that one does not show common sense in the case of a child whose parents are unknown as yet, by branding that child as a bastard and a low wretch. It may all be true; there is the possibility that man and the universe have no more meaning than refuse floating out to sea. But what logic, what science is there in setting up such a conclusion? We must be careful to concede to the man who has this bitter intuition about mankind quite as much respect as to the humanist whose intuition tells him otherwise.

There is only this difference: the humanist knows that life itself requires a sense of worth-whileness to nerve its arm; that deprived of this sense, life withers. Therefore he is in no sense taking an easy road, or smugly deluding himself if he subscribes to dualism rather than monism; rather the reverse, for he knows that it is at least as scientific a choice, as wise a philosophy as any other, and, he would insist, wiser. It provides him with a far more comprehensible standard for his exercise of "the inner check" than any philosophy of "flux and change," which distinctly encourages debilitating, chaotic, meaningless reactions which have no pattern or plan, end or aim. To have "flux and change" as a guide is to accept "going somewhere" as a sufficient direction, and mere walking as a destination.

Monism encourages precisely the kaleidoscopic phantasmagoria which has led to the philosophy of futility and hopelessness. It is a negative rather than a positive philosophy, a static rather than a dynamic attitude toward life; and it smells of death and decay. It is not and never has been the philosophy of life *of doers.* To act one must take a position, and advance in a calculated direction; one must

set up a goal and attempt to mold environment; one must row and not drift. As soon as one does this one inevitably sets up a dualistic tension between the flux and chaos of life and the dream-objective. This dream-objective may turn out to be sheer mirage; on the other hand it may turn out to be perfectly visioned truth. In either case it is something mysteriously behind the curtain, beyond the realm of present fact, somewhat beyond the range of reason's cold calculations; and yet man's intuitive faith and man's unrelenting dream, combined with man's action, may transform it into reality, through maintaining steadfastly the dualistic tension and applying the inexhaustible pressure of man's will.

18. Has Man a "Free Will" or Is He a "Robot"?—It is impossible to go far in developing a philosophy of life without running into this question. What meaning is there in man, and what need of a philosophy if everything he does he must do because he is definitely destined to act that way and cannot help it? We must face the query: "Are men merely conglomerations of cogs which revolve and perform according to the iron laws of matter and mechanism, chemistry and electricity, doing what they do because their action is forced on them? Or have they any freedom of will and choice whatsoever?" It is easy to see that if we are all mechanical robots going through our paces in strict obedience to the same law that produces a radish in your garden or that rolls the earth around the sun, a vast deal of human thinking, feeling, acting and dreaming becomes as empty as the sound of waves beating upon a shore.

The monist, of course, is certain that we are robots; wherefore we have the philosophy of endless mechanical flux and change and little meaning. This is the bill of rights of the naturist to sound every depth, curse the world

as a charnel house, and deride the "pretensions" of man. This is the Magna Carta of the futilitarians who regard all philosophies as a babel, all effort as pointless, all ideals as hypocritical, all ambitions as wasteful.

The supernaturalist has equally extreme views. Man is to do the will of a father-like ruler of the universe, as disclosed many centuries ago in precise detail to a few chosen people.

The humanist faces these two extremes with great care and deep thoughtfulness. There is not the slightest question but that man is to a very large degree a machine with automatic reactions, operated by laws. Our appetites, our loves, our reflex actions, and an appaling proportion of our daily activity and feelings are absolutely fixed and predetermined for us by our chemical, electrical, mechanical nature. We are mechanisms, that is certainly true; but are we also something beyond mechanism? It seems exceedingly difficult to escape saying that we are not, for when the mechanism stops we cannot go on, and we must, therefore, admit dependence upon our mechanism. The great philosopher Kant thought that while all this was true of our body, our "soul" was free from the compulsion of the mechanism; but the soul is an abstract assumption and may not really exist at all, for we have not the slightest evidence of it, except an intuitive belief that there is some part of our awareness that is master over instead of slave to our mechanism. This is the "dualistic" position of the humanist, as opposed to the monist, who considers us all pure machinery, despite the dilemma we put him in if we ask why it is that a machine cannot react differently to precisely the same situation at two different times, as a human being can. Or when we remind him that a man can form habits, but that a machine cannot.

We are now, however, coming much closer to a solution of this entire problem, and the chips of truth are falling in the direction of the dualist instead of the monist. The scientists themselves are bringing us to this point, so it cannot be claimed that we dualists are "rationalizing" ourselves into believing that there is an escape from the purely mechanistic view of life. *We do not need to become unscientific in order to be dualists.* This is very important and very welcome news to a sound humanist because a sound humanist is far too sophisticated and has far too high a respect for human reason to align himself with the pseudo-scientists or fundamentalists with closed minds who indulge in beliefs which are without logic or foundation in fact. It goes without saying, therefore, that if science could show *indisputably* that man has no free will, that he is a mechanistic robot, the educated humanist would freely accept the dictum. He would no more wish to deny the validity of proved reason than he would wish to deny the validity of proved emotion.

However, the question of man's free will *has never been anything but disputable, and has never been proved scientifically.* For ten centuries the philosophical world has rung famously with the discussion, and it is not ended yet, although now it becomes more and more academic. Let us place the discussion in the hands of scientists themselves, because, frankly, the humanist can contribute nothing but a settled conviction, based on his intuition, that free will for man is at least an experimental, felt fact, proved by his immediate personal experience.

It is the "quantum theory" and the experiments with the action of light particles which have overturned the more cocksure scientists who denied any possibility that nature's laws might not be rigid and entirely deterministic.

It now appears that while *large masses* of matter seem always to act rigidly according to laws, *individual electrons or atoms occasionally act contrary to such laws.* Professor Arthur H. Compton of the University of Chicago (winner of the 1927 Noble Prize), after fifteen years of incredibly patient experiments with X-ray light diffraction, discovered that light particles sometimes refuse to obey the laws supposed to control them, when they collide or explode. This and other experiments led Professor Werner Heisenberg of the University of Leipzig to develop the revolutionizing "*principle of uncertainty*" in natural law, something which would have brought only smiles of incredulity and disdain from scientists twenty-five years ago. Today it is not questioned. As Professor P. W. Bridgman, professor of mathematics and natural philosophy at Harvard University, says: "The same situation confronts the physicist everywhere; whenever he penetrates to the atomic or electronic level in his analysis, he finds things acting in a way for which he can assign no cause, for which he never can assign a cause, and for which the concept of cause has no meaning, if Heisenberg's principle is right. This means nothing more nor less than that the law of cause and effect must be given up.

"The physicist thus finds himself in a world from which the bottom has dropped clean out; as he penetrates deeper and deeper it eludes him and fades away by the highly unsportsmanlike device of just becoming meaningless. No refinement of measurement will avail to carry him beyond the portals of this shadowy domain which he cannot even mention without logical inconsistency. A bound is thus forever set to the curiosity of the physicist. What is more, the mere existence of this bound means that he must give up his most cherished convictions and faith. The world is

not a world of reason, understandable by the intellect of man, but as we penetrate even deeper, the very law of cause and effect, which we had thought to be a formula to which we could force God Himself to subscribe, ceases to have meaning. The world is not intrinsically reasonable or understandable; it acquires these properties in ever-increasing degree as we ascend from the realm of the very little to the realm of everyday things; here we may eventually hope for an understanding sufficiently good for all practical purposes, but no more.

"Another important result of the realization of the structure of the world is that the scientists will see that his program is finite. The scientist is perhaps only a passing phase in the evolution of man; after unguessable years it is not impossible that his work will be done, and the problems of mankind will become for each individual, the problem of best ordering his own life."

And so we are back to the humanist's view for the best ordering of our lives. We may very reasonably assume that man is not a "robot" but has a free will.

19. Chance and Multiplicity of Choice.—There are other angles to this matter of the mechanistic view of life, which the humanist—always with a sense of measure—repudiates. He can concede that our reflex actions and ordinary doings and emotions, especially the actions of mankind as a whole and in groups, are predetermined and mechanistic, and that as mobs we behave as "automata" to a very large degree. But he has a conviction that the splendid brains of conscientious scientists themselves—humble enough not to step out of their character as scientists to become prophets—will fully establish what the humanist's intuition tells him. This would be nothing new, for good scientists themselves use intuitions as starting points for

their researches, and have intuitive advance conceptions of the truth.

It is the intuitive belief of many of us humanists—a belief shared by Professor Compton himself—that *the reflective processes* of the human mind represent the real free-will zone of mankind—or such of mankind at least as uses the reflective process. This would tally with Kant's idea that the "soul" is free, for if there is anything about man that has genuine claim to be "soul" it is his reflective, deliberative faculty of mind. When man reflects, he compounds thought and emotion, to make imagination and intuition, which are reflective processes of mind. He is then using the highest qualities which as a human being he possesses; the last qualities which develop in him, and which are found only in the finest type of human being. *This reflective process is accomplished solely by the use of the "inner check."* Indeed, "the will to refrain," to select, to be attracted or repelled or merely indifferent to various stimuli, is the very soul and center of life. Man checks his response to a particular stimulation somewhat as a railway switchman checks a train—commands it to slow down and turns a switch to route it over the longer and more circuitous route calling for deliberation. In this way the response does not travel over the first, or shortest track—the instinctive, unconscious track—nor over the second and longer track, that of merely conscious but *undeliberative* response. It is shunted to the *third* and longest track, that of *fully deliberative* response. This track, in a well-educated man, is a bewildering maze of interconnecting checks, which use imagination and intuition as well as stored information to trace out the consequences of a contemplated thought or act, and to check it if the intuitive decision is against it.

When the "inner check" has thus stopped short and

switched a question into the deliberative zone, one particularly significant thing should be noted: it has immeasurably widened the range of possible responses. Indeed, so immeasurably that all question of free will, it seems to a humanist, vanishes, or becomes purely academic. If a human being finds it possible to chose from among literally trillions of millions of alternative responses, there is then no more genuine point in discussing free will and determinism. If I may have almost all imaginable choices, then the question of whether I was destined to make the choice I fix upon thins into nonsense. All our thinking about determinism centers around a *limitation* of our choices imposed upon us by our mechanistic status; therefore when in the deliberative field I have a quite uncountable number of possibles to choose from, the "limitations" to which I must adhere become but an infinitesimal fraction of the whole.

Consider merely a piece of white paper and a pencil. I could write on that paper surely a trillion different combinations of words or markings. If I then decided to take a *blue* instead of a white piece of paper, there would be another trillion choices. By deciding upon endless other new circumstances, I could set up very quickly a total of possible differences in choices outracing all known means of counting, and I should only have begun to list the possible variations of choice. A pack of cards can be dealt into 53,644,737,765,488,792,839,237,440,000 different combinations. The varieties of choice for any one kind of thing are equally immense. To say that whatever one of this infinite number of choices I should make was, after all, predetermined by my mechanistic status as a human being would be technically correct and scientific, *but would humanistically no longer make sense.* The very meaning of the term free will would have become dimmed, somewhat after

the manner of the quantum theory, and Heisenberg's principle, which indicate that the ultimate possible accuracy of our measurements is limited; that, for instance, the more accurately we measure the *position* of an electron the less accurately we can measure its *velocity;* that the physical properties of an electron are not absolutely inherent in it, but involve also the observer; finally, that in fine-scale matters the interaction between the individual elements of our physical world *is essentially unpredictable.*

No wonder some German savants have decided that the universe is governed purely by chance! "Inexorable," "iron-clad," "immutable" natural law and the old rigidities of science, jarring so roughly against intuition, are now discredited, and humanism and science find each other better company. Science itself is slowly moving toward the great humanistic middle position.

20. The Rigidities of Heredity Also Relax.—Nowhere is this more significantly true than in biology, which had been made by some eugenists and scientists (like Wiggam) into a too rigidly mechanistic system, and by some psychologists (like Watson the "behaviorist") into something worse than a stud-farm outlook on the breeding of humans. Again the humanistic tendency within science itself has done for the humanist a work not otherwise possible except by intuition.

Professor H. S. Jennings, a great leader in biology, has now (in his book *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*) set the seal of doom upon the over-mechanistic conception of heredity. What the humanist had believed by intuition, Professor Jennings now certifies as scientific fact. Somewhat in the manner in which we have resolved the free will question into a great infinitude of choices, so also the "recipes" for varying possible individualities through heredity

resolve themselves into infinity. Man carries within himself, Professor Jennings finds, *not only the thing he is*, but but also vast varieties of latent elements which do not develop in himself but may appear in his descendants.

Furthermore, heredity begins to be modified even long before birth, for what the cells become depends on their surroundings, on what the cells about them are becoming, and on what other environmental influences do to them—even inside the body. So Professor Jennings says: "Heredity is no inexorable fate fixed upon the individual; it is a pattern which shapes itself in one way under certain conditions, in another way under other conditions. The single human individual has not a single definite prearranged fate or tendency, but a vast number of capabilities, a vast number of keys, as it were, through which the environment may play upon him; a multitude of impulses, tendencies toward action in diverse directions."

Like can no longer be said to breed like, and Dr. Jennings sees, like other humanists, that we can purify and uplift the human race by selectivity; the best as well as the worst of us coming from the great biological *middle class.* It remains true that a million superior people will surely breed better children than a million mediocre people; but the significant thing is, again, that while a mass or group follows law, and its results can be predicted, you cannot predict *about individuals.* Just as has been found concerning individual electrons—that they break away from law and prediction by law—so two superior individual parents may not produce superior children.

21. God or a Directive Intelligence.—As J. B. S. Haldane has said, we know much more about iron than we know about God. Consequently the average person has a great deal of easily understandable difficulty about the

question of God, and the humanist believes that there should be provided some easement of this difficulty. Since the humanist is definitely committed to a position different from that of the supernaturalist, he cannot believe in a literal God, but to the entire question of God he brings a broad and educated understanding of the mainsprings of our need for God.

In the first place the supernaturalist has so tenaciously clung to the ideas of God which simple shepherds conceived, confining the majestic concept of a Creator to the basis of a Christmas fairy tale, that some very dexterous shoe-horning is necessary to fit this kind of God into any modern brain, however uncritical. Some supernaturalists have undertaken to reform their ideas of God, and a few have done it very competently, virtually ranging themselves on the side of humanism. Indeed John Haynes Holmes' Community Church in New York, has rather definitely a humanistic credo, while that of Dr. Potter of New York actually uses the name of humanism. The competence of such liberal supernaturalists is illustrated in their answers to both humanist and naturist. As Harry Emerson Fosdick says: "One rejoices that men and women who are unable to believe in God can yet believe in the good life and courageously undertake to live it. In Dean Sperry's figure they are like folk who, finding that the great theistic systems have suffered shipwreck, have taken to the life boats." This is acute, for it realizes that an act of faith is required both for believing in God and believing in "the good life," only faith in different degrees.

With this the humanist quite agrees. He has already granted the fact that faith is an indispensable element in life—even, indeed, in business. Every time you accept a payment made with a check, or accept paper money, you

operate on faith—as you do in a thousand other daily situations, in matters great as well as small. The humanist declines, however, to have faith in the supernatural; and to this even many religionists, including Fosdick, subscribe. "Supernaturalism is an obsolete word and stands for an obsolete idea," says Fosdick. He would stress the spiritual as against the physical, and here the humanist is at one with him; but the religionist insists on God, insists on him as "the inherent nature of all being," or "the principle of concretion" as does Professor Whitehead. This a humanist like Paul Elmer More scorns as simply reducing God to mathematics. Harry Emerson Fosdick admits that the religionist often appears vague in regard to his deity, but stoutly asserts that "behind man's inadequate ideas of God is God." The naturist, of course, scorns all such dallying. He says flatly, "Man is only a bundle of cellular matter on the way to become manure," or, in the words of Joseph Wood Krutch: "Man matters only to himself. He is fighting a lone fight against a vast indifference." The naturist is a "monist," and must be an absolute atheist or pursue what Professor More calls the mathematical "demon of the absolute" with high-sounding cosmic names for God, based on mathematics.

What is the humanist's answer to the God question? He does not wish to be dogmatic, and therefore he offers no single, final answer. He is committed to a "dualistic" view, meaning that the human will and consciousness are not demonstrably the supine servants of the mechanism of nature, but have a relation, however attenuated, to a directive intelligence in the universe, which is broadly described by the word God. Indeed, the humanist goes so far as to say that man's will and consciousness and intuition may themselves be such a God, or a fragment of such a

God, but that in any event there is in man a double entity with a tension between a "higher and a lower immediacy," as Babbitt puts it. The humanist can offer also as an alternative a modern version of Kant's idea that even though the ideas of God and soul are paralogisms, we should regulate our lives *as if God and soul existed*. In other words we should boldly assume that there is a directive intelligence, and keep in communication with it by means of our intuition, but remain careful not to claim too *explicit* communication with it. Moreover we should give reason an equal place in our counsels, insofar as reason can go.

This is the very essence of humanistic moderation, bringing together the values of the supernatural and natural in a wise amalgam to reduce the viciousness of extremes. As a matter of fact, this is precisely what some great religious teachers did. Both Buddha and Christ aimed to ameliorate the extremes of their day and assume a middle position. They both represented reactions against the pessimism which had arisen because of such extremes. Both on the one hand opposed the asceticisms which the prevailing philosophies of their days (Sankhya and Essene), had tried to impose, and on the other hand aimed to prevent the reaction against this asceticism from turning into a form of hedonism (the philosophy of sheer pleasure and indulgence). Both these great philosophers rejected fasting and also indulgence, yet both renounced monkish exclusiveness and lived humanistically as men among men. Thus they were in considerable degree humanistic, paradoxical as this may seem, since both were later deified. Confucius, of course, built a thoroughgoing humanistic philosophy.

As Arthur Balfour, England's late statesman and philosopher, says in his *Theism and Humanism* (he was a pro-

nounced humanist): "A world where God is either denied or ignored is a world where some higher values are greatly impoverished. . . . God is himself the condition of scientific knowledge. If He be excluded from the causal series which produces beliefs, the cognitive series which justifies them is corrupted at the root." Balfour means that the humanistic conception of a supreme intelligence must be regarded as a part of the whole scene of life which has produced a man with such an intuitive feeling of God. We may go further and say, with thoroughgoing humanism, that in man himself are contained the two elements, a supreme intelligence and mechanistic man; but of course we must add that the attitude man takes toward such a value and such a destiny, and the use he makes of his God-capacity, make for a great deal of difference among individual men. If he sets up a high tension between his mechanistic self and the supreme intelligence possibilities within himself, he approaches nearer to God, and if he slackens that tension he recedes from God. And instead of being a deity located in a corner of the universe at a distance calculated by "light years," or present vicariously in a cathedral or an ikon on Sabbath, God for the humanist "walketh beside me."

How does such a God function? The answer is, so far as the humanist knows it, through the reasoning and reflective processes of mind and the creative urges, qualified intuitively and transmuted by a complicated series of "inner checks" which represents the operation of the highest type of human will and consciousness, as yet so imperfectly understood. Whether God is Himself in process of "becoming" through human beings, whether God is something forever incomprehensible in full to human beings, whether God is a Great Magnificence operating from afar, does not

vitally concern the humanist; but he does deny that God is merely a physical law or an ultimate attribute of mathematics, a differential equation of some kind. If the concept of God is of the slightest merit or has any truth whatsoever, says the humanist, then He must be felt at the sensitive end of the antenna of human intuition, and nowhere else.

22. Scientific Effort to Discover a Directive Intelligence.—The humanist, because of the statement just made, does not expect to learn at first hand about God or a Directive Intelligence through the reason or through scientific fact. He does not, therefore, as the supernaturalists do, feel a thrill every time some scientist makes loose generalizations about his findings and their possible cosmic meanings; as if any moment we should get a written message from God or reach Him via radio. Of course, he has not the slightest objection to science advancing its torch into the forest of mystery surrounding man; rather the reverse, since he insists that reason is just below intuition in importance. While Descartes rested his belief in science on a belief in God, and the modern scientist rests his belief in God on a belief in science, the humanist does neither. He believes that scientists making inferences about God and destiny either exceed their function as scientists, or are using their intuitions and are humanists. A "scientific" view of God and destiny would be an anomaly and a waste —as was that of Kant, the greatest scientific intellect produced in the last century or more, up to Einstein. (And Einstein is a humanist who permits himself to generalize more meticulously and sparingly, in consequence.) When a scientist is, however, a supernaturalist or a fundamental religionist, he is greatly and often disastrously tempted to exceed the bounds of science and to use his scientific reputa-

tion to give the weight of scientific finality and authority to statements which do not deserve the inference of certified truth which he gives them. The true humanist has so high a respect for reason and science that he insists that those speaking in the name of science shall be humble in the statement of anything not strictly indisputable or proved.

Sometimes the speculations of such scientists have a valid fascination because of their high standing and the fact that they are working upon crucial experiments dealing with the meaning of cosmic laws. Professor Arthur H. Compton, Nobel Prize winner, is one of these. We have already mentioned his proof that the "immutable" laws of physics are not immutable. Professor Compton consequently disputes the unswerving rule of law in the universe. Moreover, he says that if matter has to even so small a degree some random properties as disclosed by the lawless atom, the chances are infinitesimal that a world of such order and variety as we know it could have developed. It is not difficult, consequently, to read into the universe some greater degree of intelligence than we have been willing to grant. "It strongly suggests," says Compton, "that the evolutionary process is not a chance one but is directed toward some definite end. It thus becomes reasonable to suppose that *intelligent minds* may be the end toward which such an intelligent evolution is proceeding.

"A survey of the physical universe indicates that mankind is very possibly nature's best achievement in this direction. Though astronomers tell us that there are millions of millions of stars in the sky, a planet on which life can exist is even more rare. If in the world scheme conscious life is the thing of primary importance, what is happening on our earth is thus of great cosmic significance, and the

thoughts of man, which have come to control to so great an extent the development of life upon this planet, are perhaps the most important things."

Such a view of man, which is, after all, the humanist view, is incompatible with a deterministic conception of man. Individual man may be just like the occasional atom among billions which does not wholly conform to mechanical law. He may be another special demonstration in the universe of free will or selectivity for the higher ends of the universe, assuming that it has such ends.

Professor Needham of Cambridge says, in *The Sceptical Biologist:* "We may regard the mechanistic view of the world as a legitimate methodological distortion, capable of application to any phenomenon whatever, and possessing no value at all as a metaphysical doctrine. . . . In other words, to say that the functions of the kidney or the brain can best be described in a mechanical way *is not to say that they are mechanical and nothing else.*" He thus clearly indicates that for the scientist's laboratory purposes the general mechanistic theory is useful, but that it is quite another thing to take a mechanistic view of human beings and their destiny.

Another scientist of great note, Professor Robert Millikan of the California Institute of Technology, also believes that there is a universe in the making. He modestly indicates by the word "perhaps" that his idea of an evolving Creator and creation, ever and always in process, is an intuitive judgment. His definite scientific finding, now proved, is that an up-building process of atoms by means of the "cosmic rays" is going on constantly in space, side by side with the never-ending down-tearing process. Sir James Jeans, another famous scientist, must now retire his idea that the universe "is a clock running down." Our sun

is losing millions of tons of matter per second as it burns its life away, and will finally cool and stop life on earth; but, never mind, an equal amount of energy is being created at the same time in another part of the universe.

For a long time philosophers have had difficulty with the ominous conclusion of science that the universe was slowly rotting and dying. It implied a far-off single act of creation, and of this the supernaturalists made full use, because it agreed with the Bible account of a Beginning and an End. Now, however, we have something much more in unison with the humanist view of growth and perfectibility. It also fits in with the new developments of Compton and Heisenberg, already spoken of, which indicate that individual atoms show entire independence of mechanistic "natural law" even though large masses obey it. Thus we may say now that a new dignity resides in individuals—in individual atoms as well as in individual men—for there exists a genuine degree of freedom from natural law, an opportunity for the God in man and the God in such atoms to guide the universe creatively. It must be admitted that this view also gives the believers in the philosophy of flux and pragmatic experience some aid, and a further ticket of leave to drift aimlessly; but we may pass that by.

Let us now join up these facts with a brilliant concept of Professor Eddington, another famous scientist. He says that the human body may be regarded as a device by which an atom is magnified in its nature and effects up to a visible scale. In other words, a human being is really an atom as we might see it in a giant magnifying glass. An atom is, therefore, according to this idea, in principle and essence all that a human being is. As material for philosophizing this will do very nicely, indeed, and a humanist need not be at all afraid today that this will push man back

into the class of pure mechanism. We have already shown through Compton and Heisenberg that the atom does not always obey natural law and therefore is not pure mechanism, as has so long been maintained. The atom has a fair degree of free will and so has man; but man is obviously more important as a free agent in the same proportion that he is larger than the atom. Thus we arrive at the same humanistic position, that man is a thing strangely and uniquely apart from anything else in nature, in degree if not also in kind. A few free, creative atoms cannot accomplish much, but a free, creative man can, in proportion. Indeed, he can actually create new atomic combinations. He is more and more showing capacity to be a co-creator in the universe. This line of reasoning seems to be a logical basis for support of his intuitions, which tell him that he has a dignified, high place in the cosmos, and, as Compton says, may actually be the most significant thing in it. The humanist believes that he is.

23. Is Man Immortal?—"This pleasing hope, this fond desire, this longing for immortality," as Addison phrased it, is as old as man himself, and springs as easily from the breast of a savant as from that of a servant. The simple logic of it was perhaps most neatly expressed by Sir Thomas Browne when he said that "what has no beginning may be confident of no end." The fact that man's source and origin are in doubt has very naturally helped to make uncertain also his *end*. There is a similar piece of logic such as was expressed by William de Morgan in *Joseph Vance*: "I never have seen, and shall never see, that the cessation of the *evidence* of existence is necessarily evidence of the cessation of existence."

These are the hopes of the thoughtful supernaturalists, although of course most other supernaturalists accept with-

out any question the particular standardized details of the life to come which their sects prescribe. Professor Compton, being a scientist, is classifiable as one of the thoughtful supernaturalists. "If human beings on this planet are the most important things in nature," he says, "we might expect nature to preserve at all costs the living souls which it has evolved at such labor, which would mean the immortality of intelligent minds. While on the mechanistic view the mind could not survive the brain, the evidence seems against this view, and no cogent reason remains for supposing that the soul dies with the body.

"We found strong reasons for believing that, in spite of his physical insignificance, man, as an intelligent person, may be of extraordinary importance in the cosmic scheme. If we were to use our own best judgment, what would we say is the most important thing about a noble man? Would we not place first the beauty of his character? It takes a whole lifetime to build the character of a noble man. The adventures and discipline of youth, the struggles and failures and successes, the pains and pleasures of maturity, the loneliness and tranquillity of age—these make up the fire through which he must pass to bring out the pure gold of his soul. Having been thus far perfected, what shall nature do with him? Annihilate him? What infinite waste!"

Compton is however, a very dubiously lively speculator from his valuable researches, particularly so when it comes to the question of immortality. He is like many others over-eager for "proof" of immortality.

Evidently Professor Compton is repeating, with some use of science terms, the epigram of Callimachus, "a good man never dies." Like Walt Whitman he "saw the little that is good steadily hastening toward immortality." The naturist is far from compromising emotionally or opti-

mistically with this question. *Without flourish and without qualm he gives up immortality*—closes firmly even the door of hope for it. There is certainly nothing in a mechanistic view of life which leaves the slightest chance for any other view. As Joseph Wood Krutch says, "Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe." Or as one scientist puts it, "Nothing will remain, not even the ruins." Bertrand Russell says, "Sure doom falls pitiless and dark."

How, then, does the humanist view the case for immortality? He at once rules out the systems and techniques of all religions which place so high an emphasis upon the hereafter that they have over-elaborated and embroidered their ideas of the life to come until they now seem positively barbaric and in some instances meaningless. He rules out all emotional rationalizing and "wishful thinking" about immortality. His intuition tells him to beware of the bias of his emotions in the matter, for the sheer will to live is primordially strong. He has understanding for the humanist who accepts a modified form of supernatural view in such a personal matter as God and immortality, and has no disposition to question the reality of such a man's humanism.

A considerably more consistent view for a humanist, however, is to deny *personal* immortality altogether, and focus attention upon an immortality which comports more with the dignity of man and with the realities concerning spiritual values. The desire for personal immortality is not even altogether dignified, as Mark Twain once made clear when he endeavored to describe heaven, and as Marc Connelly's play "Green Pastures" (a conception of heaven as the Negro sees it) surely demonstrates. Personal immortality, the survival of individual consciousness after

death, it seems to the humanist, *is not a necessary part of immortality of spirit.* What Whitelocke called "the seed-plot of immortality," the material for survival after death, is not hands and feet, voice and face, and all the reflex psychological factors of personality so closely connected with them—but such *selfless* spirituality as the individual may have built up or created or disseminated, plus their seedlings, the acts, words, and influence of that individual. So at least certain of us humanists believe. If anything is worthy of life everlasting, these are; and if anything is worthy of the grave and oblivion, surely it would be the tortured bodies and twisted finite minds which represent humanity at death. It is surely no wrench to reason, to beauty or to fitness, to justice or mercy, to affirm that our bodies and their immediate attributes are lowly and miserable candidates for the wreaths of immortality; heavy and lumbersome freight indeed for Charon's boat.

Surely, also, it is a humility which can only dignify man and add to his stature to say that only such crumbs of genuine selflessness and beauty and nobility and other quite impersonal fruits of the spirit as we may have been able to distil from our lives, should rightfully survive us. Our difficulty is, of course, that we have no measures for pure spirit, scarcely even sure means of recognizing it, and certainly no perfection of the vast scale of immortal effectiveness over the centuries and millenniums, possible for even a simple soul to set in motion. We find it easy to concede such importance to the immortality of spirit of a Lincoln or a Christ, a Plato, a Shakespeare or a Spinoza, but when we think of an ordinary person, ourselves, we suspect that we are empty of the stuff of such immortality.

We are in deep error, humanistically speaking, for the human being has a high and indefeasible worth, every single

living human above the savage level. Each human being can deeply influence, through heredity alone, the future course of the race and of our culture; and spirituality is by no means all a matter of making addresses at Gettysburg, or conceiving the League of Nations. The smallest acts, the most ordinary attitudes among the simplest common folk have reverberations reaching infinitely far into the future. The impress on a child's brain of one sentence may move—and, it can be proved, has moved,—*mountains*. Bunau-Varilla dug nearly through the Panama Canal under frightful odds because, when a lad, at the time the Suez Canal had been dug, his mother said: "Philippe, *you* can dig a great canal, too!" This is not a legend but the truth from his own lips. Psychoanalysis has books full of evidence to bring to bear as proof of the engraving of lifelong changes upon the minds of others of an event, a word, an act.

Professor Bridgman, in delineating the intricacies of interaction of infinitesimal "bullets of light," shows that such infinitesimal reactions profoundly affect all things. "A cat may look at a king"; yes, says Bridgman, but the king will never be the same again—nor the cat! These tiny changes ring down the endless halls of eternity. A truckman's oath in a traffic jam, a housewife's gossip over the back fence, or a child's quarrel on the playground may and probably will have negative and destructive repercussions ten centuries from now; and these are no fanciful exaggerations. Things infinitesimal exist, even though we have not the senses to perceive nor the instruments to measure them. Just as it is now known that both a building-up and a tearing-down process are simultaneously at work upon the matter in the universe, so we may be reasonably certain that both beneficial and malign spiritual influences live on and on immortally. Some crude and simple but spiritually rich

mother or wife who lived a thousand centuries ago may have turned the whole tide of human growth toward civilization, by a few simple household words of love or vision from the depths of her intuition; while the stupendousness of the changes thus wrought over a broad span of time were of course inconceivably beyond her half-animal comprehension. All the magnificence, the song, and the story and promise of love may stem from a guttural crooning sound from her untutored lips, the first such sound heard by man, the beast. If we may believe Freud, the reason we have the sculpture of Phidias, Praxiteles or Rodin is (horrid and incredible as it may sound) that some one of our ape ancestors millions of years ago molded his excrement. Let us not recoil too sharply from this: it is entirely probable. Great ends have utterly insignificant beginnings.

There is immortality even in the unfulfilled *wishes* of mortal man. Man's arts have been called by psychologists the disguised expression of instinctive wishes, otherwise denied. Wishes, these psychologists also point out, have dynamic power. "Words and symbols," says Dr. Beatrice M. Hinkle in *The Re-creating of the Individual*, "are the energy carriers of humanity of far greater force than all the physical forms of energy measured in foot-pounds in the world. The thought or imaginative vision, the wish of one man thrown out into the world has traveled down the ages gathering energy as it sped, firing other men's minds and producing greater effects in action than the measurable strength of regiments of men." This refers not only to a Homer or a David or a Paul, but obscurely, below our line of vision, to such lowly humans who transcended self to any small extent at the obscure firesides or public places in dead and forgotten villages many centuries ago.

We do not think in wide or high enough spiritual terms,

or carry our imaginations out to a spiritual scale equal to the magnificent scale on which we carry our mathematics and physics. We are, as yet, spiritual babes, however technically clever. We have not yet even domesticated the savage in us, and it may take us another hundred thousand years to do it.

Spiritual immortality, then, is thoroughly worth while, and of enormous proportions beyond our calculation. It is humanistically civilized to lay emphasis on a survival after death of spirit instead of personality—without making the error of interpreting "spirit" as merely that idiosyncratic combination of attitudes which makes up personality. That fortuitous combination of attitudes, glands, body and mind, which we call personality, crumbles with the death of the body and has no meaning outside the body. Spirituality in our humanistic sense is something more universal and impersonal. As Henry Ward Beecher once said, speaking of the immortality of authors, "Unless a man can link his written thoughts with the everlasting wants of men, so that they shall draw from them as from wells, there is no more immortality to the thoughts and feelings of the soul than to the muscles and bones." Excellent as this is, it caters to the inferiority complex of the ordinary man, to his feeling that while *a writer* may well be immortal because his words are permanently recorded, the ordinary man cannot be. He does not understand that love, the most patently immortal of all spiritual qualities, in all its many types and in all its subtle ramifications, is within the range of the simplest of men and women. He does not understand that spoken as well as written words, minor acts and attitudes as well as imposing ones, reach to eternity. The bootblack as well as the man on horseback may be immortal; indeed *is immortal*, in the power—which we have just begun to measure—of

small factors to effect endless series of changes. When once it can be made fully clear to us how all that we are and all that we do, how we love or hate and how we use our intuitions and other faculties determines the course of uncounted lives and happenings in the distant human future, we may acquire altogether new standards for immortality. Thus it seems to many of us humanists that we can afford to render obsolete all ideas of personal immortality in the sense of conscious survival. We individuals die, but the song and spirit of our being and of our loving will surely live on to immeasurable proportions in the great immensity of the human future.

Only recently H. G. Wells has given expression, in the *Forum*, to the same philosophy: "I think Man is immortal, but not men. Man is more important than the things in the individual life, and this I believe not as a mere sentimentality, but as a rigorously true statement of biological and mental fact. Our individuality is, so to speak, an unborn obsession from which we shall escape as we become more intelligent. And we are under a necessity to escape from it as we become more intelligent, because increasing intelligence brings us more and more clearly face to face with the ultimate frustration of every individual desire in age, enfeeblement, and death. Personality, individuality, is a biological device which has served its end in evolution and will decline. A consciousness of something greater than ourselves—the immortal soul of the race—is taking control of the direction of our lives."

V

Beauty and Fastidiousness as Guides

"The beautiful seems right by force of beauty," said Elizabeth Barrett Browning. This is a lofty structure of thought, and Emerson supplies the underpinning to it with the statement, "The beautiful rests on the foundations of the necessary," while Oliver Wendell Holmes gives it a splendid superstructure by saying, "Beauty is the index of a larger fact than wisdom."

All of these are only further expressions of Socrates' idea that the beautiful is also the good, and that both of them are at the same time *the useful.* The Greeks had a strong conviction that the beautiful mind in the beautiful body represented the ideal of proportion and value, but Aristotle went further than Socrates to say that beauty was more to be prized than the useful, and that *pleasure-giving* was the test of beauty.

24. Human Sensibility.—The humanist goes further than this. Just as Taine said that "art sums up life," so the

humanist ventures to say that beauty sums up life; that beauty and fastidiousness set a criterion for many of the nuances and ultimate values of life which to the civilized are exceedingly important. For beauty implies sensibility, opening a vast keyboard of values and tones upon which to construct symphonies of design and value, and so infinitely enriching and refining the human spirit.

Few people have really surveyed the amazing scope of human sensibility. There are in the sense of sight alone about 40,000 discriminable qualities; about 15,000 in hearing; nine classes of smell, each with hundreds of variants, three or four classes of touch and four of taste. These are the so-called "five senses," but many of us do not know that there are three more (temperature, anaesthetic and organic). We have highly developed the sight and sound senses and rather neglected the others so that we are even below an animal standard; but through sight and sound, especially through language and print, we have opened a myriad of sensibilities which practically constitute the difference between us and animals. As a matter of fact we have tended even to assign moral values to the senses and consider some worthy and some ignoble. The sense of smell particularly has been left to atrophy.

This human sensibility, we are now realizing, has been the antennae by which we crawled out of the slime of savagery. Becoming ever more delicately perceptive of new values, feeling tones and shades of difference, and being ever more sensitive to the sensibilities of other human beings and to ultimate meanings, man has surely made a vast comparative progress in the last three or four thousand years.

To secure the contrast, let us examine a realistic picture of the *in*sensibility of man some four thousand years ago.

The Assyrians may be taken as the prototype of man in the era before the flower of Egyptian and Greek civilizations had increased human sensibility. A whole people is steeped in a horrific insensitivity, presided over by a "Sar" or King who is a sadistic beast, knowing only indulgence, blood, killing and power, and who boils or burns men for his capricious satisfaction. Flesh is torn from his victims by the lash and brought to him to gloat over, and he himself calmly puts out the eyes of chained prisoners, while his soldiers *bowl* on the lawn with the decapitated heads of the victims! Sargon, a famous Assyrian king, made monuments out of piles of corpses from which heads and limbs had been cut, and he chopped off the hands of his prisoners. The Assyrian kings expressed their physical prowess in this sodden civilization by choking lions to death. The ferocious bas-reliefs of the palaces of Nineveh are nearly always full of these passionately alive but beast-like, bloodthirsty scenes of Assyrian life; a pictorial representation of incredible human butchery and insensitivity. Blood spouts thick, teeth tear, claws rend, limbs are depicted as taut with murderous action—and withal the faces are as unperturbed as children's.

There was present here not a vestige of that finer quality of sensitivity shown by the Egyptians; the Assyrians had no discernible spirituality, no tenderness, no subtlety. War and the hunt, blood and appetite were their interests. Their artists obeyed their kings and sculptured with a stunning brutality. In this the Assyrians were like other primitives far lower down on the scale; and it is this terrible, swift, burning brutality which fascinates us today in all primitive art. Their scale of sensibility was incredibly narrow; like a harp with only two strings.

Such a picture is important for us to see, in order that

we may note how the values of life are bound up to a high degree with our sensibility. How many keys on our scale of awareness? Are entire octaves of sensibility meaningless to us? Are the half and quarter tones and the overtones distinctively clear to us? Are we literate enough to appreciate harmony and counterpoint, even dissonance, on these scales of awareness?

The easy critics of religion are extremely likely to forget the great part it played in enlarging man's scale of sensibility. Even in Chaldea, fairly contemporary with Assyria, there was no such brutality, because the Chaldean studied the stars, dreamed and submitted to a softening religious influence; as did also the Egyptian. Religion unquestionably was the one force which could lift man above the animal level by increasing his sensibilities, and it is the one authentic glory of the Christian religion that it took the great step of giving a spiritual value to every human soul, however lowly, something to which neither the Greek with his slave system nor the Roman with his warlike ruthlessness and indifference to human suffering had been sensitive. The Christian's heart bled at the misery and agonies and cruelties which in their day were taken casually and callously. Far as we still have to travel to the gentleness and tenderness of the first Christian, we need to set the main effect of Christianity in its true perspective as a great mile-post in humanism. It represented the first genuine valuation of the human being—*every* human being—as intrinsically high and noble.

The Hebrews and the Hindus had made the first steps to turn man's look inward; to take his mind from idols, gold, luxury and externals, to the qualities of *inwardness*. In this, they, too, were the forerunners of true humanism, since inwardness is especially stressed by human-

ists. Most sensibility is inward sensibility; and so it is that a truly cultivated, rounded, full-bodied, mature human being in whom the complete scale of human sensibility is authentically developed is a human being who represents the most amazing instrument for comprehension which exists in the world today, and possibly in the universe. No machine that man has made—and he has contrived many instruments of astounding precision—has the range or the inclusive delicacy of the *maker* of the instrument himself. Such a human being can distinguish between a thousand blends of tea leaves, or can conceive the likenesses between vast concepts such as space and time, and between different universes. He can suffer and measure not only his own pains, but the ills of humanity as a whole. He can "see" the atom and vision the beginnings and the ends of universes.

Sitting at the keyboard of this truly magnificent range of sensibilities, the human will and consciousness can call forth an infinitude of orchestrations in many keys, with intricate variations, with subtle harmonies, daring discords and finely calculated counterpoint. But if he has the instrument of sensibility and the technique of performance, he also requires themes and motifs: he must have imaginative grasp, and he must compose and perform *on a scale equal to his instrument.* The humanist has been fearing, and so have others, that this triumph of sensibility, this marvel of technical skill, aided by this lavishness of equipment, may after all wear a mask of spiritual vacuity and produce a mere babel of meaningless sound, like a great man suddenly gone gibberingly mad. As John Cowper Powys says in *The Meaning of Culture*, in order to obtain more penetration, more philosophy, more power giving meaning to our lives, our acts and our reading, we must orient everything "*toward our own secret cultural purpose.*" We must have

a string for the beads of our sensitivity; we must have an organized way of life, a philosophy—accepted from the outside, or developed from the inside.

25. Fastidiousness as a Code.—The young people of today are using fastidiousness as their code of conduct. This fact speaks volumes for the increasing general ideals of humanism. Rejecting one by one the authorities and standards which have as their base any historical or superimposed convention—rejecting supernatural authority equally with naturistic authority and license—these young people have fallen back upon man's own disciplined sensibilities and aesthetic codes as their surest guides. They have tasted the iron authority of dead and formalistic codes as provided by the supernaturalists; and they have tasted also of the codeless experimental anarchy of the naturists. They have discovered what psychologists have known for a long time, that the aesthetic impulse in us represents the aim of the individual to give form and meaning and artistry to the crude, helter-skelter facts of our environment. It is in itself a code. "Art" is in reality a system of relations; beauty is a pattern of order and proportion and value which our culture and our individuality set up. We choose this, reject that, with an intuitive, confident sense of rightness.

In an age like ours, when most of our young people have had considerable access to the aesthetic standards of many ages, and have perhaps unconsciously imbibed a great deal of aesthetic impression, it is not at all surprising that they should turn to aesthetics as their guide when other guides crumble. It may even be said of the young people of today, especially of the city-bred young people of the comfortable and wealthy classes, that they have had a great deal more contact with the codes of aesthetics than they have had either with the codes of religion or with the

codes of parental or other disciplines. They know and like Picasso and Monet, Thornton Wilder and Elinor Wylie better than they know or like Moses or Paul or their own parents' or pastors' minds. Their sense of fastidious aesthetic discrimination is both more precious to them and more frequently used than any other code of values. We are probably unable to realize the striking truth that our young people of today represent the first generation in America to emerge thoroughly from the shadow of the Puritan sin complex; the first American generation to share genuinely in the values of the Renaissance. As Everett Dean Martin has pointed out, America escaped the values of the Renaissance because her population was drawn, in the main, from European countries before the Renaissance had touched them. All these years, then, America has labored under the yoke of pre-Renaissance ideas, so strongly tinged with supernaturalism, and when once it broke away belatedly it swung very hectically to the other extreme, but has just as swiftly bounded back. Our young people are singularly and amazingly free, therefore, from our old shame-faced psychology and hypocrisies; and in their need they have turned for guidance to intuition, disciplined by the severe codes of aesthetics. The reason they do so is that intuition tells them: "Here at last is measure, here is proportion, here is beauty. Here are both expression and restraint, both daring and self-criticism, both thought and emotion, both intellect and intuition, both logic and taste."

In the name, then, of beauty and fastidiousness, humanists old and young use their sensibilities in the formation of new codes of conduct, which, however they may vary individually, may after all converge toward the same general humanistic base. Gilbert Murray, famous Oxford professor, has described the process of mind:

"When I have, on occasion, felt instinctive disgust or disapproval at hearing of some lewd behavior, was that feeling in the least degree dependent on the probability that the actions in question would lead either to venereal disease or to the birth of illegitimate children? I think, not in the least. I think the dislike was predominantly a feeling of fastidiousness; an aesthetic repulsion."

If he had asked whether his "instinctive disgust" was due to a moral sense of sin, or a desire not to break a convention, the answer would have been the same, for he says elsewhere, "It is not Victorian prudery, it is not Christian asceticism, it is not even the Hellenic tradition, which dislikes uncleanness, physical and moral; it is something that springs eternal in the nature of man."

There has always been a relationship between ethics and art; for the significant reason that the best ethics and the best art both proceed from the unconscious and are at their best when they are *lived and felt* instead of merely talked about. As John Cowper Powys says, "To philosophize is not to *read* philosophy; it is to *feel* philosophy." It is the supreme merit of the new code of fastidiousness that it is something that is *felt*, and followed by intuitive preference, rather than something carried out in fear of consequences or because other people do it. No level of human achievement could possibly be higher than the operation of a good code of conduct by individuals because they personally feel the rightness and adequacy and beauty of such a code, irrespective of any influence brought to bear on them to observe this code.

26. The Disciplines of Beauty.—Since the manifold impulses of human nature so obviously call for some sense of order and form, some application of proportion and restraint, it is in the highest degree logical that it should se-

lect the disciplines of beauty as the code promising most aid and satisfaction. Complete and utter freedom is ideological nonsense. The artist who betakes himself, as Gauguin did, to a wild isolated island to create what he wished without the slightest interference, cannot after all escape the interference of his own "inner check." Gauguin still had to sift his impulses to paint through his own vision of what both painting and life were or could be, also sift them through the disciplines made necessary by the limitations of paint and brush. In the end he slid toward chaos, because he slackened even these disciplines.

As Arthur E. Morgan of Antioch College says: "The modern vogue exalts freedom to the place of an absolute value, independent of all others. Yet excellence and effectiveness of life demand design and order, and these impose limitations upon freedom. Where such limitations are ignored, society suffers. Present-day deification of freedom is acceptance of an abstract social doctrine and is not sustained by the common-sense judgment of mankind."

The disciplines of beauty are vigorous indeed, and they cannot be escaped. As Richard Wagner said, "Anything I could do to flee from art would be more artificial than art itself." Beauty and art are certainly not specific likes and dislikes shared by everybody at certain levels of culture; on the contrary, the more the culture the more divergent are the ideas of beauty existing. But at the same time that there are increasing differences, there are also increasing likenesses. As Lord Balfour said, in *Humanism and Theism*, "Admitting that these prophets of beauty neither possess any inherent authority nor can point to any standard of appeal, we must also admit that if in art there were no orthodoxies, if the heresies themselves were not organized, if every man based his aesthetic practice on a too respectful

consideration of his own moods and fancies, the world we live in would be even more uncomfortable than it is."

The technical disciplines of the creation of beauty are very many and very severe, a fact which explains why we have vast numbers who try to create beauty, but a very few who succeed. But as Professor Needham has said, it is a question whether the development of intuition is not itself an end, among others; whether the *effort* to create beauty is not intrinsically more important than its actual creation. That a large number of mankind is moving, groping toward beauty is a fact of possibly greater humanistic meaning than that some have arrived at Olympus. After all there are no proved roads to beauty. As an old Japanese Shinto song has it, "The roads leading to the top of the mountain may be vastly different from each other at the foot, but the same moon will always be seen from the top." Each road is arduous, and each follows different contours, but each moves on an upward slope toward an apex which is called beauty, but which itself wears many aspects. Only the climb upward toward beauty is real, together with certain fundamentals of beauty enjoyed on the way, such as the purity of the idea or concept which stands in our mind's eye as the beauty sought after. It is an effulgent light such as nothing else that ever shone, free from any life-serving uses, free from all disagreeable associations. This, like mathematics, to which it is related, may easily be carried out to an "absolute" in an other-wordly and unhumanistic manner. The other element of beauty is that of remembered emotions and their associations, many of which we can share in common. Indeed one other element of beauty is the ability to be shared; sharing of sheer purity of line, sharing of color and harmony, novelty and contrast; sharing of association values, sharing of significances and symbolizations, sharing

of massiveness, fragility, opposing form and contrasting color, pattern and texture.

The solidarity, the form, the code in these strivings after representations of beauty are a universe in themselves of hope, love, ambition, striving, vision, suffering, labor, renunciation, restraint, discipline, beauty. The instinct to seize upon these for general spiritual guidance is not wrong. From Plato to Ruskin it has been familiar. By analogy the value-standards set for beauty are value-standards which can meet any test that may be applied. The artist is not working in a separate compartment, he is a replica of all of us striving with our lives as the artist strives with his materials. As Elie Faure says in his *History of Art:*

"Every image is an expression of the artist's desire to bring about in this world the reign of that order which he knows how to discover in it. Art has been, since its most humble origins, the realization of the presentiments of certain men—who answer the needs of all men. Art has forced the world to yield to it the laws which have permitted us to establish progressively the sovereignty of our mind over the world. Emanating from humanity, art has revealed to humanity its own intelligence. Art has defined the races; alone it bears the testimony of their dramatic effort. If we want to know what we are, we must understand what art is. Art is born of the association of our sensibility and our experience and formed in order that we may be masters of ourselves." Could anything make clearer that the interest in beauty is an interest in order and proportion, wherever these qualities may be called for in all phases of life?

27. Likenesses in the Artist's and the Humanist's Codes.—Both the artist who endeavors to create beauty, and the humanist who endeavors to live by the code of

beauty, cannot escape having somewhat the same philosophy of life. "Dualism" as an outlook on life is rather essential to the artist. Indeed Dr. Beatrice M. Hinkle, famous psychologist, in *The Re-Creating of the Individual,* makes the flat assertion that "without dualism no art creation could exist." Freud himself says in his *Clark Lectures:* "If the individual who is displeased with reality is in possession of that artistic talent which is still a psychological riddle, he can transform his fantasies into artistic creations. So he escapes the fate of a neurosis and wins back his connection [with reality] by this roundabout way."

It will be noted that Freud does not say that the artist invariably uses *pure* fantasy or makes a *complete* escape from reality (as admittedly some artists did; Poe and Blake, for instance). He only says, in effect, that the artist makes a long-circuit, roundabout connection with reality, filtering it through a long series of "inner checks" and tests in order to give "reality" still greater fidelity to truth, as it is refracted through the microscope of the mind. This answers the criticism which has been made—both of the artist and of humanism as a philosophy—that both try to *escape* from the truth, from reality.

It is a vital error. Both the artist and the humanist know by the authority of intuition, as well as by fact-research, that the truth, the whole truth, is never confined to what confronts the ordinary eye—not even to what confronts the microscopic eye of science. It needs the additional dimensions and filtering processes, the telescopic perspectives of intuition, which are only suppliable by the artist or the humanist. The artist knows the vast importance of *elimination* of the irrelevant details, and *composition* which places significant things in the foreground in a significant way. Likewise the humanist knows the vast

importance, in attaining genuine truth, of screening out the obscuring and unimportant details, and of arranging harmoniously a pattern and a significance from among the heterogeneous, formless stuff of reality. It is not that the true artist or the true humanist has any wish to ignore bare, uncomposed reality, or to distort it; on the contrary it is his dearest hope to represent reality with much greater truthfulness than ever. But the artist and the humanist are in possession of that fine secret which Dr. Richard Cabot once expressed as the knowledge that no human being you may encounter is quite understandable until you have projected your image of that person forward toward what it is becoming, even to what it is dreaming of becoming. That gawky young man who tended people's furnaces in California, that lanky, crude young giant who split rails in Illinois, were not what they appeared to the eye, or would have appeared to a scientific investigator. There were qualities in each of them that only very superior intuition might have perceived.

Friendship and love, very particularly mother love, insist on judging the objects of their affection not by the narrow, visual standard of reality, nor even by cold "scientific" truth, but by a synthesized truth—much closer to that of the humanist or the artist—which insists on taking into account the hopes, dreams, will and conscious or unconscious striving of that person. Even before a lad has even a dream of what he will be, his mother may have that dream and include that in her judgment and valuation of him.

The artist sees reality in precisely the same way. He may love reality so dearly that he cannot bear to see it disarranged and chaotic and fragmentary, as life surely is when visioned with the ordinary eye, or even when examined with the aid of science. Counting, weighing and measuring

the steel and stones of a cathedral before it is built cannot provide an idea of the beauty that the cathedral is to represent when completed. Only the charted plan for the finished cathedral or an intuitional conception of that plan can provide such an idea.

Nor does pointing a camera at random at life give any concept of the beauty and meaning of life, such as may be obtained through a painter's, sculptor's, poet's or novelist's schematic arrangement of life in an art form. The artist sees life as it is becoming and also as it is. Science is now actually following the footsteps of the artist and the humanist. Einstein and Ouspensky have shown us that an object we see is far more than what we see. It is all that it has evolved from, and all that it is evolving toward. A tree that you look at is not just what you see—it is a seed, a stripling, a young tree, an old tree, a leafless tree, a full-leaved tree, a rotting tree, a decaying stump—all this in one unity, but not in one moment in time.

Science is thus once more certifying intuition. The humanist has a sharpened appreciation of that sense of becoming, of that intuitional point of reference which stretches out from crude reality to true reality; from man in his commoner aspects to man in his rarer aspects; from the animal instincts and urges to the perfectible spirit of man; from sheer lazy flux to intricate design and iron discipline. The artist is often a very definite humanist in his entire philosophy of life, like Leonardo da Vinci; but he may also be akin to the humanist only in the fact that he is a dualist in his creative method; separating this entirely from his personal life and philosophy. But it remains true that no one who pursues beauty—artist or humanist or whosoever—can do so without the severest of disciplines and "inner checks," without the dualistic philosophy.

Beauty is an ideal conception which is not an inherent property of matter, but an attribute of the mind and spirit of the observer arising from the most liberal application of imagination and intuition. It is for this reason that the beauty of a woman's body is much lessened when completely nude, carelessly posed and fully visible in a powerful light. On the other hand it is much heightened when partially draped and given the advantages of half-lights and selectivity of pose. Restraint, proportion, measure, sparingness, are as important components of beauty as lushness, excess, daring, independence; and both sets of qualities, humanistically used, do not neutralize each other, either in the artist or in the ordinary individual. They are true expressions, all of them, of the state of tension between opposites which can and should exist in one complex but harmonized unit. As Pascal put it, true greatness consists of uniting in one person all extremes, and occupying all the space between them. It is only the simple and commonplace unit which has no such complexity or dualistic character. To speak of contradiction and paradox because of the presence of such conflicting elements means nothing.

28. The One Beauty and the Many Beauties.—The humanist strongly suspects that the worship of the One (in whatever form) lies at the bottom of many of humanity's greatest difficulties. It crucifies and it dehumanizes. It is a dreadful kind of cosmic hypnotism; excruciatingly painful. It is an "*idelon* of the will," a kind of insanity, and it deranges all humanistic value-standards. Intense fixations upon one very specific form of beauty, one particular version of perfection, one narrowly defined God, one exacting utopia, one precise dream of glory—these are incredibly cruel and misshapen masters of men; sometimes leading to beatific visions, but oftener to twisted lives, warped spirits,

unhappiness and even bloodshed. As Professor Babbitt has pointed out, the history of philosophy from the time of the Greeks is to a great extent the history of the clashes of the metaphysicians of the One and the Many.

For the humanist there are many beauties, and he ranges over them like a harpist over a full complement of strings. The humanist orchestrates life, and while he may slightly prefer the wood instruments to the "brasses," if forced to a choice, he nevertheless is in principle loth to do any sharp choosing. The beauty of *the whole* is greater than even a preferred beauty of a part. The parts have their own qualitative values, incomparable with each other. This is sanity; this is healing wholeness; this is the aesthetic outlook of the humanist.

For the person whose combination of individual forces is such that sanity and wholeness are denied him, who despises all lute strings but one, whose tension is so high that he cannot stretch it over the whole without snapping and breaking, the humanist has sympathy and concern. Out of the agony and conflict of such spirits has been born much beauty—but by no means all beauty, or all the highest beauty. Flight from all but one aspect of reality, and rapture over that one, may be inevitable for some natures, and may produce some forms of beauty, but cannot be material for any philosophy of life except a sick philosophy and a ruinous one; nor can it provide a key to further beauty.

The humanist knows well the tensions and the conflicts of man; in truth he builds his philosophy upon them. He knows, better than the naturist, better than the supernaturalist, that man is dualistic in his entire nature, and nowhere quite so certainly as in his aesthetic nature, in his contemplation of beauty and the effort to harmonize this beauty with life. The harmonizing of opposites is the task of the artist,

precisely as it is of the humanistic philosopher. As Helen Huss Parkhurst says in her book *Beauty*:

"For those in whom conflicting passions are especially profound and irreconcilable, not even through religion nor through love is there possible without some disturbing repression the perfect synthesis of emotions essentially antithetical. For them,—the less integrated, the more tormented individuals,—there is one type of experience, and probably it is the only one, within which all warring tendencies are not merely preserved and harmonized but actually made to serve the ultimate ends of perfection. And this experience is the aesthetic."

Here is perfect humanistic philosophy, and when Miss Parkhurst also says that beauty is "a creative synthesis in which the opposites are retained but are reborn into a new estate and glorified by their garb of fresh and unforeseen significance," she might well have been describing the humanist's synthesis; his uniting of naturism and supernaturalism, the age-old racking and destroying extremes, into a new vision of beauty.

Again, when Miss Parkhurst shows how man's highest estate and individuality are reached when he creates art, in the image of the beautiful, she might also be describing that high status for man upon which the humanist insists:

"Art is the product of man—perhaps his only genuine and peculiar product. Of all his works there is no other upon which the stamp of his nature has been so indelibly set. Whatever else has issued from his brain and his hand has been under some practical coercion or suffered from some extrinsic limitation. In the act of artistic creation alone does he seem to have shaken loose from the fetters of circumstance and found himself suddenly free and glorious as a divinity under no compulsion other than his desire

to behold, godlike, the unclouded reflection of his own countenance."

Let us also, before leaving Miss Parkhurst's book, obtain an artist's healthy, humanistic delight in the many aspects even of One, not to mention the varied aspects of Many beauties. "The color red," she says, "has uncountable modulations. Paled, it gives us all the modes of pink—of sea-shells and magnolias and anemones, of arbutus and cherry blossoms and clouds at dawn. Darkened, it grows to crimson and maroon, and verges upon magenta and the hierarchy of the purples. In between are the fierce reds and scarlets, neither delicate nor yet somber, the red of bittersweet and poppies, of the scarlet tanager and the wing of the blackbird, and of fire and blood and winter sunsets."

Miss Parkhurst also helpfully points out how selected arts, such as music, may be the reconcilers and healers of human conflicts. Music, she says, "is at once the symbol and the realization of the unresting tides whose impalpable waters wash ceaselessly over the sands of consciousness."

29. Harmony and Grace in Ethical Values.—Seen thus, beauty is a rich hierarchy of values with many aspects, some of which are soporifics and some stimulants; some heady wines and some soothing balms, but possible humanistically to use to build a harmonious and whole life, a graceful and fastidious life, a full life and a disciplined one. Beauty is disdainful of fixed precepts, but almost unimaginably severe in her exactions; ascetic beyond the dreams of St. Augustine, yet magnificent beyond the dreams of an Egyptian pharaoh. Beauty's disciplines are conspicuously *self*-disciplines, and it is for this reason that they have so great a philosophical value, so deserved a prestige with young people of today as guides to conduct.

That "scorn for miserable aims ending in self which

every matured, mellowed and civilized individual knows," and of which George Eliot wrote, must be created anew in every person born. It is a distinctly humanistic poise to attain, for the naturist bluntly admits that he is out to expand and indulge himself, even though he is by no means insensible to the claims of society. On the other hand the supernaturalist goes to the opposite extreme and desires to make every breath we draw and every sex impulse we feel an altruistic and religious rite. The humanist hopes only for a mellowed individualism, making ample use of all things human, twisted by no absolutism, wrung by no despairs and pessimisms, cut off from no delights, savored with measure, judging all situations on their merits, and guided by all possible beauty and fastidiousness.

The call of beauty and fastidiousness as a guide to conduct is infinitely more appealing than that of the moral "ought," the Hebraic sternness which Havelock Ellis believes was "more or less violently grafted into our Christianity." As Professor J. A. Hobson points out in *Economics and Ethics:* "'Right' itself is of strictly aesthetic origin. 'Straight' and 'crooked' conduct have a stronger purchase on most minds than 'good' or 'bad.' Beauty of character is more than goodness. Greek thinking, especially as shown in its master Plato, saw the good life in terms of beauty, harmony and grace." Professor J. S. Mackenzie has also said that beauty is more adequate than any other term for expressing intrinsic ethical value. As Plato said, "Rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace." He also speaks of "insensibly drawing the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with beauty and reason." Plotinus, too, in his famous chapter on Beauty, compares the sculptor's work with that of man chiseling at his "good

life"—"cutting away all that is excessive, straightening out all that is crooked, making all one glow of beauty."

John Dewey, one of America's leading philosophers, says in *The Quest for Certainty:* "There is nothing in which a person so completely reveals himself as in the things which he judges enjoyable and desirable. Such judgments are the sole alternative to the domination of belief by impulse, chance, blind habit and self-interest. . . . The formation of taste is the chief matter wherever values enter in, whether intellectual, aesthetic or moral."

30. What is Finally Beautiful?—The most grotesque and horrifying example of the strange wilfulness of beauty is to be found in the African savages who many generations ago stretched the lips of their women outward until the lips became huge wide pans extending eight or ten inches from the face. This was done in order that the women might be made unmistakably ugly in the eyes of the pirates and marauders who had been persistent in stealing the tribe's women. And then, gruesome to relate, in time this distortion of face came to be regarded as *beautiful,* and still is! Surely this is overwhelming proof of the humanist's and the artist's contention that beauty is a relative thing; that a value must be seen in all its dimensions, with the imaginative as well as the visual eye, before beauty may safely be ascribed to or withheld from it. That is why the scientist is as a child before beauty, unless he is also a humanist.

The approach to beauty, like the approach to a rose, is thorny. Knowledge, finesse, parts, intuition, literacy in many things instead of one, a little of reverence and a soupçon of cyncism, a little of earthliness and a little of heavenliness, some solitude and some plain herd life, some simplicity and some complexity, some joy and some gravity, are all asked for in approaching beauty as she unwinds her

seventh veil. Otherwise she passes by and is never recognized, not even by those who would give much to see her. "Perfect" beauty is always a mere moment in time. As Clive Bell puts it: "The ideal is an instant of perfection, made infinite—the best of the best forever. It is always high noon in heaven." He should have added, always high noon *only* in an absolute heaven, and *not* on earth, not for humans. The lightning of perfection, if it were prolonged beyond the instant, would blind us and scorch us to death. Thus the seeker after beauty needs to know that on earth one cannot "leap from crag to crag," cannot live always on the tips of great mountains, cannot hope for beauty unalloyed, or even a burning beauty that blazes forever, except as memory. "The demon of the absolute" is an inhuman and destructive beast, aiming to imprison man in a palace so devastatingly beautiful that man would swoon with the agony of its unendurable perfection and swiftly die "the rose-death," overpowered by the unbearable perfume.

The humanist accordingly develops the following attitudes:

He is no intransigent seeker after perfection;
He does not crucify himself on the cross of the "absolute";
He does not seek utopias;
He does not reject life *in toto* or in major part as unbeautiful;
He does not denounce all existing systems of government, economics or society as unworthy, in favor of some system as yet untried and untested;
He does not hope to prolong the high moments of sex romance to the very grave's edge;
He does not, in his mature years, seek sophomorically for "the woman of his dreams";
He will not fanatically and neurotically pursue one hope, one dream, one aim that is beyond realization;
He will not place unrestrained confidence in or have uncritical adoration for any person, nor even himself.

In short the humanist adopts the most advanced and ultra-modern of scientific attitudes when he says that beauty must be looked at from a four-dimensional point of view, from the angle of *the whole,* as must all reality. To say that the tree is beautiful only at that moment in the spring-time when it carries the maximum number of blossoms which are at their maximum of opened bud and perfume, and then only as the rosy light of a perfect dawn strikes it, is to fumble the whole question of beauty and reality. It is to succumb to the demon of the "absolute," and it is to make human life into a neurosis, caused by the rejection of beauty in any moment of time but a certain chance one, when the mathematics of the "absolute" brings all numbers to a momentary grouping, like the seventh minute of the seventh hour of the seventh day of the seventh year of the year 777. There was such a minute, and there will be another like it thousands of years hence; but human life cannot be lived on the laws of chance or of arbitrary concatenations. Human life must be lived daily, hourly; and beauty is an ingredient which is hourly vital to it. The humanist says that the concept of the tree as beautiful must consider the tree as a complete unity, leafless as well as blossomed, young as well as old, seedling as well as rotting stump. The tree in blossom is but one of the aspects of its beauty, and to be blind to the other aspects is to be neurotically insensitive to full beauty.

Perhaps the meaning of this will come out even more clearly if we again take woman for an example. To ascribe beauty only to the girl of sixteen, or, more neurotically still, to a girl of sixteen gowned in white in a garden under a June moon, is grievously to miss woman's beauty in all its dimensions in space and time. Woman as child, woman as young mother, woman in rounded maturity, woman in ripe

old age are all aspects of woman at sixteen. Woman in a garden in June, woman baking "a lordly dish," woman tying her sandal, woman nursing a child, woman nursing the sick, woman driving an ambulance in France, woman as an aide to an executive, woman bathing, woman passionate, woman praying, woman teaching children, woman singing in opera —these are all dimensions of woman.

The humanist disdains the impulsive, fickle fantasies of beauty which the naturist sees and apostrophises, in his shifting sea of flux and change and experiment. It is not that the humanist disdains all experiment, but that he disdains the cry of "lo, here" and "lo, there" as the enthusiams of schoolboys for each new girl who titillates them. The humanist does not believe that the sophomore experimental period should be made a permanent characteristic. "Mooncalfing" through life, as the naturists persist in doing, seems trivial and immature, a dangerous arrest of emotional development. The naturist is ever meeting "the perfect" girl —and ever deserting her for another; thanks, of course, to his defective vision of beauty. Had he the full vision of beauty he would maturely select a woman and find in her nearly all possible women, and nearly all possible womanly beauty. That she would inevitably fall short of *absolute beauty* would inflict on the humanist no agonies of spirit and induce no constant neurotic seeking after the final romance or the ultimate beauty. D'Annunzio, the Italian poet, incurably romantic absolutist, is an excellent instance of the extremism to which comes the naturist-experimentalist in search of beauty. His hectic romance with, and swift desertion of the beautiful and superbly talented actress Duse, and his continued feverish search for other high peaks of romance, both in love and in dramatic ego-expression in politics, presents the familiar picture of the naturist expand-

ing himself to the excruciating extreme. Shelley, Byron, Burns, Whitman, Poe, Verlaine, Blake and others have made the type familiar.

The true humanist, be it noted, does not for a moment condescend to these authentic creators of beauty, and must not be understood as belittling their shining genius. He does insist, however, on recognizing the folly of setting up the philosophy of these tortured, highly adventitious spirits as a conception of a "good life" or a happy one. Civilization would blow out like an overloaded fuse if such a philosophy were put into practice. It is a grave error to value the psychophysical distortions or the philosophy of life of an artist on a par with the beauty of his creation, for they are entirely different things. The fact that Poe was impotent, that Byron had a club foot, that Milton was blind does not argue that to breed more poets we should breed plenty of blind, club-footed and impotent men; nor that we should educate men to be absolutists and naturists in their conception of beauty. In spite of the assertions of some cock-sure amateur psychoanalysts (like Alfred Mordell or Clement Wood) that all genius is the consequence of thwarted and frustrated emotions, sublimating into art forms what it could not succeed in expressing in life, the truth appears to be that *some* genius results in this way, but that it is certainly no more reliable a recipe for producing genius than blindness, impotence or club-footedness.

The naturists are here trapped in a paradox in their ideas of beauty, for they are actually oscillating rapidly and feverishly between two extremes. They seek "absolute" beauty, final, full perfection (and never find it, except mystically), quite as the supernaturalist seeks but never knows God (except mystically). But they also shift rapidly to their naturism, in feverish experiment, flux and seeking, and

therefore are never at any given moment resting upon any solid foundation. Like an *ignis fatuus* over a bog, never distinctly to be seen and ever luring into the mire or into the blue ether, the beauty which the artist-naturist sees is more dualistic than monistic, but dualistic in the supernatural sense. It keeps him in a constant state of tension, but it is not a humanistic tension. The beauty which he visions is "unearthly," superhuman, ineffable; "where breakers never break, nor tempests roar"; where he "knocks at the Uttermost Gate" and finds that "beyond is the Infinite Morning." In this he is precisely in the same ecstatic state of mind as the supernaturalist and religionist, John Bunyan, who said in his *Pilgrim's Progress*, "And behold there was a very stately palace before him, the name of which was Beautiful."

Let it be clearly stated here also that the humanist is humble in the presence of any genius, by whomsoever displayed, and does not attempt to dictate a philosophy of life to it. With La Rochefoucauld the humanist says, however, that "it is the prerogative of the great man only to have great defects." Therefore the humanist considers it the veriest nonsense to build a philosophy for many people on the defeats, freedoms, anarchies, disintegrations and illnesses of the occasional unbalanced man of genius, in such arts where emotional power (with its instabilities) is of primary importance. There have been and are men of genius who are entirely humanistic and balanced in their lives and philosophies, but they are not so spectacular because they do not afford such contrast with the rest.

Humanistically speaking, then, final beauty does not lie in a mystical absolute, or in other-worldly strangeness; nor does it lie in the stark picture of a fat, nude woman with warts. Both represent the typical extremes of naturism

and absolutism; the "kitchen sink" school of realism on the one hand and on the other "rhododendron pie," as Margery Sharp humorously calls super-aestheticism. The humanist believes that there are perhaps three general subdivisions of beauty—(1) beauty such as man finds in nature, including beauty of the human person and creativeness in propagation; (2) beauty of design and form; the selectivity, composition and plastic creation by man's art; and (3) inward beauty; beauty of spirit, emotion, reason, character; beauty of mental concept; beauty of human action or restraint; beauty of ideas, works, social relationships, fellowship and organization.

Beauty is surely no common commodity, despite Remy de Gourmont's saying that wherever life is, there is beauty. As the Greek philosophers knew, "the beautiful is hard—hard to judge, hard to win, hard to keep." Men talk too lightly of beauty, as Havelock Ellis has pointed out—and it consequently often eludes them.

At the same time the catholicity of the true humanist must also be evidenced. The humanist does not close the door of beauty upon the nose of the curate and look away when he sees the worshipers in the dim-lit nave of Notre Dame Cathedral, or when he hears the muezzin's call to prayer in the eastern twilight. Nor does he deny the forthright freshness of some of the canvases of the stark, unselective painters of reality. Here and there he finds beauty even in the rather absurd exhibitions of the "independent artists" of this "stark" school. But the humanist ideal of a painter is more likely to be a Claude Monet, who with every attention to science and certainly to reality, and with the utmost independence and discipline, still produced rare beauty which does not require initiation into a cult to appreciate.

Beauty which is the handiwork of man and shows upon its face the application of man's disciplines, man's measures, man's conceptions of proportion, man's selective restraints and sense of composition, and the whole invested with his imagination and intuition, is beauty in the genuine sense to the humanist. It acquires then a spirituality which makes it worthy of very great importance, since beauty and fastidiousness are the chart, and intuition and reason are the compass of the humanist's course. The humanist insists that such beauty and fastidiousness are not alone for some genius to create and for ordinary man merely to admire, but that the ordinary man is or can be a co-creator and maker of beauty in his daily life. A humanistic philosophy distinctly encourages him to do so, for it strips away the myth of the "God-given" inspiration of genius, and recognizes that genius is a relative term, as is also beauty, and that the ordinary man has a genuine opportunity to create as well as appreciate beauty.

The humanist gives back to man his dignity and intrinsic worth, also his hope and his faith; and these have ever been important ingredients in beauty, as the Greeks, who were superb and celebrated humanists, so amply demonstrated. So deeply did the Greeks love life and find it beautiful, and so content were they with their destiny as humans, that in the little cemetery at the foot of the Acropolis these attitudes are symbolized on the tombstones. No tears, no tearing of hair, just calm pleasant faces at death, with the familiar domestic animals and serving maids also at the scene. Death as human as birth, that is the Greek spirit, as Greek as the three summits of Greece, the Parthenon of Athens, the Sanctuary of Delphi and the Atlas of Olympia —places where man came to adore Reason, Beauty and Energy. But there was also Eleusis, a veiled summit in

Greece hiding a mysterious initiation to beauty for those who were fit and ready. Thus did the Greeks maintain their humanistic tension with their higher selves. Though the words that were uttered there to the initiates and the beauty that they were given to look upon we shall doubtless never know, it might well be that they were the Greek equivalent of the words of John Masefield, England's new Poet Laureate:

"O beauty, touch me, make me wise!"

VI

The Taming of Crude Individualism

From the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock to humanism is one of the longest and most tortuous roads known in the psychic life of man. It is rather like the human embryo recapitulating the eons of human evolution in a short space of time. Cut away from Europe, missing the liberalizing influence of the Renaissance, and faced with the gigantic task of creating a large new civilization, America was truly a new embryo, agonizing over the whole series of steps of the creation of civilization, and missing none of its birth-pains.

Every new society and country must tame the unleashed individualism which so naturally arises when there is no old web of tradition to bind men. All new countries are notoriously lawless and crude in their individualism; and when special circumstances are present, such as surrounded America's history, the task of bringing the crude prevailing philosophy to a civilized humanism is obviously beset with

great difficulty. Beginning with cruel hardship, religious zealotry, war and contention with savagery, and discovering that the field which was open to individualism covered an incredibly large area of territory incredibly rich in resources, the individualistic urges thus unleashed in people coming from the tightly fought-over acres of Europe were prodigious. Inevitably a drama of exceptionally picturesque and vigorous kind was played here. It is rather a thrilling story, and the denouement of humanism is now occurring.

Individualism had been tamed and socialized in Europe centuries before, following its own earlier agonies due to super-individualism. Europe had at last been stabilized on *the family* as the decisive unit, with the protection of individuality as one of its main objects. Germany's individualists were only beginning to work through the social group, the state, and thus lead psychologically to the World War. In America, as soon as the early religious colonies broke up and westward migration began, *the lone individual* became the normal status for American life. Since America did not start with the traditionalized family as its unit of society, and since people never remained long in one place, the family as a unit never really obtained much power or ascendancy. Boys of 15 or 16 left the farm or the home for distant places, striking out for themselves, never to return. There was no family succession of business or occupation or residence, not even of standard of living, education or manners. American families, since the earliest days, freely dissipated their continuity or unity. The American idea of family seemed to be to produce an individual, call the task completed, and disband. A family such as the Adams family is a strange and unusual phenomenon in America, although it is a commonplace in Europe—even in China or Japan, where family is also the prime unit of so-

ciety. In the American theory of political economy, *the individual* is now and has almost always been the recognized unit, as against either the family or the state.

31. America's Remarkable Gallery of Individuals.—America produced, in her first several centuries of existence, a vast and colorful gallery of individuals; a galaxy of idiosyncratic personalities probably unsurpassed in an equal number of years in any other part of the world. We are inclined to forget this fact, but the new crop of biographies appearing in recent years bears eloquent testimony to it. In our pioneer days and onward to the twentieth century, we were gorgeously rich in individuals, from Cotton Mather to Ben Franklin, Thomas Paine, Thoreau, Daniel Boone, Johnny Appleseed, Sam Houston, Sitting Bull, General Custer, Buffalo Bill, the James boys, Wild Bill Hickock, Stonewall Jackson, Calamity Jane, Jim Fisk, Daniel Drew, Walt Whitman, Ben Tillman, J. P. Morgan, Carrie Nation, Dr. Mary Walker, John D. Rockefeller, Phil Armour, John Wanamaker, "Bet-you-a-Million" Gates, Dwight L. Moody, William Jennings Bryan. Every one of these had a high flavor of individuality, utterly unstandardized, completely unique in composition. Nearly all of them lacked that social polish which a European civilization stresses, and which thus reduces contrasts. A considerable proportion were virtually incapable of much socialized thought and action, and some were actively antisocial. Their individuality was untamed, but it was individuality none the less.

America both lost and gained through them. The American scene was for a time churned up into a writhing, cursing, battling mass of individualities, each endeavoring to advance over the shoulders of the other, irrespective of the general social good. First the natural resources, the land, the gold, the timber, the oil, were the targets for this

pushing, elbowing mass of individuals. Then the means of communication, the stage coaches, the canals, the railways. Incredible orgies of promotion, intrigue and knavery were associated with these developments. Learning organization and the device of the corporation for increasing an individual's power, the struggle then shifted to industry, and the most gigantic duel of all ensued, bringing at last a terrific tug-of-war between individualism and society as a whole, with the victory narrowly on the side of society.

The backbone of rampant individualism in America was definitely broken with the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, although it was not really acknowledged until Roosevelt's day. Roosevelt was himself a product of a *family* system, and therefore had a socialized background. He knew how to be both individual and social. He tamed and educated the individualists, finally crushing their deeply implanted idea, quite sincerely held, that everything a man could wrest from life was his without obligation to society—"by divine right," as Baer the coal baron, himself a boy risen from poverty, expressed it. This was simply the old psychology of "the squatter," the man who built a house on land which seemed to belong to no one, and then resented the true owner when he appeared. The old individualist reasoned to himself, "The opportunity is there, nobody is using it, and if I'm strong enough to take it and hold it against the Indians and all comers, my title to it is clear." It was also the psychology of the rough-and-ready mining prospector. "If I get there first and stake my claim," was his reasoning, "or even if I push others aside or play tricks on them to prevent them from taking title ahead of me, that's 'all in the game,' and I'm entitled to the rewards."

32. The Gradual Socializing of the Individual.—Such reasoning is a warrior psychology—"to the victor belong

the spoils." It is the old instinct of man to fight in order to seize something and hold it; to take what he wants irrespective of others. It is also a *child* psychology. The young child has no social sense—it wants what it wants, and will go into spasms of rage if thwarted. Its entire outlook on life is a *taking* outlook; giving or sharing, or considering the needs of a group, are absolutely unknown to it. Even if it is *taught* the social ideal, it accepts it by rote instead of by intimate understanding. When the child also feels a blow on the nose by another child, or when it sharply experiences the criticism and displeasure of others of the group, it more fully understands the rights of others. Then the individual slowly advances by stages toward socialization. First it includes its mother in its concern, then its family, then another person through emotional attachment, then that person's family, then larger and larger groups—village, state, nation—until it reaches the highest point of socialization, when it feels tenderness and can make sacrifices for humanity as a whole.

Thus is the individual ripened from the seed to the oak, as regards his emotional loyalty. But, unfortunately, great numbers of human beings stop their ripening and stay fixed at some point before they arrive at the full oak. Some never come out of the child stage; they remain selfish "takers" until the end of their days, always in the same state of mind as when they reached out to their mother's breast to take what they wanted, and always as hurt and angered as such a child is when the thing it wants is not forthcoming, or when any one else disputes its claim. Others remain fixed at the level of care for only their family and offspring. Many a ferocious bandit or gang murderer is discovered to have an affectionate family life. But this is actually below man on the savage level, for

savages submerge their individualism for the good of the clan, the tribe.

We are now realizing—since the World War—that even the patriotic devotion which is extended to one nation, but is hostile to other nations, is not the full-grown individual's highest standard. In the same class is the sentimentalized or verbalized devotion to humanity on the part of the individual; mere "lip-service" and vague, sloshy, pious words and feelings, not effective enough to curb ruthless individualism. This is also a "callow" period in the maturity of individuality. It is seen at its worst in the religious devotion and faithful worship of the ruthless individualists. It reached a high-water mark between 1880 and 1900, "the mauve decade," when for six days a week a considerable number of men practised mean and grasping business, violating every principle of Christian ethics, and on the Sabbath asked God to bless them. This is one of the reasons why supernaturalism or "Fundamentalism" is a defective philosophy of life. By placing its emphasis upon ritualistic forms and setting the highest value upon a future life, it distinctly opens the door for a two-compartment life in the individual; a life in the practical world unchecked by a competent standard of ethics, and another life in the church. The Christian ethic of giving your coat to the man who has none and turning the other cheek when struck is obviously too meek or allegorical for the literal western mind, and was especially so for the uneducated minds of our early individualists. We may therefore regard the rampant individualism of America in the nineteenth century as a breakdown of the Fundamentalist supernatural philosophy, a breakdown from which it has never recovered.

33. American Individualism Ripens to Humanitarianism.—What took the place of Fundamentalist super-

naturalism? It was a *Humanitarianism* (not humanism) based on supernaturalism; a secularizing of the Christian religion into a humane idea of service and human welfare. The churches began to develop a passion for social service, and the houses of worship were made into social centers, libraries, gymnasiums, kindergartens, social parlors, dining rooms, hospitals, etc. In many small centers they combined for better social service. "Community chests" were developed, and a very laudable era of "service" was undertaken. The poor were to be relieved, the sick cared for, the community rid of various iniquities and eye-sores.

The American individualists by this time (1900) included more educated men, a generation or two after the crude, raw individualism of 1860-1900. Judge Gary was made head of the Steel Trust and inaugurated widespread employee welfare plans to protect the lives of workers and to give them comfort and care. He also was far more sensitive to ethics and social rights than most of his predecessors. This leadership was widely followed, and the Humanitarian era developed apace and ruled until after the World War. It made the Rotary and other clubs talk incessantly of "service," and it made the trade conventions ring with a kind of moral fervor, which was actually the religious instinct expressing itself pragmatically in daily life for the first time, after the vague, ineffectual otherworldliness of Fundamentalist religion. It *confucianized* Christianity, so to speak, by relating it more actively to the business of living, as did Confucius, the famous Chinese sage.

This period represents a very important era for the education and taming of American individualism; an intermediary period in which we still partly linger, while humanism, the newer, sounder philosophy of life, gradually wins

a wider hold. Humanitarianism shook loose from the jaws of individualism its wolf-like fangs, and changed the individual from an antisocial to a social being. He was at least re-incorporated into the body politic instead of remaining an outlaw. It was a common sight, and still is, to see some new member of the Rotary or other lunch club publicly and unexpectedly presented with a flower on his birthday, to the tune of some song of fellowship, and to see this new member—heretofore a lone, predatory business wolf, with few friends and an eye only for his own profit—suddenly weep, his reserve broken down by such a simple sentimentality. Why? Because for years, doubtless, he had steeled his hard individualism against any sense of social solidarity, except in the privacy of his family, and he was now taken unawares; made acutely conscious that there was a benevolent group spirit outside the circle of his blood relatives. To the rest of his lunch companions the occasion is trivial; to the ironic critics of "rotarianism" it is childish; but to the new member, who is possibly of foreign-born parentage or perhaps uncouth, and has therefore been all the more isolated and unsocial, the occasion is a vital milestone of character. He surely contributes to the "community chest" with a right good will thereafter, as a genuine Humanitarian.

Unquestionably the Era of Humanitarianism, just passing its prime, has been of incalculable value to America —the oil upon the wounds of rough individualism. It induced the giving of billions of dollars won by rather ruthless individualism to be redistributed for the social good. But it has also served as a transition philosophy and a primary education in social welfare.

34. Why Humanitarianism is Not Enough.—Nevertheless, as Sir Josiah Stamp, the famous English economist

says, "Humanitarianism is not enough; we must have a program and a point of view." To take gentle care of the wounded and to feed and house the soldiers well is not by any means the same as guiding the strategy of the battle. Humanitarianism has been spending its time caring for orphans and the poor and improving working conditions, recreation, etc.—until we see the *reductio ad absurdum* in the plight of Mr. Hershey, the chocolate manufacturer, who gave many millions to an orphan asylum, but finds that not only are there far fewer orphans nowadays, but that the modern expert advice is that orphans be placed in individual homes rather than in asylums. Humanitarianism is heavily weighted with sentimentality, and is not scientific or philosophical. It is the touched, impulsive heart made into a philosophy; whereas what we need is not the momentary feeling of pity or generosity which comes to us on seeing a crippled beggar, but a far wider and deeper philosophy and program, making use of brains to stabilize employment, to reduce business cycles, to secure real world peace and amity, to make basic revisions in religion, politics, education and economics along sane evolutionary lines, and to work out a more balanced culture in America.

The overstressing of humanitarianism in religion has not helped Christianity, and there are evidences that it has undermined it. Humanitarianism is an offshoot of religion, but it is not religion, and it can never satisfy the instinct for religion, although it may drug it for a time.

Humanitarianism took hold so easily in America because the American is as a rule an "extravert," a person whose delight is in externals. He has a real sense of progress when he is *doing*, whether or not he is also *thinking*. Thus the concreteness of the humanitarian activities appeals to him. Buildings are put up, action takes place, motion goes

on, sounds issue forth, statistics are compiled, emotions concerning these activities are felt, for the activities are what might be called "heart-string" activities. They appeal to pity, generosity, kindliness, paternal regard. It seems like enlarging the family and making your employees, or all employees or all persons on planes lower than you, a part of your own household. This result we dare not sneer at, on pain of showing profound ignorance of the evolutionary processes of individual growth in social consciousness.

Nevertheless, as every enlightened father knows, he must not try to keep his family dependent upon him, and he must give up his paternalistic attitude at the right time and endeavor to build up real, independent individuality in his children. This is the crucial point in our present humanitarian philosophy. The reason why since the World War the "employee welfare work" and the other humanitarian labors have sunk in importance is that they were too paternalistic and not in keeping with an American public now out of its knickerbockers. They tended to keep people too *infantile,* instead of sturdy and self-reliant. Americans are now showing restlessness at the sight of exceedingly rich philanthropists endowing almost everything, instead of the public paying manfully for what it needs. Americans do not relish being case studies and objects of charity under constant professionalized humanitarian care. They chafe at the present situation in medicine where the very poor in free clinics together with the very rich at large fees secure the services of the best doctors and surgeons, while the sturdy middle class takes the leavings in medical care. They are resenting the situation in education, in politics, in religion and in other fields still touched with the old class ideas, which are at the base of the humanitarian idea. Great ladies dispensing charity, or rich men setting up institutions

to which the average man comes as a suppliant for or recipient of favor—these are not sound American principles. They are the typical extremes which humanism aims to bring together.

35. A Lincolnian Definition of Humanism.—America is coming of age; it wants a full-bodied, clear-eyed, socially poised, self-helping *humanism* as a philosophy of life, and it is indicating more and more that it is ready to wind up the Humanitarian era. It seeks instead a union of thought and emotion, a measured application of reason, a clear field for individual ability, with, however, a social discipline freely applied to it and generously accepted. It seeks the demolition of narrow intolerance and the substitution of the kind of humanism displayed by Abraham Lincoln—none too orthodox, none too partial, none too cold or none too heated—during the most crucial period of American history, when he was beset on the one hand by rabid, free-flowing humanitarians and on the other by reactionaries, absolutists and "die-hards."

In a letter to Horace Greeley the matchless humanist wrote as follows—and the letter is the last word in realistic definition of humanism applied to a particular instance—a perfect example of Aristotelian measure and proportion. Subordinating the means to a great end, and applying in majestic manner the miracle of coördinated human thought and restrained feeling; simple, clear, modest, but speeding arrow-like to its target—the letter reads:

"I would save the Union. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either

to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more when I shall believe doing more will help the cause."

In this great humanistic pronouncement there is no philosophy either of drift and flux, or of mysticism and supernaturalism or trust in fate. Its trust is in Abraham Lincoln and in a program with a clearly visioned good end, but a humanistic conception of the means to that end. Its spirit is selfless and non-individualistic, despite the many "I's." Abraham Lincoln is aware that he is spokesman for an agonized, disunited nation, and that by the use of moderation, measure and proportion he may yet weld the broken, arrantly individualistic parts. And he did.

VII

The Achievement of True Individuality

Great spiritual forces are contending in the world for mastery. Two of the most fateful which are thus pitted against each other are *the mass and the individual;* the ideal of the social group in which individuality is limited so that labor may be finely subdivided and specialized, and the ideal of the lone creative mind. It is the ideal of the beehive as against the isolated prospector and pioneer.

36. **Is the Individual Being Merged Into the Group?**—Everywhere this struggle is to be seen, and at the present moment it is individuality which seems hardest pressed and losing ground. Professor John Dewey has even said that the individual is "lost." Paderewski, the famous pianist, has made the most direct statement of the case of the individualists. "This age is not propitious for art," he says, "for it is an age of economics, an age of production, and as such it has great value. But genius, and therefore the creation of great art is impossible under the present system of

living. Genius requires not only the divine spark, which comes as an accident, but also favorable conditions in which to develop. What are most essential are quiet and intense concentration of mind. . . . There is another handicap to the creativeness of art in the increasing tendency toward collectivism. People are more and more working in groups. They form trusts, corporations and federations, and thereby accomplish marvels commercially. But no poem or painting was ever created by a syndicate. Art is great only when it bears the stamp of the individual, and today the individual is being merged and lost in the group."

In various other forms this view is widely held today, especially by literary and artistic groups, which are particularly violent in their reaction from the group. Epitomizing this is the book recently published, *King Mob,* by a well-known writer under a fictitious name. Nature knows nothing of spiritual values, he asserts; she cares only for the species, not for the individuals. Her only standard of measurement is the mob; and most of our present-day evils, inner emptiness, outer restlessness and nationalist hysteria are the result of "a group of persons unable to think straight because they are affected by the consciousness of their own numbers." The author reveals himself at least partially a humanist when he says that the mob ignores inner development by means of discipline, the slow molding of character by intense, controlled experience. He brilliantly shows the increasing tendency to do things in groups, citing our notorious gangs to show that nowadays even an individual criminal is rare. "Our civilization promises to make the question of a living easier and easier, and meanwhile living becomes emptier and emptier. A restoration of art can begin only with the individual. We cannot serve humanity unless we make much of the man, and unless we

rescue the individual we cannot help mankind. Machine, state, and nation must exist solely for the benefit of the individual. . . . The human impulse toward spiritual creation works in the teeth of a vast, crushing conspiracy which extends through every aspect of the physical universe." The same cry has come from Arthur Symons and other romantics: "The artist is against society, and society against the artist. Genius is divine madness and abnormality."

Raymond B. Fosdick, well-known New York lawyer, in addressing the Wellesley graduation class of 1930, maintained that we are living in a new kind of society which has undermined the individualism of Thoreau, who defiantly retreated to Walden Pond, saying, "I will breathe after my own fashion," and who even railed at the post-office as an infringement of individualism. Fosdick told the Wellesley girls that "hand in hand with economic integration has come a new kind of social integration. It is an age when the spontaneity and initiative of individuals are being sacrificed to harmony and efficiency. The pressure of society is toward uniformity, and we are exposed to the greatest flood of mass suggestion any people has ever experienced; consequently our tendency is to strengthen group life, to submerge the individual in the mass, to idealize the average, to set up standards of conformity. When we speak of freedom we really mean the freedom of the crowd and not the freedom of the individual. The individual, in brief, no longer occupies the place he occupied in Thoreau's time."

37. The Sane Humanistic Truth About the Individual and the Herd.—We have now listened to the case presented by those who are convinced that individuality is caught in a trap and is threatened with extermination. Has the case been made out unanswerably? The humanist does not believe it has. To set up Thoreau as a model of individuality,

or to infer that in Thoreau's time such a standard of individuality as his was common, is erroneous. Thoreau was hermit-minded, and the hermit is always totally or partially antisocial. A world made up of Thoreaus would be a ridiculous chaos. This is not to say that the humanist is not thankful for Thoreau; indeed he wishes we had a few more.

But the humanist is quite too sophisticated in human values to lose his balance at the extremist cries of "Wolf, wolf" on the subject of the herd and the individual. Cherishing the law of measure, understanding what are good ends for human beings, he is not alarmed at the age-old instrument which civilization has always used toward a good end for man—the organized group. He also knows that man's basic instincts are gregarious, that there is a powerful dualistic tension within him between his gregarious instincts and his individualistic instincts; a tension which he sees every sign of being maintained as always. The very outcries, such as those cited here, are first-rate evidence in themselves that individuality is vigorous. The humanist's idea of fine individuality is distinctly not that of an anarchist or hermit, just as it also is not that of a mere herd member. The humanist is perfectly aware of the truth which McDougall the psychologist demonstrated, that mobs behave differently from the individuals who compose them; but the humanist senses the fact that the individual must necessarily and logically behave otherwise in New York or Paris than on a Robinson Crusoe island or at Walden Pond.

It is not a matter of depravity, nor even of shriveled-up individuality, to act differently as a group-member and as an individual. When you are driving a car on a clear uninhabited stretch of road you naturally, if you have a sense of measure and restraint, drive more unrestrainedly

than when driving past a school in a village. To argue that either kind of driving should be interchangeable anywhere for individual freedom's sake, is a typical naturistic idea, a characteristic flux and "impulse" philosophy. True, the more responsible naturist would say that after the autoist had tried to drive as rapidly past a village school as he did out on a lonely stretch of road, and had been arrested and fined, or had been mobbed after injuring a child, he would doubtless "learn from experience" to drive more slowly past the school. But the humanist replies that this is naturistic chaos, and an affront to human intelligence and order—to say nothing of being murderous and inhuman, because of the injuries or loss of life of children which would constantly be necessary in order to teach each autoist "from experience" not to speed past the school.

The moment you admit that the autoist should accept a group dictum to drive differently from his individualistic, free speed, you have accepted the humanist point of view as against the naturist one. You have admitted that you must respect group rights as freely as your own, and limit your impulses. Also the moment you admit that driving differently while in the village for humane, logical reasons does not break down and destroy your capacity to drive as you wish when on a clear, lonely stretch of road, then you admit that participation in a group does not "wreck" individuality or "destroy" individual freedom. You may stay in the village so much that you become a timid driver on a lonely, clear stretch of road, but that is no one's fault but your own. Thoreau might have gone to his lonely cabin on Walden Pond years before he did, and he might have stayed there longer; but he chose differently.

Paderewski's statement that genius needs quiet and concentration places no genuine handicap upon genius. De-

spite the much-maligned "machine age," there is nothing so cheap as quiet and utter simplicity in a vast country like America. Within but fifty miles of New York City there are hundreds of square miles of waste pine lands and hill country. At least twenty million geniuses could readily be accommodated in log cabins throughout America at spots so isolated that they could shout at the top of their voices or discharge guns and still be unheard. The humanistic truth is that genius does not invariably require quiet or isolation; on the contrary it would be easy to show that genius has usually chosen large centers of population, and, furthermore, thrived on proximity to the group.

38. **Why Individuality Seems Weakened.**—We must conclude that there is something wrong with the case so violently made out for the individual against the group; and the humanist has no trouble in locating it. The individual in America has not been strengthening his will to individuality in the same proportion that the group has been strengthening its will to group aims. The disparity is due to the weakness of the inner self, not to the marauding attack of the group. If a child's left leg grows normally but its right leg stops growing, there is bound to be lameness. The outward side of life has been stimulated at the expense of the inner, and the inner self has not bestirred itself accordingly.

It is precisely this inwardness which the humanist has been emphasizing; it is a true and balanced individuality at which the humanist aims. The lengthened leg of group progress he would not cut, but the dilatory leg of inward individuality he would stimulate to grow to equal size, in order that both might function perfectly together. It is perfectly obvious that the group is very vital to the making of richer human values. It made values even for

Thoreau, and we must continue to let it make still greater values. The payment we secure for what we do in civilization is not determined in amount by our own pure individual value, but by our value as a group member. Our value as *absolute* individuals is nearly zero—except possibly to ourselves; and the very fact that Thoreau did not stay very long in his lone cabin at Walden Pond seems proof that a hermit has a limited value even to himself. Complete isolation makes for insanity; while, on the other hand, complete submersion in the herd naturally makes for inanity.

Once more then, we see the great need for the humanist's *middle position*, the application of the principle of "nothing too much." The herd distrusts the extreme ideologist, and with good reason; while the individualist distrusts complete submersion in the herd, with equally good reason. But the humanist knows that the cohesion of the herd is absolutely necessary, since the conflicts and frictions of individuals would drive them far apart if the herd instinct did not exert a counter-pull, and would make for nothing but a series of Ishmaels in the world, with every man's hand raised against the other's. Not less herd development, but *more* is desirable, so that at last solidarity as large as all humanity will be accomplished. *But at the same time more individuality is demanded*, for the herd needs individuals as imperatively as the human body needs arms and legs. The humanist again insists that humanity and life *be seen steadily and seen whole*, not seen dismembered as herd and as individual separately. It is idle to speak of the individual as separate from the herd; a Solomon is called for to prove humanistically the folly of halving us. The very writers and artists who spend time fulminating against the herd are subsisting from the herd, and calculate their sense of importance in reference to it.

As President Arthur E. Morgan of Antioch College says: "Freedom and order tend to limit each other. Only with increase of character and intelligence can freedom and order increase together. Neither is of supreme or independent importance; each gives value to the other. Civilized society will constantly seek such a balance between the two as will result in the highest degree of well-being. 'We must have order,' affirms the conservative, and he proceeds to regiment life and to suppress freedom of thought and action as though the maintenance of the prevailing order were the supreme good. 'Freedom or death,' shouts the radical, and he resents all restraint, feeling that freedom in and of itself is a sacred right, and that limitation of freedom is intrinsically evil. Extreme inclination, both toward freedom and toward order, has caused untold conflict and waste in human effort. Neither freedom alone nor order alone, but *the most productive relationship between both freedom and order*, should be the social aim." Thus speaks the humanist; and the conclusion is obvious that we need to be as active in developing individuality as we are in developing group-mindedness. None is more earnest about this than the humanist.

39. "Standardization"—Monster or Bugaboo?—Like a boulder in the path of individuality, according to a considerable group of critics, lies the tendency of the herd to "standardize" individuals intolerably. The literature of the past fifteen years has been shot through with whining against standardization. It became virtually a standardization to whine about standardization.

All individuals, so ran the accusation, were in imminent danger of being pressed like wet clay into common brick molds; they were using the same slang, wearing the same clothes, eating the same kind of patent breakfast food,

going to see the same moving-pictures on the same day, singing the same song hits, bathing in the same kind of bath tubs, reading the same syndicated newspaper articles—and so on. There is none who has not heard the chanting of the standardization dirge *ad infinitum*. It was an excellent handle for political radicals to take hold of in damning the "present order"; and it was a most serviceable forelock for the haters of the "machine age" to pull in venting their spleen. Taking their accusations at their face value, one would imagine that Henry Ford had been engaged in manufacturing heroin with which to make 26 million "dope addicts" in America, so heinous was his crime, or the crime of any one who succeeded in making a great many duplicates of useful articles at a low price.

It has been the awakening of intelligences among their own number that has finally slowed down this whining about standardization. Stuart Chase has pointed out some of the logical absurdities of the standardized complaint about standardization. More authoritatively, Professor J. A. Hobson, famous English economist in *Economics and Ethics* has poked a very large hole in the complaint. "Industry," he points out, "is mostly concerned with bodily wants and utilities in which individual divergencies are smaller and fewer. There are certain goods that are good for all, or for most, and their standardization is a large net economy." Professor Hobson does not even stop here. He does not merely make the distinction between standardized merchandise and standardized *ideas*, as some of the more moderate critics do. He goes on to say: *"This applies likewise to things of the mind.* Thus there are certain common routines in education that are right and necessary, because minds, as well as bodies, are up to a certain level alike. Were it not so society would be impossible. But

well-ordered associations will not only furnish similar goods and services to similar persons, but will enable dissimilar persons to satisfy their dissimilar wants."

Surely this should dispose of at least the whining about standardized merchandise, since true individuality is surely not fretted or confined because a duplicate of the tooth-brush it uses (or the bathtub or breakfast food) is being used by the person next door. Surely it is obvious also that the individual who desires to have a carved ivory tooth-brush, or a wooden one, instead of the standardized one, may in America find abundant opportunity to express his individuality. Never before in all human history has an individual been offered such a wide variety of choices in food, clothes, mechanisms, education, religions, shades of political affiliation, modes of travel or books as today. Individuality might truly be called confined if its choices were narrowed down, like the prisoner's choice of food, to bread and water. But Lucullus never had such a choice of foods for his banquets as the ordinary well-paid skilled workman of today—nor indeed such a wide choice of political, social and religious philosophies, pleasures, conveyances, reading matter, places to go, things to do.

The whiners about standardization would appear either to be arguing against the great expansion in man's possible choices, or else maintaining that the presentation of these choices carries with it an imperial command to choose particular things. This is arrant nonsense, a weakling psychology. Never were American women more independent of the fashion steam roller than today; never were there more religious cults and sects freely proselyting; never was there a greater variety of organizations and groups of specialized, individual interests; never was the rule of "society" so weak; never were conventions—alas, even laws!—

less feared; and never were the American people more utterly unrestrained in being what they wanted to be. The standardizations of Mrs. Grundy, of the church, of parental authority, of precedent or of tradition were never more freely flouted than now.

Where is there any meaning in the whine about standardization? The meaning, once more, turns on a point in humanism: a weakness in inner character—the lack of a "will to refrain." The human spirit is not mere protozoa floating impotently with the tide, pushed hither and thither by any little wave. It is made of better stuff; it possesses and can, does or should use its will to refrain. The humanist refuses to think so meanly of human beings as to say that they cannot confront vastly increased choices and offerings without destroying their individuality. Indeed, humanists say just the opposite. Individuality is expressed, first and foremost, in *choice*, in rejection or acceptance. The human spirit that cannot make a choice or a rejection must obviously accept any fate that is thrust upon it. It certainly has not as much individuality as an oyster.

But America is not made of such jelly-fish spirit. Its record, on the contrary, is one of intense individualism, and it merely happens that at present it is gorging upon merchandise. The aspersion cast upon it that the large amount of advertising done in America makes up the public's mind for it, is entirely undeserved. As it actually works out humanistically, the greater the amount of advertising, the more critical the reader; just as the greater the number of fishermen the more wary become the trout. Merely to advertise is far from automatically enabling you to mold the public. The law of measure, of diminishing returns, of psychological attention and contrast, appeal and response, all enter the equation. Advertising brings no results, fre-

quently, and is actually a very uncertain art. This is due to the increasing discrimination of the public, as a result of such constant invitation to compare values. It is always the sailor and the lumberjack, freshly encountering the invitations of society's group activities, who are most excited by and least able to cope with these invitations. The sophisticated New Yorker, passing by a million shop-windows and advertisements every day, adapts himself or herself to them, and finds individuality *advanced* rather than retarded by multitudinous offerings. *Discrimination necessarily increases in ratio to choices offered;* and discrimination is the very stuff out of which true individuality is created.

As a matter of fact civilization invariably proceeds by enlarging the scope of standardization. Speech is a standardization; money is a standardization; manners and morals are standardizations—all equally vital to any group advance and labor-saving progress. The clear-eyed humanist has no love of standardization *as such;* he is committed to the great principle of Aristotle never to confuse the means with the end; never to use more instrumentality than is called for by the ideal of common sense and proportion. Consequently he does not acquire "inferiority complexes" or burst out with egoistic anger because he finds himself smoking the same cigarette as millions of others, driving the same make of car, wearing the same model of shoe, listening to the same radio program, reading the same Associated Press dispatches or feeling the same conviction about the fitness of a presidential candidate.

So much for the *pro* side of standardization. With his sense of moderation, the true humanist is far from insensible to such dangers as lie in excess application of standardization. He would not arbitrarily be different *merely in*

order to be different; that would be mere sophomoric attitudinizing. He would begin his differentiation at the roots of individuality by making choices which drape his individuality as neatly about him as a tailor fits a coat. He chooses because of an *inner*, not an outer urge, since the seat of his individuality is always inside himself. He uses "standardized" materials and ideas *only* because they fit this inner need, or because they are essentially meaningless to individuality in any event—like the toothbrush we have spoken of. The individuality which can be damaged by using the same toothbrush or the same make of bathtub as the next-door neighbor is so precarious that it is a fit subject for the psychiatrist.

In a lesser degree this is true of ideas which are accepted as standard; but here a large red signal of "danger ahead" must be erected, and a constant but not over-emphasized critical censor should preside. Flexibility of mind should be guarded as preciously as life itself, and the humanist would lay very particular stress upon it, because only by mental flexibility may the necessary readjustment of the means to the end be accomplished. Humanistic common sense is defeated when any standardized idea stays in place a moment longer than its efficiency toward a desirable humanistic end warrants. "Fixed ideas" of all kinds are regarded very suspiciously by the humanist; a strict skepticism is ever ready in the true humanist's mind to extinguish the flames of intolerance, intransigent prejudice, routinization of thought in the face of change, hostility to new data, assaults upon the independence of the human spirit, or attacks from the outside on the inner citadel of value-standards. Attempts at standardizations of *this* kind the humanist scorns as much as any one possibly could. But he does not believe that all standardizations, *per se*, are "in-

sidious" or "boring from within" in the bugaboo sense which has been so widely current. It smacks too much of Thoreau's post-office hating, or of spy-mania.

40. How Can Individuality Endure in Powerful Organization?—In a very real sense this is a crucial question, the crux of our modern problem. On how we answer depends much, in all departments of human activity. It is preëminently a problem to the solution of which humanism as a philosophy is adapted, for the humanist keeps in mind the "good ends" we seek, and the means; and he is constantly aware of the danger that the means will be mistaken for the ends. Starting as a means of bettering the human individual's lot, social organization has given signs of oppressing the individual. Social organization—as exemplified in Sovietism and Fascism, and even in our modern western industrial age—has gone tremendously far in limiting the individual in the name of the general good. It has even put squarely before us the question of whether the general social good is not of more importance than individual good. In this way we appear—as never before in human history—to be near to a decision whether or not we wish to build a society based on the model of the bee or the ant; a society in which the group is everything and the individual of minor consequence, completely specialized in function. Professor J. A. Hobson and H. G. Wells are among those who distinctly minimize men in favor of Man; who set the group far ahead of the individual, and to whom individuality is largely an illusion. In such a conception the individual is exceedingly like every other individual of the same function, and thus in an ant or bee organization it may truly be said that there is *group* individuality but no longer any other individuality.

As Hobson says, "The defect of intolerance is inherent

in every organization," and so we must be perfectly frank to admit that we must make a very serious choice from three alternatives: (1) that we will develop (as the Russian Soviet is developing) into a bee-like form of social organization, with a repressive iron hand upon the individual; (2) that we will carefully balance the individual and the group values, increasing both; (3) that we will minimize the group organization and put every emphasis upon the individual. At the present time America is theoretically in the third position—where it has been since its earliest history; but it is making such remarkable technical progress in linking people together that we are rapidly moving toward the first position, toward greater socialization.

This is what makes the conflict, the outcries, the confusion. Since a body cannot occupy two positions at the same time, we are torn with the pull of opposing forces, fighting in the dark without the clear philosophy and choice which would heal us and speed our progress. Our ideal is individuality, but our increasing practice is organization and conformity, at least in outward matters, while at the same time our will-to-individuality is weakened by the general melée. Every time we invent a new means of communication or travel, or a new labor saver, or organize a larger merger, or work out a broader-scale coöperation plan, we are—as Karl Marx predicted—bringing our civilization closer to socialization; operating in larger units, more centrally controlled, and calling for more regulation by the state as a natural factor of public safety. We are thus in the desperate plight of engineers opening wide the throttle of a train going in the opposite direction from which we are instinctively desirous of going. We have in our hearts a deeply embedded sense of individualism, but our cunning hands and brains seem to make and operate only express

trains that go swiftly *away* from that individualism. Of all the places America does *not* want to go, the principal is a Soviet-bee-ant type of socialization, with a crushing hand upon the individual. But to *this* extent we have been going toward the Soviet-ant-bee type of organization: we have earnestly organized ourselves to improve our material comfort, spread wealth democratically, reduced our interest in supernatural religion, demolished class distinctions, centralized our controls.

What are we going to do about this paradox in our lives? The humanist has the answer ready. He reasons in this way: Why not use the saner middle course—the second alternative? Obviously we have not the slightest interest in a sovietism (or any other force) which would lay hands upon our freedom to think, speak and act, or which would expect us to glorify a state or the social organization. As humanists we believe that individual man is at least as important as any form of organization he may create, or as human society as a whole. Therefore why not set our philosophy on this base, and if we have been so very earnest and clever in advancing the interests of the mass, why should we not set about to be equally clever in advancing the interests of the individual? Why not devise and teach a philosophy which will exalt both society and the individual? Why not set to work to *decentralize* our increasing central controls, and give individuality freer scope? Why not thrill for the next fifty years over the making of splendid individuals and the development of *qualities* in individuals—just as for the last fifty years we have thrilled at the making of inventions, quantities of goods and gargantuan forms of organization that bound us into ever larger units? Why not stress the *inner* values as persistently and as indefatigably as we have stressed *outer* values in these

fifty years? Finally, the humanist asks, why these extremes, such as alternative No. 1 and No. 3, when alternative No. 2 is one which preserves the best of both?

Is there a serious answer to the humanist? Hobson asks whether one Darwin or one Mozart is worth as much as a hundred million happy negroes, but he does not venture an answer. The humanist is willing to answer this searching query by saying that you cannot compare unlike things; that both have their value and both can develop and exist simultaneously without destroying each other, if we operate a humanistic philosophy. He will go further and say that a Darwin or a Mozart will be more likely to develop, and also will be happier and more comfortable, if there also exist the hundred thousand happy negroes. There is no rigid, absolute choice offered us between a Darwin or a Mozart and the happy negroes; it is precisely the brushing aside of these absolutist choices of extremes which the humanist insists upon.

The humanist has not found any adequate answer opposing his choice of alternative No. 2, and from experience with extremes in other phases of life, he strongly suspects that there is no answer. If it is argued that the huge consolidations are going right on regardless of the humanist and socializing us in fewer and fewer economic units, the humanist who knows his industrial world intimately calmly replies that as a matter of fact a powerful *decentralizing* force is now at work in industry. The great industrialists (who are more and more found to be humanists, or giving way to humanists) have discovered that it is a vast fallacy to centralize human effort in one organization; so they are deliberately and effectively splitting up their great interests into nearly autonomous individual units. The Du Ponts have done this very successfully, as have the General Mo-

tors Corporation, the General Electric Corporation, Kroger Stores, and others. Otto H. Kahn, the famous banker and humanist, recently said: "I believe in decentralization in everything—in government, in business and in art. That is to my mind the best solution or prescription for living conditions which we face in our age." The men who run the constituent parts of such loosely federated, decentralized industrial interests are given the high dignity and almost the power of an actual owner, and the results by which alone they are judged include the results of public good will, employee good will, continuous employment, and value rendered to the public, just as much as sheer profits. Since these great federations are owned so largely by the public, the entire aspect of industry is assuming—gradually of course—a quasi-public character; the dignity and scope of individual initiative of the smaller manager is *rising* instead of falling in consequence. In a similar way the small retail shop, if efficiently and individualistically run, can and does outpoint the large store.

For such reasons the humanist says that we have nothing to fear from large-scale organization, so long as we keep a loose-rein check upon it and exercise freely the power of friendly but critical public opinion upon its directors. The troubles of the large chain stores in recent times have demonstrated significantly the folly of too extensive a centralization of control of business, and too mechanical and dehumanized a conception of it. The robot-like local chain store manager (the ideal of the centralizers), operated by push-buttons from headquarters two or three thousand miles away, cannot be made to perform like a human being, or become accepted as one in his community. Indeed he is being made a local pariah.

Industrialists who are not humanists are taught merci-

lessly by events that they do not fit America, because America is sensing the humanistic philosophy and calling for it, whether or not it knows it by name. The "absolutist" centralizers, on the one hand, and the naturistic unrestrained individualists, on the other, are being turned out of their places of power, and humanists are being selected to fill their shoes. The humanist industrialists believe in the individual. "The personnel problem is industry's greatest problem," they repeatedly say; and what they mean is that they are crying out for men of independent judgment, initiative, broad capacity, with a way and will of their own —but also a brain able to absorb group knowledge. They want to lay heavy responsibilities on such men's shoulders, to keep away from them and give them their chance to function like dignified, responsible human beings of parts and of power. They are overjoyed when they find such men; the material they encounter is too often either toughly and narrowly individualistic and undisciplined, or submissive, flabby and shallow. It is not individuality such as David Harum's or Mrs. Wiggs of the Cabbage Patch's or Sam Weller's that is called for today, but a more genuinely *inner* individuality, which has absorbed neither too much nor too little so that its individual opinions have a real value.

Individuality certainly can endure in powerful organization; *it can even thrive there better than anywhere else,* but it must have unusually open mental pores. The individuality which is merely idiosyncratic and arbitrary, too tough-minded or too tender-minded, has little chance in a day of large-scale organization. It must be a humanistic individuality which freely draws values from both sides of itself—from pure individualism as well as pure socialization. Individuality must freely absorb the important values which

social organization can offer; while on the other hand social organization needs to know well the inestimable values which the individual can bring. *Absolute* individualism, like absolute anything else, is a demon of the mind, and without meaning. Merely *picturesque* individuality is equally shallow.

41. What is True Individuality?—Whatever is separable or loosely put together is never individual. Whatever is a thoroughgoing, cohesive, undividable unity is true individuality. Because of this we have developed some very paradoxical and unsound ideas of individuality. Realizing that true individuality is *unchanging* individuality, we have inclined to give the palm of marked individuality to people who have certain fixed ideas, certain fixed levels of culture, certain fixed physical characteristics. Thus Bryan and his dreadful fixation on free silver and later on Fundamentalism gave him a certain "individuality"; thus the characters of Dickens were called individual because they were on a certain level of illiteracy, or had certain unchanging outward characteristics. George Moore once asserted that there was more individuality in an illiterate parlor maid than in her cultured mistress; and we all understand the sense in which this is true. But it supposes that she stays a parlor maid who says "ain't" and "Gawd" all her life. In Europe she does, but not in America.

We strongly tend to "tag" and "ticket" people with an outward characteristic, much as a caricaturist does. When you think of one man you think of his nasal twang; with another you think of his monocle or his red hair or his way of laughing. Actually, none of these things is truly individual, because they are not at the real heart of the individual; they are only outward, surface characteristics. There are many people with red hair or monocles or similar laughter.

But the particular combination of outlook on life, temperament, philosophy, will and special abilities, encased out of sight *inside the body,* is the real individual. It is the inner part where the individual makes his last stand against life, which is continually assaulting individuality and trying to break apart the special combination, like waves dashing against a stubborn rock.

Many people suffer from a sense of non-individuality. They have none too strong a will, and a sense of their individual lack of worth. They lack confidence in their own combination of qualities, and thus "borrow" individuality by imitation, or change individualities, chameleon-like, according to whom they are with. Such people need particularly to absorb the humanist philosophy of high human worth, and of inwardness and independence. The tremendous emphasis in our industrial age on outward things has tended powerfully to build this "inferiority complex," to rob people of their confidence in their individualities; and only the stronger egos have been able to resist. The powerful social forces have shouted down the inner voices and thus endangered true individuality in more timid people. In a sense the machine civilization has *cowed* and intimidated individuality, but it has done so, the humanist says, not because it must *necessarily* do so, but because individuality has failed to guard itself, strengthen itself, develop itself. This is what the humanist philosophy proposes that we do. It aims to encourage people to listen to their own drums, instead of the drums of the regiment exclusively.

42. Concentration on Strength Rather Than on Weakness.—True individuality lies not so much in making desperate efforts to be different, or in changing certain weak qualities over into others, *but in making full use in action of such strong qualities as the individual possesses.* It is the

great crime of the supernaturalists that they have frittered away too much of the precious time of human beings trying to press triangular individualities into circular molds; trying to amputate the limbs of human individuality in the belief that they were ungodlike, instead of using them. They have concentrated outrageously *on man's weaknesses* instead of *on man's strengths*, on man's sins instead of man's glories, on don'ts instead of do's. "I will forgive action which is mistaken, but I cannot forgive inaction," said a famous industrialist. In the same way true individuality is always positive, because only then does it take on definite character.

On the other hand, it is the crime of the naturists that they have offered no system of values whatsoever, that they have pessimistically assumed the doctrine of utter human weakness and negativity. They have piled up so much psychological knowledge of human frailty that Karl Menninger can say in *The Human Mind* that there are no normal people, that we are all "broken personalities." This statement has as little genuine importance as the statement of the Life Extension Institute that after examining the bodies of hundreds of thousands of people, no perfect body was discovered. *Frailty is unimportant, strength is all-important.* It is from this premise that the humanist criticizes modern psychology, so deeply obsessed with the abnormal. Only the humanist has applied measure and balance, apparently, to our ideas of the worth of human beings, and refuses to be stampeded into the belief that our weaknesses rather than our strengths are the vital keys to our individuality. The humanist knows that much more individuality and power result from concentrating on exercising the strong qualities than from concentrating on trying to repair the weak ones. The humanist insists that it is far more constructive to give time to practising one's

virtues than to suppressing one's weaknesses. It is a grave error to believe, as some do, that humanism is concerned chiefly with suppressions, sublimations and restraints; with "playing safe" and maintaining a colorless equipoise; with "neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring." Humanism has always numbered among its adherents red-blooded and forth-right individualists from Rabelais, Leonardo da Vinci, Lorenzo and Goethe onward to George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. It has no patience with pallid individuality, and its very philosophy calls for courage and trust in human capacity and in individual intuition. It is the naturists who are over-pessimistic and the supernaturalists who are over-optimistic. The humanist believes in *"a tempered optimism,"* as Professor Charles A. Beard, author of *Whither Mankind,* phrases it. Such a tempered optimism is as important and preferred a state as the temperate zones of the globe are important and preferred as climate for humans.

Believing so heartily in the need for more individuality, humanism urges that the special and peculiar qualities which represent a particular person be capitalized as they stand, without either the self-mutilation, shame, suppression or distortion, or the glorification of a mythical soul which the supernaturalist appears to stress; and without the morbid, gloating, defiant preoccupation with human frailty and contemptuous worthlessness which marks the naturist. The humanist is perfectly aware of both strengths and weaknesses, insisting that they should be subjected to logical disciplines and subordinated to good ends; but as a matter of vital strategy of life—on the authority of intuition—he concentrates his attention on the powers in which he feels confidence.

Strength and action and dynamic thinking are the ele-

ments which the humanist relies upon; dynamic thinking which is whole-bodied and effective because it is not afraid to face facts, nor afraid to use faith for a working hypothesis; dynamic thinking which refuses to become mired in the facts or wafted into thin air via other-worldly mysticism, both of which subtly undermine the individuality, integrity and worth of the human body and mind.

The corrosive influence of this other-worldliness is to be seen in India, truly a vast museum-full of exhibits pertinent to an education in humanism. The *Upanishads* (earliest Hindu scriptures) set forth that *it is passion which leads to action.* Buddhism echoes this thought, and then follows the oblique deduction in the *Bhagavad-Gita* (later Hindu scriptures) that since passion and desire are at the root of action, and action is the source of all evil, then passion and desire and their result, action, must all be regarded as man's enemies, against which the preacher of religion must contend.* Little wonder that India, following such a philosophy of life, has become devitalized, when all bodily existence and action are regarded as misery, all individuality viewed as illusion, and release from it the only heaven. The Christian supernaturalists actually derive their basic ideas from ancient India, and weakness and sin and futility of earthly things are equally a factor in both religions.

Curiously enough, the naturists, the pessimistic wing of the intellectualists, have come to this precise general goal by an entirely different route. They too discovered that passion and desire lead to action, and on eagerly adjusting the microscope to their eyes, these intellectuals have discovered that passion and desire (and their various patterns,

* For fuller details see *The Bhagavad-Gita,* by Franklin Edgerton. Note also that the Bhagavad-Gita in a self-contradictory manner also preaches a more humanistic "discipline of action."

making for individuality) are a network of tensions, tautnesses, pulls and pushes, stresses and strains which are anchored deep down in the gruesome bottom of our earthly pit. They have discovered that there are fractures and warts and scars on every individual pattern of passion and desire, and in consequence they insist that we are all broken personalities, that love is mere refracted illusion, that we are weak, ridiculous puppets, that our individuality is a sordid assembly of complexes. Those naturists who are not despairing pessimists, reviling man as a hideous accident, are busily dreaming of a heaven which goes by the name of utopia (just as the supernaturalists dream). Such believers in utopia are as authentically religious in their belief as the supernaturalists. Communism, as John Dewey has said, is the soviet *religion,* with every one of the earmarks of a religion, not even omitting an inquisition or a foreign missionary system.

Both are equally disastrous to individuality, and to human life on the humanistic plane. The glory of the individual, the promise and possibilities of human strength, the development of a genuinely free spirit are lost causes, the humanist fears, under any philosophy but that of humanism. It is no accident that great human genius and plentiful individuality have occurred mainly during the periods when humanism was a widespread philosophy—in Athens, and in Florence, Venice, London and Paris, after the supernaturalist rigors had relaxed. Humanism encourages human strength, individuality and action, and puts human weakness and futilitarian negativity in their place—as it puts in its place every other aspect of life that threatens to mar the harmony of the whole by a cancerous over-growth. Human individuality tends most surely to become what it has the faith and confidence to become. No philosophy offers

to the individual greater promise and assurance of becoming than the philosophy of humanism, for none rates his powers more highly.

VIII

The Creation of Rounded Personality

In the pregnant words of A. E. Orage, "Remember you are a pianist and not a piano. *Act,* do not merely be *acted upon.*"

In such phrases one visualizes the high human dignity and importance upon which the humanist insists; the call to be more than inert matter floating to and fro on a meaningless, directionless sea. Instinctively, on hearing such a pointed and barbed command to live up to the full stature of one's human possibilities, one straightens up and increases the tension (which may have slackened momentarily) between the lower elements of life and the higher possibilities; between the drag of mere static, instinctive existence and the dynamic power of individual will and creative imagination.

We are at the beginning of an era of far greater attention to personality and human values, of more appreciation of *being* as against *doing*. We have for several centuries

overstressed *doing* things as against *being* things. We have failed to make a connection between doing and being, because we have considered the doing as an end instead of as a means, and cared too little whether all our doing resulted in a growth of being. *Quantity* does not bear a very close relation to *quality*, and we have slurred what relation there is. We have as a consequence a "quantitative" civilization rather than a "qualitative" one. We can boast of many things that are the biggest, the highest, the longest, the largest and the strongest, but we are remarkably lacking in what is the finest, the most mellowed, the most rounded, the most balanced, the most beautiful, the most cultured, the most wise, the most spiritual. We have been *acted upon* by our instincts of acquisition, accumulation, construction and competitiveness. We have not acted aggressively toward the good life conceived as a whole, to fulfill our personality and round it. This is what we are now more interested in than anything else, it seems increasingly clear.

Explanations why we have not done this before are easy: our shaping of a new country, our mixed mob of all kinds of people, so many of them low-grade. But we will have no patience with explanations. Let us "take our medicine straight," and believe Frank Notch when he says, in *King Mob*, "this is an age when great spirits perish, done to death by a formula." This formula is undoubtedly following the path of least resistance by loving things and motion rather than loving selective character values; being acted upon rather than acting. As Emil Ludwig says, "Greatness is always masculine; it is always productive, never receptive; always gives, never receives." It is never merely acted upon. Nor does Ludwig necessarily mean this to be true

only of Lincolns and Shakespeares; he means it for even apparently ordinary lives.

43. **The Vital Need for Roundness of Personality.**— Mere trust in immature desire, flux, free-flowing experience never makes for rounded personality. Nature never produces a perfect circle; that is for man's conscious art to accomplish.

There are enormously powerful forces arrayed against the rounding of personality. First there is inheritance, which spatters out an arbitrary pattern, one that is practically never rounded out. To this extent is true Karl A. Menninger's statement we are all incomplete, partly sick and broken personalities. Freud would go further and say that we are a mass of accidentally acquired obsessions, inhibitions, shocks, complexes and emotions of a strength decided by the state of our glands. There is nothing "rounded" about us, unless we consciously strive to put it there.

Education is supposed to round us out, but the world of education is amazingly confused on this issue, since hundreds of thousands of young people of constantly lower average levels of intelligence crowd at the gates of colleges, mainly for the social values involved or to qualify for some specialized vocation. Specialization is undoubtedly winning against the rounded personality, in the colleges. The average college produces mainly *extraverts* (people whose chief interest is in objects and externals), with a quite small percentage of pure introverts (people who care only for mental or inner things in the world of idea and fancy). It is a nice question which of these two extremes represents the least-rounded personality!

Away with such extremes, says the humanist; let us have less specialization and make more determined efforts

to develop a sane and rounded personality which will include both extravert and introvert tendencies. We have undoubtedly been proceeding along false lines. A child which shows a tendency to live in a world of fancy and to care little for home chores, but keeps its head buried in books, scarcely noting what is going on, is frequently encouraged to continue in this unbalanced state, the parents taking a kind of pride in the child's "studiousness." The same is true of the boy who early shows a desire to take clocks apart and to be interested only in mechanical objects. The parents whisper that he will be an engineer some day. Nothing could illustrate better than these two familiar instances the tolerance of formless, unbalanced extremes and failure to apply any rounding treatment. It is not necessary or advisable to stop the child from reading or from taking the clock apart, but it is exceedingly advisable to contrive to surround both children with stimulations and opportunities for other interests.

The human spirit is not a mere single instrument or mechanism. A screw-driver does not have to be also a chisel, a plane, a hammer and a saw; but the human spirit with its complex instincts and capacities can never achieve rounded happiness from an unrounded, highly specialized personality. It is true, many men of science devote themselves utterly to one small specialty, and are happy in this devotion; and their private life may be unruffled and calm. But they cannot be said to be very fully human, and their happiness, such as it is, is confined within a pitifully small space and time. They are mere shadows in a world of men; their devotion is noble but their sacrifice is not yet proved to be necessary.

It is related how a German professor of philology visited England and attended a tea in his honor, at which

gathered the flower of Oxford intellect in nearly all branches of human knowledge. Asked later if he had enjoyed it, the German professor shrugged his shoulders. "But there was no other philologist there!" he exclaimed, unable longer to hide his boredom! When even college professors, our repositories of learning, can no longer find common ground to spend an hour together, specialization may be seen to have fallen to its nadir of disservice to humanity. It should be added that the intense pre-war German professionalism, taking a leaf out of England's book, has now softened somewhat. The Englishman is incurably amateurish in his outlook, and dislikes narrow professionalism, which accounts for his far more rounded personality.

The German philologist is only the counterpart of our American obsession with specialization; he is blood brother to the American business man who, when asked by his wife if he had enjoyed himself at a dinner party, shrugged his shoulders and complained that there had been no plumbing supply man present with whom he could discuss the only subject he knew! It has of course long been notorious that American business men are pitifully unrounded personalities, but it has not been so widely known that such narrowness is not a monopoly of business men but extends to all the arts, sciences and every human activity. Specialization has thrown its blight over us all.

It is now abating, however, because a number of forces have come to the rescue of human personality. Not only a humanistic philosophy, but actual technical developments are forcing changes.

44. The Era of Specialization Recedes.—Like flood waters which envelop everything, and because of their very extreme finally fall, so the age of specialization has been falling slowly from its high-water mark—leaving, it is

true, a characteristic layer of unsightly deposit everywhere.

Specialization was one of the typical "absolutes" of an inhuman era, which subordinated all ends to the means, or rather simply failed to recall that a human being is not a tool or means to an end, but an end in himself. The theory on which this and other extremes usually work is that if specialization is a good thing, we can not have too much of it. Specialization is of course to some degree necessary and valuable. It is one of the foundation stones of civilization. Subdivision of labor is one of the triumphs of man's brain. It would be necessary to unravel the entire fabric of civilization to get away from it. But it loudly calls to be applied with a humanistic sense of measure.

Fortunately another powerful force has joined the humanistic protest. Technical development now indicates what the humanist intuitively knew—that an unrounded personality is never so competent, even at a technical task, as a rounded personality. Judgment, imagination and skill gain through the ability to compare, to draw strength from many varied skills and ideas, and through reasoning by analogy from other compartments of knowledge. A group of young army engineers, trapped during a war in the Near East at a river's edge, was saved not by engineering skill but by the recollection of one of its number of his boyhood farm days and what could be done with a sheepskin. Humanistic knowledge, not specialized knowledge saved the day. Even the arts are interrelated, and modern business is learning to apply a synthesis of art, science, sociology, psychology, economics and other values and techniques, where once only the bold instinct for acquisition and a knack at horse-trading were the guides.

Henry Ford has put the case in a symposium in a new

book* *A Philosophy of Production:* "The release from special requirements brings the opportunity or the necessity to widen the individual's field of work, so that now we find a generation of men who know how to be helpful along many lines; who, in fact, have a very moderate amount of knowledge of half a dozen jobs instead of a knowledge of only one job. The old gibe about a Jack-of-all-trades is out of fashion. No knowledge now comes amiss to a man in doing his work. So many formerly unrelated lines of work now enter into the production of the simplest article that a man must be made versatile in spite of himself. We have discovered that though a man may never attain the status of a specialist on any job, which few ever attained even under the old system, he can attain a moderate mastery of half a dozen different kinds of jobs as easily as of one. An ability to work at a wide variety of tasks with an understanding of what he is doing is a necessary characteristic of the new kind of general workmen that modern industry needs."

In such a view emerges clearly a humanist trend, or a verification of the humanist view. It applies equally to any task a human being may undertake, even in laboratory research, for we now see the group laboratory taking the place of the lone inventor or research worker, and the modification of the evils of individual specialization by acceptance of more general ideas of the humanistic good life. The business man of today smiles rather indulgently at the old tales of the "early-to-bed-early-to-rise," terrifically concentrated captains of industry of several generations ago, who were crude, unhappy, unsocial, unable to enjoy the wealth they so inordinately loved, even after they

* "A Philosophy of Production," a Symposium by Owen Young, Henry Ford, Walter Gifford, Sir Philip Gibbs, Earnest Elmo Calkins, etc. Business Bourse, New York.

attained it. We seem hardly to have noted that the present generation of business men is quite far removed from this standard. It works fewer hours, plays, enjoys music and the arts, travels, and has many civic and cultural interests, at the same time utilizing an increasing number of all these rounded values in business itself. The entire commercial technique is being humanized. Extremes are being throttled down and the means to ends prevented more and more from becoming ends in themselves.

We have broken the back of unhuman specialization, and a more mellow humanistic philosophy is slowly pervading all fields of activity in regard to subdivision of labor. The decentralizing movement in industry and in retail distribution means a definite recapture of some of the values of all-aroundness, by discouraging the making of automatons of store managers and executives in big business, and by substituting the opposite idea of loading as much decentralized responsibility and authority on them as possible. Even in medicine the system of specialists, which also has run to inhuman extremes, is now being modified in favor of the general practitioner.

The modern humanistic idea is not to discard the specialist but to humanize him or permit him to humanize himself. The humanist does not want a nation of specialists, or even a great class of specialists, unless the specialization is a part of a fairly well-rounded personality. The humanist actually suspects the unrounded specialist of leading him astray. No other group can so boldly or harmfully misuse its knowledge and prestige against the general human good as the specialists who are without due roundness. They have not the humanist sense of measure, and they have no saving sense of the whole or of general human good ends.

45. What is Rounded Personality?—To see how im-

portant our subject is, one has only to look at Karl A. Menninger's seven malformed types of personality (in his book *The Human Mind*). These are—

(1) *Crippled Personalities:* people who have physical defects or organic diseases or faulty, ill bodies or mind (victims of tuberculosis, deafness, gland troubles, paresis, etc., who show effects of their condition in their minds and acts).

(2) *Stupid Personalities:* morons, cases of border-line feebleminded-ness, stupidity, etc. (Bear in mind that war tests showed that 7 out of 10 people had a mental age of 15 or under.)

(3) *Lonely Personalities:* lonely by reason of poverty, isolation, wealth, being an only child, feeling inferior, or some other cause.

(4) *Queer Personalities:* queer because seclusive or hard-boiled or artistic or grouchy or suspicious or radical.

(5) *Moody Personalities:* moody because constantly shifting from happiness to sadness; always being in either an "up" phase or a "down" phase.

(6) *Frustrated, Neurotic Personalities:* having doubts, fears, anxieties, obsessions, hysterias.

(7) *Antisocial, Perverse Personalities:* ne'er-do-wells, criminals, drug addicts, the hard-boiled, surly, antagonistic types.

The Menninger view of all of us as "broken personalities," is a typical "specialist's" point of view. The tonsil specialist is sure that all human ills arise from bad tonsils, and the colon specialists is sure all ills arise in the colon. Applying a due, friendly sense of measure, however, the humanist would put the matter in this way: in all likelihood every person has visible signs of *a tendency* in one of these seven directions, many people undoubtedly a strongly marked tendency. For this reason the classifications are useful, because it is always the accentuated part of one's self (like a prominent nose) which identifies us, even though it is not really representative of us. If we consciously and courageously pick out which one of these seven tendencies

we lean toward, we will have our first and most important clue to greater roundness of personality. Bear in mind that there is no use denying and protesting; we will surely find that our personalities are exaggerated in one or more of these directions. It may shock us to face ourselves with this selection, and it must be remembered that we may lean toward it ever so slightly, but if we do we must confess it willingly. The procedure then is to erect safeguards lest we go too far in that direction. A very important aid toward eliminating an undesirable mental tendency is to know about it and to appraise it coolly.

The rounding process is always a healing process. Not one of these seven types of unbalanced personality could develop, if the person started early enough to round himself; in fact lack of such roundness is in nearly every instance the chief reason for such a state. The statements of our psychiatrists that more and more people are needing treatment for one or another of these seven tendencies is proof of the growing need for rounding our personalities.

46. **Checking Up the Elements of Your Personality.**—To prevent confused thinking about rounded personality, it may be not too much out of place to chart personality more in detail. A rounding process may consist of widening not only one's subjects of interest, but also one's personality qualities of temperament and spirit.

There are presented below two groups of personality qualities, each containing 25 items. It is an interesting and instructive proceeding to rate oneself on these qualities. To do so, the simple plan is to deliberate over each one, and rate yourself by means of a figure from zero to 4 on each item; using decimals, such as 1.5, 2.8, 3.7, etc., for greater fractional accuracy. When all 25 of the items in Group A have been rated, add up the figures. The result-

ant represents your rating. 100 is perfect, 90 very unusual, 80 excellent, 70 very good, 60 good, 50 fair, etc. Follow the same procedure for Group B. When ratings for both groups have been completed, combine the two figures and divide by two. This will produce a fairly significant general figure indicating the roundness or lack of roundness of your personality.

Group A Personality Qualities

1. Cheerfulness
2. Freedom from changeability
3. Freedom from occasional extreme depression
4. Freedom from quick temper
5. Promptness of recovery from anger
6. Freedom from liability to extreme anger
7. Aesthetic feeling
8. Humor
9. Desire to excel at performances
10. Freedom from tendency to impose will on others
11. Eagerness for admiration
12. Belief in own powers
13. Self-esteem
14. Freedom from superciliousness
15. Fondness for large social gatherings
16. Fondness for small social gatherings of intimate friends
17. Ease of laughter
18. Playfulness
19. Corporate spirit (loyalty)
20. Trustworthiness
21. Conscientiousness
22. Deference
23. Thoughtfulness
24. Desire to be liked
25. Tact

Group B Personality Qualities

1. Wide influence
2. Friendship capacity
3. Mental capacity
4. Courtesy
5. Manners
6. Sympathy
7. Thought for the future
8. Power to overcome obstacles
13. Originality
14. Modesty
15. Physique (health and vitality)
16. Talent
17. Leadership
18. Athletics
19. Strength of will

Group B Personality Qualities—(Continued)

9. Tendency not to abandon a task from mere changeability
10. Quick apprehension
11. Profound apprehension (deep thinking)
12. Common sense
20. Small talk
21. Vivacity
22. Social ease
23. Magnetism
24. Lack of self-centeredness
25. Good looks

47. **Qualities of Human Character.**—Another interesting chart is shown on an adjacent page. This is on a different principle, charting the degree with which you possess certain personality or character qualities *or their opposites*. The procedure is to make a ring with a pencil at the figure which represents a fair marking for you on Item 1, and then to draw a pencil line to the ring representing your marking on Item 2, and so down the entire list. When completed, and when the chart is held up horizontally, with the figures 1 to 5 toward the top of the paper, the effect will be that of a regular graphic chart, all markings below the middle line representing deficient personality, or "below par" as on a financial chart showing the dip of prices below normal.

Personality is an extremely difficult factor to capture and describe, but its elements are after all classifiable. For what it is worth we shall include a series of twelve factors making for genuinely good personality which the author prepared some time ago:

1. *Consistency in always holding to your special characteristics*
2. *Accentuating your special characteristics, especially those which are your best—those your unconscious self partakes in*
3. *Harmonizing all your characteristics so as not to present to view a broken pattern*
4. *Spontaneity in your actions and manner, so as to give grace and line and naturalness to yourself*

ROUNDED PERSONALITY

1. Careful	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Careless
2. Daring	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Cautious
3. Ambitious	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Unambitious
4. Unselfish	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Selfish
5. Punctual	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Tardy
6. Sweet-Tempered	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Bad-Tempered
7. Accurate	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Inaccurate
8. Industrious	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Lazy
9. Modest	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Vain
10. Constant	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Changeable
11. Enthusiastic	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Indifferent
12. Firm	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Yielding
13. Trustful	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Distrustful
14. Brave	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Cowardly
15. Clever	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Stupid
16. Good Memory	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Bad Memory
17. Self-Confident	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Self-Distrustful
18. Deliberate	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Hasty
19. Observant	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Unobservant
20. Sociable	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Unsociable
21. Orderly	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Disorderly
22. Cheerful	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Gloomy
23. Patient	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Impatient
24. Ready to Forgive	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Holding a Grudge
25. Humble	1 2 3 4 5	6 7 8 9 10	Egoistic

48. Chart of Personality Opposites

5. *Courtesy in contact with others, particularly innate courtesy*

6. *Leadership, being the earmark of supreme personality*

7. *Definite convictions, definite ideas, definite goals, definite philosophy of life*

8. *Human oddity and even human weakness, which are genuine parts of personality, and over which one should never feel inferior or embarrassed*

9. *Personal neatness, cleanliness and good taste—fundamental in attractive personality*

10. *Modulated voice, good English and verbal charm of expression*

11. *The inner spirit of a person, which has a way of escaping all methods of camouflage and registering itself on others*

12. *The ability never to take yourself too seriously—a final psychological personality secret.*

49. The Introvert and Extravert Personalities.—Any discussion of the rounding of personality would be quite vague and unscientific without reference to the very important modern classification of human beings by psychologists into two basic classes: (1) *introvert*—the type of personality which takes little interest in external objects, but a great deal of interest in inwardness, ideas and fancy; and (2) *extravert*—the type of personality which has very little interest in ideas but a great deal of interest in external objects and people. Even casual observation will confirm the fact that most of us are roughly classifiable as belonging to one or the other of these main divisions of human personality. That is to say, we slant more or less definitely toward one or the other of these directions, even if we are a mixture of both.

The personality of the introvert tends to move toward the center, *or inward*; whereas that of the extravert tends to move *outward*. The typical introvert finds himself and books, solitude, meditation much more agreeable than ob-

jects, people or working with his or her hands upon materials or people. The typical extravert loves mechanics, objects, people, action, motion, manual labor, management, social groups, etc., and is not studious or meditative. For these reasons many of our geniuses have been introverts, and not well adapted to the outside world. In consequence America, with its great stress upon inventions, comforts, luxuries, building, movement and organization, has an admitted lack of the traditional kind of genius. Our characteristic national genius is extravert. Our ideal and hero is the engineer, the business man, the man of action. To see a nation whose characteristic genius is introvert, we must go to India. In both America and India these opposites of personality have been overdeveloped, and need balancing.

The classifications of introvert and extravert, however, are too rough; there are further subdivisions, as Beatrice Hinkle shows in *The Re-Creating of the Individual.* The two types break down, each into three sub-classifications, as follows:

Introvert: (1) simple and clearly marked; (2) *objective* introverts (whose inwardness is not mental, but simply self-centeredness); (3) *subjective* or emotional introverts, who are not clearly marked introverts, but tend to shift unsteadily from extravert to introvert characteristics.

Extravert: (1) simple and clearly marked; (2) *objective* extraverts, (whose interest is very markedly in *things,* without any interest in subjects, and who are self-centered); (3) *subjective* or emotional extraverts, who are not clearly marked extraverts and shift unsteadily from one to the other.

These six classifications explain many conflicting human actions and points of view, for the entire valuation of life is different according to the classification into which a person falls. The extravert finds the world of affairs simple

and easy, whereas he finds himself bewildered in the world of ideas. The introvert finds the world of affairs very difficult and straining, but the world of inwardness and ideas familiar and simple. The philosophy of life of each is very different, as that of President Roosevelt (an extravert) was different from that of President Wilson (an introvert).

The subjective or emotional extravert and the subjective or emotional introvert both use a good deal of intuition, but it is usually too little mixed with reason and too much mixed with mere feeling to be as good a guide as it might be. The objective extravert and the objective introvert both rely so strongly on the external world that intuition is a somewhat negligible term to them, and they do not easily live by it. Consequently they are not easily made into humanists, or into followers of any philosophy which calls for thinking. They are much more amenable to external authority—the Catholic Church for example, or any fixed standard. Spirit and philosophy are not matters of much interest or importance to them, for they live a day-to-day existence in their immediate surroundings.

Even to these, however, humanism has an important appeal, because it ends some of the uneasiness they feel over their lack of spirituality. They are often naturists, if they can think, but more often supernaturalists in some form. Both are uneasy because they notice how little care they have for the "other-worldliness" which is in religion, or if they are naturists, how materialistic and uninspired they are. Humanism—being a philosophy more accurately fitted to human need—makes these strains, these feelings of unworthiness, of inferiority and drab, disillusioned pessimism disappear. It gives a nobility to human nature as it stands, with its higher as well as lower self; and by reason of its flexibility (having a place in it for both religion and

skepticism) humanism is just as valuable for the extravert as for the introvert.

50. **How Rounding Out Is Accomplished.**—Can either type be rounded out? Must one always be an introvert or an extravert? The humanist answers yes to the first question, no to the second. Personality is a process, and while doubtless the scales will always tilt in the original direction, *the extent to which they tilt can be lessened.* In other words the almost pure extravert ("gauche of appearance, painfully anxious to escape observation; prickly, inaccessible, haughty; headstrong in pursuit of ideas, and uninfluencable; uneasy with, and neglectful of others, impractical"—as Jung describes him) may become a far more rounded personality. He may do it by his own studies, by his regard for others who stand in the relation of advisor to him, or by the rough schooling of hard knocks. Jung himself, it should be noted, according to Harvey O'Higgins, developed the extravert side of himself remarkably, in order to counterbalance his very decided introvert character. He did it through his scientific work. Rounded personality is a realizable ideal, and if a person is aware of being one or the other of the two types, he should choose as a vocation or avocation an activity which educates the other lobe of his brain. An introvert who cultivates sports, society, scientific experiment, or an extravert who cultivates philosophy, religion or other abstract interest is applying vastly important correctives to his personality which will make his life far happier and more productive.

The English have always been unusually adept in the rounding-out processes, and in fact have established a tradition for it. Few nations are therefore quite as humanistic as England. Gladstone, an extravert, was a devoted Latin student, and Lord Balfour, an introvert statesman as well

as philosopher, was exceedingly versatile, sociable, and a tennis player even into old age. Winston Churchill is possibly England's most notable present example of rounded personality, embodying this tradition. He is an extravert, balanced with a degree of introversion. This is his philosophy as recently expressed:

"In this life of ours I am sure there is but one way to find any true happiness, and that is to get some fun out of work, irrespective of the results. The artist or even the dauber who gets a thrill out of putting paint on canvas, the man who is enthralled by trying to write a sonnet or a play, or even the little craftsman who gets real pleasure from turning a lathe—any one of these men, can he make but a bare living, is getting paid for doing something from which he derives joy. Now look at our poor millionaires, worried to death over their affairs, who get no pleasure from their work. After they have been successful, they spend their lives endeavoring to learn some way of obtaining happiness by spending their money.

"While in public life there are many recompenses to the cares of office, nevertheless there are many heartaches also. Here in the country I keep busy doing all the things I want to do. I can write, paint or lay bricks, whereas in other places I have often had to do things I did not care about.

"It is hard to imagine how much fun I had in building a wall on my country estate, for apart from the actual pleasure of seeing it grow, I think that I planned out a couple of books while I was laying the bricks.

"These paintings, bricks, etc., are my toys, and I believe that as long as a man can play with toys, that long he will remain young. When you meet a man who can derive no enjoyment out of doing something, you can make up your mind that that man is old, no matter what his years are."

We greatly need in America more rounded personalities who are not such sharply marked introverts or extraverts. There is evidence that such men are now developing in larger quantity. Men like Andrew Mellon and Dawes, who are musicians, or Julius Rosenwald, who paints, or Otto Kahn with his wide range of interests, or Owen Young, a practical business man but also a philosopher and statesman, are pointing the way. American life is softening and mellowing in a distinctly humanistic way far more rapidly than it is given credit for.

51. **The Feud Between Introvert and Extravert.**—As we have seen elsewhere there is conflict between the herd and the individual, which is, actually, a conflict between the herd-members who are mostly extraverts and constitute a large majority, and the introverts, who are individualists and constitute a small minority. The enmity between these two is due to the necessary differences in their constitution, and the over-sharp, unhumanistic emphasis upon these differences. During the last decade (1920-1930) this feud blazed up in America as never before. Writers and critics, educators and artists, who are preponderantly introvert, lashed out with bitter fury. It was, on the whole, a beneficial happening, for it curbed the mounting arrogance of the extraverts, who in America have been too narrowly specialized. Books like *Main Street* and *Babbitt* and critics like H. L. Mencken, working through the more plastic and amenable younger generation, struck hard at complacent extravert thinking. Today extraverts are not nearly so cock-sure and self-confident, as a result.

To the humanist, of course, this is only a half-way result. The introverts have succeeded in securing a greater measure of respect for their character and point of view, but it still remains a fact that neither side has really modi-

fied itself. It is only a kind of armed truce, and both sides are still embattled in their extremism. The humanist seeks for a better end than this; he desires the introvert and the extravert to take on some of each other's characteristics. There is inevitably too much intolerance and class feeling when these two lobes of the human brain are pitted against each other, instead of collaboration toward a humanistic, rounded personality. No humanist has any hope or desire to make over a clearly marked introvert into a blurred, indeterminate combination, for we have seen that the subjective or emotional introverts and extraverts are very neurotic because they oscillate between the two. The sound principle is for an introvert to become just sufficiently extravert to develop humanistic sympathy and understanding of life as a whole. There is precisely as much arrogance and narrowness of outlook in an egoistic, introverted "intellectual" as there is in a pompous, extraverted realtor. Both are incomplete personalities.

Part of the mutual misunderstanding comes from the failure of the introvert to envision the group as a whole, with its necessity, in the present state of human development, for a very large proportion of the group to be something short of true individuals, but only *type-individuals*. Because of his constitutional failure to adjust his inwardness to life as it is, and his utter rejection of life as it is in favor of life as he visions that it ought to be, the introvert despises the type-individual. The extravert, on the other hand, easily satisfied with life as it is, and having little or no vision of what it ought to be, considers the sneering antagonisms and impractical fancies of the introvert to be insults and insanity.

Into this bitter breach humanism steps in a healing fashion, because it sets up *a philosophy of the whole*, having

as deep a regard for the conforming extravert herd-member as for the non-conforming individualistic introvert. The humanist regards the hates and repulsions shown by these two types for each other as mistaken—but as natural—as the excessive patriotisms and nationalisms of various nations. The humanist philosophy is as healing as world courts, the League of Nations and peace conferences, because it reconciles human opposites in the interest of all concerned. It would have been disastrous if Lincoln had been only a rail-splitter and a good politician; the value to America of a man in the White House at that time who could be both introvert and extravert, in a fine humanistic balance, of "nothing too much," was certainly incalculable in 1863. The gradual breeding of more men of breadth and introvert-extravert coördination is perhaps the most important task that education, philosophy and religion have upon their hands today.

IX

Growth by Disciplines

Those inhabitants of the modern world "who carry a magnificent undergraduate irresponsibility into the affairs of every day life" (as the London *Times* has referred to some of the disciples of flux and naturism) seem never to understand the word "discipline" in any sense excepting that of a birch rod in the hands of an unreasonable parent, or a censorship in the hands of a "puritanical" society.

Particularly do they appear to miss the enormous significance of the word in its relation to human development.

52. **The Tremendous Creative Power of Discipline.**—The very condition of living or existing in the universe is a disciplinary condition. The disciplines of our physical and social evolution were incredibly vigorous and powerful. The disciplines by which almost any savage tribe holds itself together are enormous and complicated. A thousand and one absolute "taboos" regulate the savage's every act. A Trobriand Island savage who would have a meal together with

the girl he is going to marry would profoundly shock the community. Other South Sea Island natives would commit a dreadful error if they so much as spoke to their mother-in-law. As Raoul Allier shows in *The Mind of the Savage,* the compulsions, fears, obsessions, and disciplines of savages are comparable to those of civilized men. Dr. Hortense Powdermaker tells of her studies among the South Sea New Irelanders: "They have no morals in our sense, but a really strict system from their own standpoint, and the difference between them and us is that *they really obey their rules.* They are required to commit suicide if they seriously break them."

The disciplines of all great, long-lasting civilizations have been most markedly severe—Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu, Japanese. Indeed they were so severe that they have frozen into unchanging iron stiffness, fearful and wonderful to behold when one reflects on the generation after generation, century upon century of changeless rigidity of these disciplines. So complete is this discipline that these great Eastern peoples are themselves complete unconscious expressions of their philosophy. Count Keyserling can therefore say in his *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* that the thinking of the Chinese "is not their essential quality . . . their wisdom expresses itself in what they represent by their lives. . . . There is probably no more inward or profound art than that of China. . . . They know very little about the meaning of morality, but have instead allowed Confucian principles which express eternal truths to take complete possession of them." In other words the triumph of the Chinese discipline is so thorough as to be almost incomprehensible to us. It was precisely so with the Egyptians, and is so today with the Japanese and the Hindus. Discipline is the very heart and soul of the Hindu philosophy—

discipline carried to the utter extreme of self-torture; walking for miles on shoes full of sharp nails, or with spears dangling in the flesh.

But whatever the disciplines, strange or terrible, these great nations have kept their identity only by clinging to them. They would all have been dashed to pieces upon the rocks of time long, long ere this had such not been the case. As Count Keyserling says in *The World in the Making:* "Every general condition achieves continuation only through specific concrete types, through a succession of individuals; and for this reason the dissolution of the living tradition means the dissolution of its 'meaning.' . . . Today all the old culture on the face of the earth is perishing because the new man disavows it." Spengler elaborates further how "cultures" rise, flourish and decline; and proves that the more vigorous the discipline the longer-lived the culture.

We have looked at this matter of discipline from such a point of view only in order to realize its tremendous power, and to learn that discipline is not necessarily a tyrant's iron fist, but may be and is the chosen way of life, indeed the ladder by which humans climb out of the primordial slime, as have billions of people over many thousands of years. There is no warrant for becoming disrespectful of discipline as such simply because we may believe that the Chinese or Hindu or Japanese or other disciplines have now become outworn. The disciplines by which these and all other cultures arrived at their high point of greatness is to be respected; the world would surely be infinitely poorer had there been no China, India, Egypt or Japan. It is not discipline *as such* which is at fault; it is the human tendency to go onward with old disciplines when new disciplines should be substituted to fit new conditions.

53. Guarding Against Over-Discipline.—It is here that

we make contact with the values which naturism can supply (bearing in mind that humanism is not intolerant, and has no real prejudices against either naturism or supernaturalism). Naturism and the philosophy of flux and experiment would certainly never set up the rigid disciplines of the Orient. The naturists are, if nothing else, constantly watchful to keep the human spirit *fluid and mobile*. They are resentful of *all* disciplines, and they believe that if we set up none we shall never have to struggle to break down one. Try everything, experiment, learn, indulge all instincts, deny nothing: this is the creed of the naturist. It is an understandable creed for a man who already has achieved a balanced philosophy of life, and who (inherently and intuitively, out of broad wisdom) has set up his own criteria of value and related them wisely to his fellow-men and his own ends. But then it is at once limited by the law of measure and is no longer pure naturism! Indulged in *genuinely and completely* without these reservations, as it has been by some of our bolder young generation, chaos and emptiness have resulted, as they logically must. The humanist surely may borrow from the left here, and decide to accept disciplines only as means, not as ends in themselves. If he knows what they are for he can accept them freely, but if he uses them automatically without thought he is de-individualizing himself.

The humanist understands quite well what the trouble is with disciplines. They tend to become merely mechanical reactions, and the individual routes them through his mind over the automatic tracks instead of over the judgment tracks, thus crystallizing them into habits. The naturist's ideal is for every one to be habitless and entirely free. To do the naturist justice, he does not *wish* for chaos; he is actually seeking a high end. He wants human beings to be

in a free-flowing state like a river, so that they cannot freeze up into rigid disciplinary ice jams such as the Chinese or Indian cultures represent. If all naturists were John Deweys this possibly would be a sound philosophy. The human race would go forward majestically, because simultaneously every individual would of his own free will, without tradition or authority, choose the same right path toward progress, unhampered by any rigid disciplines. The fearful truth is that the human individual does no such thing, but does so completely the opposite thing that the slide downward is rapid and destructive.

There are two forms of wisdom, individual wisdom and group wisdom. Either one, unmodified, quickly produces chaos; but in right relation to each other they work well. Vast numbers—by far the greater portion of humanity—cannot endure the mental pressure of living without a discipline obtained from the group. An adequate discipline which is entirely individual and self-created is actually a rarity, even among educated people. Every philosophy of life is almost invariably a compound of group and individual philosophy, with its roots deep in the prevailing unconscious discipline of the times. A Chinaman of ten centuries ago, born and educated in the middle of China, coming in contact only with Chinese thinking, could not help accepting a large part of Chinese discipline, try as he would. Today a few minds range over many philosophies, but nevertheless very few even of these few minds entirely escape the unconscious disciplines of our Western world. Similarly, the Hindu or Chinaman, however much he may travel and read of Western philosophy, finds it nearly impossible entirely to discard his own unconscious disciplines. Count Keyserling, spending years living in various countries, with the precise object of steeping himself in each philosophy so sympathetically

that he could say after a year or two in China, or in India or in Japan, "I feel that I have virtually become a Chinaman"—or a Hindu, or a Japanese—nevertheless has remained always under the spell of the typical Prussian and German disciplines.

The point we are making is that disciplines are both very powerful and very subtle, very deep-rooted and unconscious, and in any case practically inescapable. The humanist knows that the idea of the "free" spirit, the idea of experiment or flux, or rejection of all disciplines by everybody, is an ideological dream, if not an anarchistic nightmare. He has sympathy with the dream, as pure idea, but objects to acting as if the dream were a reality, which it can never be. He sees a better plan. He would build a basic structure of philosophy, a general foundation of discipline, soundly oriented along humanistic lines, recognizing the absolute human need of a central foundation, and then give individuality its opportunity *in the embellishment of the details* of the superstructure. In other words he would recognize the need of disciplines for the elemental aspects of human life, using them to press humanity toward the obvious center of gravity of its need and its opportunity, but trusting further only to the disciplines of art and beauty, and to the principles of proportion and of measure for the rearing of the more individual façades of the edifice of civilization. At the base the *outward* disciplines would be strong, but as we reared upward, more and more dependence would be placed on *inner* discipline. Thus would the humanist guard against over-discipline. He asks to be shown a more valid principle than this, and strongly doubts that there is one.

54. What Are the Primary Disciplines?—It should now be clear that disciplines are inevitable in life, and that

even if we dashed away from "civilization" (as some do) and sought the company of "carefree savages" in some romantic South Sea island, we should in no real sense free ourselves from discipline. As Camillo says in *The Winter's Tale*—

"A wild dedication of yourselves
to unpathed waters, undreamed of shores"

would merely be exchanging one set of fetters for another, and as a matter of fact, tighter fetters of discipline than ever. The further down the scale of civilization, the heavier and more numerous the fetters of discipline. Every animal, bird and insect is tense from birth to death with the grim, ever-present reality of these disciplines. Only civilized man has ever been able to relax these tensions somewhat.

The primary discipline is to set limits to the relaxations of these tensions and disciplines. Man's very arrival at civilization, giving him an opportunity to relax them at all, places in his hands both a glorious and a dangerous tool. Too great relaxation has pushed him toward something worse than jungledom. He needed to use measure in reducing his disciplines; therefore from the dawn of civilization humanism has been the logical philosophy for man. Unfortunately, instead of sanely applying measure in relaxing his disciplines, he invariably has relaxed too much, then become frightened and set up terrifically severe disciplines, and then, once more being irked at them, has suddenly crashed through for another period of "wild dedication of himself" until frightened once again into severe disciplines. In this way we have had our violent oscillations between the extremes.

The self-censor is thus the primary discipline. As Franz Alexander, Berlin psychologist, told the 1930 International

Congress on Mental Hygiene, *every human being is in a sense a born criminal,* because every one comes into the world with impulses and instincts which are not adjusted to society. "If a little child could realize the demands of its instincts," he said, "it would act as a criminal. From the age of four the entire development of the child consists of a gradual adjustment of the demands of instincts to the demands of society; a development that no human being finishes entirely successfully. One might more reasonably inquire, why don't all people become criminals, rather than why do some become criminals?"

The obvious answer is that the common social needs of man are so great as to enforce self-censorship. There are four primary instincts: self-preservation, nutrition, sex and the herd instinct, and the latter is powerful enough to command the others to modify themselves. It is reinforced by the pull of self-preservation and sex toward adjusting to other individualities. In any person seeking the greatest gratification of all four of these primary instincts, a humanistic philosophy of discipline and proportion at once becomes necessary. A good savage accomplishes it early in his life, and takes the necessary discipline as a matter of course. Indeed, the fact is often overlooked that it is as natural and human and pleasurable to obey the call of the herd instinct as it is to eat, to love and to live. The ill-balanced, cynical, introverted followers of naturism at its extremes seem to scorn the slightest feeling of oneness with the herd, or acceptance of herd discipline; whereas the herd instinct is as powerful as any of the other three primary ones, and the naturists are no exception: they invariably themselves run in packs!

The interaction of the primary instincts upon each other constitutes our first humanistic education in balance; our

primary discipline. If it is thoroughgoing, as in savage peoples, it achieves a real balance. As J. A. Hobson says in *Economics and Ethics*, "Human nature thus presents itself as an ordered equipment of organs and cells, stirred to activities that are contributory to the survival and development of the individual and the species, with a physical attachment of desires and conscious satisfactions, under the more or less effective control of a central directive sense or intelligence exercising some orderly government over the instinctive urges by coördination, suppression, repression, sublimation, in the interests of the organism as a whole." This is a perfect picture of the primary disciplines.

But civilized man is very clever, and he is constantly at work destroying nature's balance in the desire to reach higher levels. In so doing he inevitably must shoulder the responsibility for making a humanistic balance of his own, consciously thought out and properly adjusted to the "good life" which he visualizes. The real difficulties of today spring from man's failure to do just this. Cutting one knot of discipline after the other, in his egoistic intoxication with his power and increasing scope of mind, man tends to be unaware that he is sawing off the limb on which he sits. The naturist joyously sings of freedom as he plies his saw, and then ruefully emits cries of despair and pessimism as he goes crashing downward toward undisciplined chaos.

As Dr. Hornell Hart, professor of Social Economy at Bryn Mawr, told the 1930 International Congress of Mental Hygiene: "Emotional energies unconfined leave peoples flaccid. Arbitrarily confined, they burst out with explosive energy. But when disciplined willingly and intelligently, they may provide the motive power to carry human culture and human happiness to the new high levels of the future."

55. Motives for Discipline.—Why should we discipline ourselves? Assuming that a certain primary kind of humanistic discipline is necessary, one might ask what motives are there for further disciplines? Particularly one might ask, is "morality" or "altruism" a good motive? The humanist does not evade this question, nor does he preach altruism, nor does he urge throwing off all disciplines. He does not believe in absolutist standards, and he decries the setting up of vague notions of perfection and then crucifying human beings on the pattern of this perfection. He keeps before him clearly the principle that the means must be subordinate to the end. The humanist end is a "good life" on this earth, up to the best that lies within man. *Any* means which furthers this end is important.

The first idea to go is that of *morality for its own sake*. As Dr. Hart, just quoted, says: "Morality for its own sake has no claim upon us. We are through with the worship of any arbitrary ideal. Orderliness, obedience, conformity, chastity, monogamy, such ideals are valid only if they promote deeper and more vital values, only if they serve to bring personalities into blossom, only if they call out to the full the possibilities of the self, only if they make for rich, intense, growing, creative experience. Morality must be a means, not an end."

Walter Lippmann develops this still more clearly, in *A Preface to Morals*: "Insofar as men have now lost their belief in a heavenly king, they have to find some other good ground for their moral choices than the revelation of his will. It follows necessarily that they must find the test of righteousness wholly within human experience. The difference between good and evil must be a difference which men themselves recognize and understand. Happiness cannot be the reward of virtue; it must be the intelligible con-

sequence of it. It follows, too, that virtue cannot be commanded; it must be willed out of personal conviction and desire. Such a morality may properly be called humanism, for it is centered not in superhuman but in human nature. When men can no longer be theists, they must, if they are civilized, become humanists. They must live by the premise that whatever is righteous is inherently desirable because experience will demonstrate its desirability. They must live, therefore, in the belief that the duty of man is not to make his will conform to the will of God but to the surest knowledge of the conditions of human happiness."

This is good humanistic philosophy, and it is being adopted by our open-eyed young people. Walter Lippmann and Dr. Hart, both humanists, have a large and increasing following among the young. A philosophy insisting that the means must never be glorified above the end at once breaks the back of much of our narrowness—religious narrowness as well as naturistic narrowness. It releases a great deal of new power and individual force. The motive is *fulfillment of personality,* which never has been and never can be possible except by the application of many and rigid disciplines, just as no metal can be hardened except under pressure, and no art or technique can be made fine except by submission to very exacting disciplines. Dr. Hart makes this very clear in these additional words: "Where shall one find that firmly grounded code of conduct which will stay steady under the pressure of passion? Dogmatic religion may provide a prop for a rapidly diminishing fraction of the population, but the day of such magical aids to morality is rapidly passing. Far larger numbers will remain inertly supported by the uncriticized conventions of the group of which they are a part.

"But we must seek for a solution that will make possible rich and splendid life for the thinking men and women who are building the customs of the future and for the sufferers who have been crushed in the clash between cultures or between deep-seated needs. The spirit of science affords a far sounder and more permanent support than the superstitious dread of dogma. Character must be built on foundations not subject to upheaval in the moods of the individual. It must be based on the voluntary acceptance of a code which makes for the fulfillment of personality in the richest manner."

56. The Pains and Tensions of Discipline.—Havelock Ellis says in *The Dance of Life,* "There is no discipline without pain." This is of course a shining mark for the naturists to pounce upon, with their doctrine of free and easy libertinism and unlimited expression of ego with little or no regard for social ends. Down with all pains and all disciplines! is their battle-cry. The humanist knows better. He knows that the formless raw material of nature has never and cannot now attain the higher level of the human values without the application of discipline, with its inevitable pains. As Havelock Ellis further says, "Art is the active practical exercise of a single discipline," and in a very real sense every conscious effort of man the animal to discipline himself and lift himself to a human level is an art: a reshaping of nature's raw material into new forms. Every true artist agonizes somewhat over his creation; and man, the artist of new forms of man must likewise agonize.

But he has a choice in this. He may avoid the pain of his disciplining, as the savage does, by completely accepting the disciplines of his group and being happy within its strict limits. The savages who have no economic struggle for existence and no warring neighbors are invariably happy

within their strict disciplines—but they do not produce much that is truly individual. They are counterparts of the ant or the bee. The humanist does not advocate such a savage-like submersion of the individual into the tribe. He earnestly urges individuality, and he knows that this involves the individual's going some distance from the norm. But he knows that an individuality which cuts itself off almost completely from the norm or the primary disciplines is merely "expanding itself" defiantly, and must accept pain and perhaps annihilation as its portion. The humanist knows very well that rounded individuality, however powerful, has no actual need of cutting itself off from the norm. Despite this he realizes the need for sympathy with the individual's struggles to hold to measure and proportion when he moves away even a short distance from the norm. It is at best an adventurous proceeding, and it is surely not surprising that the right proportions are not accurately attained and that suffering is inevitable.

To be not too near and yet not too far away from the social group is the problem of all individuality, and such a precarious position is always excruciating because it requires conscious thought, without any aid from the outside. The herd-member is borne along without much effort, like a swimmer floating with the tide. Individuals who in a spirit of defiance, daring or ignorance utterly ignore the herd and go where they will often suffer so greatly that they break under the pressure.

But it is not only physical and mental isolation from the herd which induces pain and tension. Any discipline, as William James showed in his essay on habit, cuts into the human consciousness as a knife into living tissue, until adaptation to it is accomplished. The training of a dog or a horse, the disciplining of a child, the accomplishment of

skill on the piano, the mastery of any technique is painful and even sometimes excruciating. It is rather like the binding of the feet in older Chinese days, painful at first but later quite without pain. Or like the slow taming of a jungle elephant, chained fast until the wild extremes of naturistic impulse are set into new rhythms and states of mind, befitting man-made civilization.

It is always a battle of instinct against consciously reasoned aims; always the tension between nature and man's imagined concepts and forms; always a strain between the lower and the higher. Man is a tight-rope walker over an abyss, and the wise man knows that discipline is his only tool for its successful accomplishment. Discipline may be great and constant pain, or no pain at all, according to the degree of perfection of his philosophy of life; or perhaps we shall have to say according to the degree to which he has a *humanistic philosophy.*

57. Discipline and Rhythm.—How can the pain of discipline be alleviated or changed into pleasure by a humanistic philosophy? Psychologists have long ago discovered that we do those things most easily which we do unconsciously, and without internal friction. Indeed it is astounding how *tireless* and joyous is the person who does his task *unconsciously,* fully adapted to it and liking it. Furthermore people invariably do *best* those things which they do unconsciously.

Here is, then, the secret key to a vast increase of power and pleasure in life; one which a few wise and happy people always have known, often without quite understanding it. Those unfortunate or perverse people who have failed to apply this great secret in any degree have suffered greatly and often destroyed themselves. To use this secret one must tread a careful humanistic path of thought. One

must avoid ruinous conflicts between the conscious and the unconscious. One must not pursue the "absolute"; that is to say, not set goals or enforce too rapidly ideas which the unconscious self will violently and hopelessly oppose. This is precisely like the dreadful collision of two terrific forces, which grind each other down destructively. Some forms of insanity represent this and nothing else whatsoever.

One must therefore be careful to have *humanistic* goals and ideas which, although setting up tensions between the conscious and the unconscious, do not bring about a crash. The ascetic who attempts to deny sex or hunger, or the hermit who attempts to deny the herd, is an example of severe conflict. The man who yearns to be an artist and instead keeps himself at an occupation he hates is another example. He will not excel in his occupation, because he has not the coöperation of his unconscious self. If his unconscious self is by nature and instinct willing to be an artist, and if this unconscious self is disciplined and trained early enough in life and accepts the guidance of the conscious in a harmonious whole, then we have an ideal, harmonious, creative individual. Creation is as easy to such a person as breathing. There are no "monkey-wrenches in the machinery." The consciousness does not attempt to do cruelly impossible things (although it may undertake difficult things), and there is no painful lack of connection between the two halves of one's being. Instead there are a rhythm and an effectiveness equaled in no other way.

It is quite true that some creative artists have achieved great values at the price of much agony and conflict; but of course it was *despite* the agony, not because of it. Rodin's favorite model has told how the sculptor suffered over his great creations. This was because the conscious self imposed upon the unconscious an unyielding discipline,

against stiff opposition. Doubtless Rodin's unconscious self could not follow him when he developed, in middle life, his radically new technique of sculpture. He labored for twenty years over "The Portals of Hell" (in itself a symbol of the writhing of tortured humanity). Rodin's "The Thinker" is also a significant picture of the pain caused in the unconscious by the conscious thinker who is always going ahead too fast for the unconscious to keep up with it. The unconscious represents reflex action, habit; and the mind which basically and suddenly shifts its position invariably collides with its own unconscious self. It is for this reason that it is enormously important for an individual to begin early to create a sound and effective humanistic harmony, so that there may be a close working relationship between conscious and unconscious. This is done by aiming at a rounded personality, by refusing to develop the outward or the inner self one-sidedly, by keeping close to both the realities and the idealisms of life, without overstressing either at the expense of the other, and by conscious disciplines which do not bind the human spirit too hard, nor too freely relax the instincts into a formless pattern. Always there is the need for the firm hand upon the throttle, the directing pressure upon the steering-gear; always there must be the pattern of life and character and aim which serves as the map by which one steers.

In a very real sense the unconscious represents the herd in us, and the conscious the individual. The same principles thus apply here that we have discussed in regard to the herd. The conscious self dares not, on pain of much suffering, disdain or ignore the unconscious, and yet it must lead the unconscious and keep a distance and a tension between.

To some people such thoughts are too subtle and troublesome to understand. Not fond of self-analysis, such people

incline to discredit psychology. This is the sheerest folly. We live in an age when our advances and possibilities lie most in the field of the psychological. Even Edison says that the age of invention is drawing to a close—at least as a special epoch. The insides of our brain represent far more possibilities of new human advances, it seems likely, than any mechanism man can now conceivably invent, for it is already obvious that our philosophies are not quite equal to our own inventions. The intricacies of the outer world we have created bewilder and threaten to disintegrate the inner world.

Discipline of the broader kind, to shape and build inner value, is our obvious need. So obvious, indeed, that Dean Roscoe Pound, of the Harvard Law School, in his *Criminal Justice in America,* says that many American communities still reveal the characteristic pioneer hostility to discipline, good order and obedience, and show our excessive individual self-assertion and aggressiveness, "at a time when the general security demands that we think more of an ordered society and of common ends, and less of individual freedom to do in all things as one likes." We have not even much outer discipline, to say nothing of inner discipline!

X

Inwardness and Spiritual Values

"Self is the lord of self," said Buddha. Self is man's awareness of the inwardness of man, and inwardness is the special jewel of humanism. The authentic hallmark of the humanist is the degree to which he cherishes inwardness, the extent to which he bravely defends the inner fortress, against which the infinite bludgeons of nature hammer and ram from birth to death.

Inwardness is not, of course, merely the egoist "I" setting itself up in opposition to all else. It is not a "soul" in the sense that either the religionists or the philosophers (such as Kant) used the term. It is rather the sensitized human will and consciousness, seeing more clearly than any sense which the body possesses, than any instrument the hands can make, than any logic the brain can fabricate, or than any feeling the instincts have developed. It is the central whole of life, the nucleus to which all else is shell. As John Cowper Powys says in *The Meaning of Culture*,

"Slowly, as life tightens the knot of our inner being, our outer leaves, like those of a floating water-plant, expand in the sunshine and in the rain of pure chance; but we still are aware of the single stalk under the surface, of the single root that gives meaning to all."

Inwardness is our sense of connection with deeper, more permanent forces and values than the "sunshines and rains of pure chance" which come before our eyes and ears, and attempt to push us hither and thither. Inwardness is our attempt, however inadequate, to represent the permanent spirit of life in the drama which Time and Space stage in a particular corner of the universe at a particular instant of all existence. That representation is obviously of supreme importance. To betray it, to scuttle it, and to drift with the lesser forms of life in a sea of aimless eddying currents, is to sell the birthright of human beings. The complex organization of this birthright, infinitely above that of any other known form of life, has made it virtually the only spiritual creative force of the universe, dynamic instead of static, striving constantly and consciously toward a higher range of aims and satisfactions.

While Walter Lippmann is entirely justified in saying that man no longer believes in "an immortal essence presiding like a king over his appetites," still it remains true that *man himself,* man's higher will and consciousness, man's inwardness, are facts which we vividly experience and must accept as true. Their power of control, compounded of imagination, intuition and reason, using freely all man's abilities and tools, but using them toward an end which seems good, makes the true inwardness, the true spirituality. To quote John Cowper Powys once more, for he occasionally states humanistic philosophy with especial felicity: "This slowly evolved vision of things, which is a man's very own,

is concerned with what might be called 'life in itself,' apart from practical affairs . . . it is something that has been half-created, as well as half-discovered by the creative mind. . . . In this region where philosophy is a part of the psyche's very life, such will is not used in the sense of a will to believe but in the sense of a will to select and a will to reject. . . . What matters is that in the depths of a person's culture there should be some sort of grim, stark bed-rock philosophizing. It is this basic grimness and starkness that gives to any worthy culture the iron it needs, the formidableness it needs, if it is going to remain undazzled by the brutally glittering surface, undeafened by the brazen voices." This is inwardness: human consciousness supreme in its inner fortress, defending its pattern and creative impulse.

58. Attaining Spiritual Inwardness.—Bergson, the French philosopher—who is not a humanist, and has done much to encourage the notion of flux and drift—believes that one becomes spiritual by abandoning both thought and action. In this he is reinforced by the Oriental philosophies, not excepting even Christianity. The Bhagavad-Gita, ancient Hindu Scripture, says: "Whoso neither loathes, nor desires, is to be regarded as having permanently abandoned action. He should not be delighted at attaining pleasure; nor distressed at attaining pain." Later Hindu philosophy was more humanistic, preaching not the abandonment of action but the *discipline* of action, and this is the modern humanist's road to spirituality.

There has been much false thinking about spirituality and spiritual inwardness, and we are only now beginning to comprehend some of its true meanings. The rank weeds of superstition and ignorance have been cut away at least sufficiently to obtain perspective and establish the points of

the compass of permanent values. More important still, we are escaping, via humanism, from the clutches of hard and fast religious theology, which puts narrow ritualistic meanings upon spirituality, and from the clutches of naturism, which deflates spirituality of all meaning. As David Owen of Yale University says, "If the shades of St. Thomas Aquinas, Voltaire and Benjamin Jowett were to meet on neutral ground—between heaven and hell—to discuss the significance of civilization, three minority reports would be the only outcome!" So tangled has been the skein of human spirituality in our modern world, since the Fourteenth Century.

After "living at peace with its universals," as the Christian world did until the Fourteenth Century (accepting quite unquestioningly the theological idea of spirituality), man's inward spirituality seemed to realize that it was imprisoned and confined, and broke through to enter upon that tremendous adventure which the Greeks and the Chinese and the Hindus had already begun, of building a humanistic spirituality, worthy of the greatness of man, out of his brain, rather than merely out of his emotions and fears. As John Haynes Holmes, himself a fine humanist, says: "Man is the implicit spiritual principle of the cosmos, becoming at last explicit, and thus manifest unto itself. He is God in the process of birth from the material to the spiritual. . . . The spiritual, as the essence of man's life, is what the world has been coming to through these aeons gone. The spiritual, therefore, is the light (from man's inwardness) which reflects itself back into the world and suddenly reveals its meaning. . . . Man is the key to the world's mystery . . . All creative thought—scientific, philosophic, artistic, religious, must be humanistic. . . . Worship to the humanist is not man's adoration of the Most

High but man's exaltation of the highest within himself. Prayer is not petition to a divine being but communion with one's inner life. Salvation is not escape to some future heaven but consecration in this present world to ends of love and brotherhood. The soul is not God's endowment but man's achievement, and a fellowship of souls is God's kingdom becoming manifest upon the earth."

This view of spirituality has taken six centuries to ripen. Egon Friedell says in *A Cultural History of the Modern Age:* "Scepticism and sensualism atrophied the medieval organism. When its philosophy was dethroned medieval civilization lost its meaning. Finally all Europe developed a traumatic neurosis, 'a sickness of soul.' The Renaissance in Italy accepted this neurosis as normal, and by conceiving beauty without spirituality bankrupted itself and fell." As Friedell brilliantly puts it, Fifteenth Century Italy, where the Renaissance flourished, represented "an era which no longer believed and had not yet arrived at knowing."

Today we are arriving at the age of knowing. The many roads of adventure are converging, and we are coming to the hilltop from which breadth of view is possible. The far stretches of distance in all directions lie open to more illumined choice. As Count Keyserling has said of our age, "Our quest for action has been opposed to depth of recognition"; but that recognition is now occurring, and our simple-minded reliance on *motion* is being changed to a greater understanding and appreciation of *direction.* Spirituality during the past century has expressed itself very markedly in motion, in doing rather than being, as the life of Graham Taylor, for instance, graphically illustrates. Taylor, beginning as a clergyman, developed a genius for turning churches into social betterment organizations and is

the honored father of the social settlement development in America. He expressed perfectly the spirit of the age, the translation of modern Christian spirituality into action. "Spirituality and religion *are relationships,*" he insisted, and this is the prevailing sense of today. It has succeeded so well that it has secularized not only the churches, but rotarians, Chambers of Commerce, Y. M. C. A.'s, Boy Scouts, community chests and other group activities, until "service" on the plane of action is the almost universal definition of spirituality—the accepted religion of our time. It is distinctly a *humanitarian* concept of life, and as such it is surely a distinct advance over the old "Fundamentalist" conception of spirituality; an important milestone in the attaining of spiritual inwardness.

59. Humanistic Spirituality as Against Humanitarian Spirituality.—As we have seen elsewhere in this book, however, humanitarianism *is not enough.* It is a half-way station and an escape from the wanton cruelties and crudities of the old order, but it does not represent the rounded creation of man's complete powers. *It is not humanistic enough.*

Humanitarian spirituality is still primarily emotional. It proceeds out of pity and tenderness, like the woman moved by a beggar to tears and the giving of alms. It does not think through; it has no direction; it does not proceed from a permanent sense of the whole. It is like an ambulance caring for those who fall over a precipice, instead of the removal of the precipice to end the accidents. Spirituality which is predominantly emotional is an untrustworthy, erratic spirituality. It swings like a pendulum from cold to hot, from love to hate, from service to indifference, and from maudlin sentimentality to cruelty. It is only the

old Fundamentalism dressed up for a Sabbath, and it does not know where it is going.

A genuinely humanistic spirituality is a synthesis of man's whole nature and man's whole culture, with a far greater dependence on *being* than on doing. It recognizes the enormous importance of the inward self, and its sources of power and value for growth in its own will and insight. It stresses man's inwardness, not man's outwardness; it arrives at man's dignity, worth and meaning not from any supernatural fiat from heaven, nor from any emotion of pity or social improvement, but from the inside, from the humanist philosophy of man's high estate, the presence in man of the highest possible spirituality—if he will defend it (by means of the "inner check") from the downward pull of the animal instincts. These instincts he must use as means to his spiritual ends, but never allow to become ends in themselves.

Contrasted with this, the humanitarian believes that he is displaying true spirituality if he uses his emotions benevolently. The supernaturalist believes that he is displaying true spirituality if he accepts the commands given by a God who revealed His will several thousand years ago, and never since. The humanist knows that true human spirituality is far greater and more noble than either of these two conceptions, and he believes that even the founder of Christianity would agree, for the words of Jesus are, "The kingdom of God is within you." The early church fathers, not Jesus, built up the complicated supernatural theology which passes for Christian spirituality today, and which has already gone through three major changes: one from the early Christian ideas, one at the Reformation, resulting in dissenting sects, and one in modern times, the secularizing of Christianity into social welfare work. The humanist is

thus possibly more Christian than Christianity itself; but Christian only in the sense of emphasizing, like Christ or Buddha, a true inwardness, a spirituality of insight arising from the "divine" in man; a spirituality which he can and does often degrade by failing to exercise the higher will to refrain upon the elements of common clay in him.

Here, then, in fairly simple words, we have the humanist's idea of true spirituality, unencumbered by any trappings or ritualism or rigmarole of logic or mathematics. It takes its stand upon the unassailable truth that man is unique in nature and that all there is knowable of spirituality is expressable through man's discrimination among values. It is no true discrimination among values to do as the humanitarian does, and expand his emotions sentimentally to feel pity and play the part of the philanthropist. Actually it is an impulsive indulgence and a pandering to a subtle kind of vanity and egoism, devoid of the elements of true spirituality. Nor is it a true discrimination among values to do as the supernaturalist does and follow the mystical dictates of a religious sect. Few people really choose the religious sect they belong to, for they usually follow tradition or local custom; and within the sect there is no room for discrimination between values.

The humanitarian is a naïve humanist or a self-deluding Fundamentalist. He may, in fact, be spiritually empty and utterly base, like the Tammany chieftains who steal public funds and at the same time give away shoes and food to the poor. Nothing in modern life is more vicious or unspiritual, and this is why critics like Aldous Huxley sneer at the "service" talk by certain classes of business men and politicians who prate of what they do for the public, but prey upon it nevertheless. Sometimes they are so steeped in the current low standards that they sincerely do not know

how unethical and unspiritual they are. *Service in the true spiritual sense involves sacrifice.*

Humanitarianism is every day showing more cracks and is already an object of satire. It is entirely a transitional philosophy, making a temporary sentimental connecting link between the distorted spirituality of the past and the budding spirituality of the present.

60. The Vital Importance of Spiritual Objectives.—Dynamic spirit calls for a *direction*, which is vastly important in regard to human spirituality. It is the commonest of our practical experiences to find ourselves aimlessly drifting—in regard to our work, our character, our philosophy of life, and in regard to many minor matters. This produces in us a definite contempt or uneasiness—a sure intuitive realization that we need to apply more discipline. But discipline toward what? The answer is, discipline toward a definite objective. To the degree that we visualize that objective and sense that it is a good one, to that degree we have an intuitive sense of well-being and satisfaction—*spiritual* satisfaction.

It is for this reason that the followers of the philosophy of flux and drift and impulse are *fundamentally unhappy*. They cannot, being human beings with a spiritual inner self, be happy because they sense somehow the loss of power and happiness that comes through meaninglessness and lack of direction. "Let's step out and go places," is the slang idiom for the cure of boredom arising from lack of aim and objective. "I don't care where we're going so long as we are going," is the gay slogan of large numbers of restless people who tire of having no sense of direction. The more sophisticated of the naturists see through this illusion of motion and they plump down in a hideous, sour despair, spurning all motion and all direction; a kind of philosophic

suicide, such as Joseph Wood Krutch, Aldous Huxley, James Joyce or Theodore Dreiser have made familiar.

Very few of those who so gaily attach themselves to the naturists really understand what they are doing. They believe it is "smart" or "modern," or they take the word of some one who seems to know. Quite often it is a revulsion against the supernatural philosophy, without knowledge that there is a far sounder middle ground between the two extremes—namely humanism. They follow naturism blindly and become mere libertines, finding it thrilling, for a time, aimlessly to indulge every impulse, and having no desire to think their position through to a conclusion. They gyrate in the vicious circle of cynicism, disillusion and futility down to the bottom of its vortex, there to awaken slowly to a sense of living spiritual death, with the dignity of the human spirit dragged down to the level of primordial nature, whence it came after millions of years of slow struggle.

What is the motivating principle of this philosophy of flux and experiment? It is subscribed to by many people of exceedingly able brains. Professor John Dewey, a great figure among philosophers, is its high priest, and his philosophy must be accorded the highest respect and serious examination. Its central principle is that progress is more sound when "laws, principles, standards and ideals" are not regarded as "something to swear by and stick to at all hazards," but when "clews and tests found within concrete acts are employed instead. The test of consequences is more exacting than that afforded by fixed general rules . . . When new acts are tried new results are experienced, while the lauded immutability of eternal ideals and norms is in itself a denial of the possibility of development and improvement. . . . Ideals serve vaguely to rouse 'aspira-

tions' but they do not evoke any direct strivings for embodiment in actual existence."

Now it is perfectly clear that Professor Dewey is honestly trying to dislodge the same old "demon of the absolute" which the humanists also wish to demolish. He, like the humanists, is aware that men fix their eyes upon some remote arbitrary or other-worldly idea and then ignore the plain human facts of life. They "hitch their wagon to a star," and stumble and cut themselves on the mundane facts of everyday human life. Professor Dewey is a notoriously obscure writer and involved thinker, and it is probably the truth that he is at least half a humanist. He has not yet, even in the opinion of so friendly a critic as the *Nation,* succeeded in making out a really strong case for the philosophy of flux and no direction. As Henry Hazlitt says in the *Nation:* "I cannot rid myself of a suspicion that Dewey pushes his experimental empiricism too far. . . . The primary purpose of experiment still seems to me to be the discovery of antecedent reality—the cause of a disease, the distance of a star, or what not." In other words, one must have a direction, a purpose under any circumstances to give meaning to any activity, despite Dr. Dewey's elaborate effort to show that one can get along by just drifting with impulse and experiment, using the philosophy of flux and flow. There is excellent evidence that Dr. Dewey himself has, at bottom, the objective of striving to break the strangle-hold of pure unrealistic dream; the kind of thing which Leonard Hess in his book *Tomorrow's Voyage* illustrates when he says: "When you dream, you are all free things. Day dreams. Night dreams, too. Flight need not lead anywhere. It is in itself liberation." This kind of philosophy does not make adults and it leads toward a void. Dr. Dewey, quite like the humanist, wishes

to "see life steadily and see it whole." He wants a philosophy to fit human need more perfectly.

But where does this really leave Dr. Dewey? He has thus a spiritual "end" and direction of his own, and that is not precisely living up to the strict letter of his own philosophy of flux. He is himself forced to concede what to a humanist is a fatal concession, destroying his argument that we should be more interested in the means and let the ends take care of themselves. He says, in *The Quest for Certainty:* "In principle, experimental method does not signify random and aimless action; it implies direction by ideas and knowledge. The question at issue is a practical one. Are there in existence the ideas and the knowledge that permit experimental method to be effectively used in social interest and affairs? Where will regulation come from if we surrender familiar and traditionally prized values as our directive standards? Very largely from the findings of the natural sciences. . . . *It is not for a moment suggested that we can get away from customs and established institutions. A mere break would doubtless simply result in chaos.* But there is no danger of such a break . . . what is needed is an intelligent examination of the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions and customs, in order that there may be intelligent consideration of the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of the generation of different consequences."

To all this, from the most powerful thinker in the camp of humanism's most determined enemies (the naturists), the humanist can only say that this is just as good humanism as naturism, and that from the point of view of the flux philosophy it contradicts itself. No responsible humanist ever has denied the need for creative change in the world;

while none has more vigorously challenged the miserable death-grip of the absolutist or supernaturalist on fixed ideals and standards. All that the humanist insists upon is that Professor Dewey's own words above (which we have purposely italicized) be fully recognized and that there be recognized also the necessity at all times, even when experimenting, of having standards, ideals or spiritual objectives which satisfy the higher man. A man without spiritual objectives is as meaningless as a ship on the ocean without destination, captain or compass. An experiment without any objective or standard is equally meaningless. Dr. Dewey is an entirely orthodox humanist when he makes such statements as quoted above. The only true difference is that Professor Dewey would rate the means as equally important or more important than the end; whereas to the humanist the end, the objective, is *always* more important than the means. So long as the humanist does not hesitate to correct the means toward his objectives in the light of any really important new knowledge and wisdom, well authenticated, this difference between him and Dr. Dewey becomes more or less academic and unimportant. It is unjust to believe, as some naturists do, that the humanist "hitches his wagon to a star" of some idealistic standard and then refuses to learn from science or from experience and experiment.

The humanist really believes in advancing spirituality and in organized growth because only he really has a spiritual objective and criterion by which he works upon life. The supernaturalist has an objective, unworldly and unfitted to life, while the naturist refuses to give any importance to any objective. He who sees the error in both of these attitudes has no choice but to be a humanist. The humanist knows that the wonder, the dignity and the destiny of man

rest upon his having a spiritual objective; he knows that even the spiritual objective of the religionist, arbitrary and other-worldly as it is, has done far more for humankind than naturism can do. And, as we have seen from the philosopher Dewey's own words, no responsible thinking man, even a supposed naturist, can really be without spiritual objectives. They must perforce be more important than any methods used to attain them, as the message is more important than the messenger.

61. Connecting the Individual With Spiritual Objectives.—Man is but an assembly of unimportant bone and gristle if he is not also the embodiment of a spiritual purpose and end. This is the firm conviction of the humanist, and if this is true it explains why human beings who brush aside and frustrate spiritual purpose seem worthless and animal-like—even to themselves. Man acquires lustre and value only in the degree to which he admits connection with something greater and more important than himself and his instincts. Intuitively man knows this. It is the explanation why even the savage has a religion and a mythology by relation to which he becomes important. It is the explanation why many of the naturists, who do not believe the individual to be important, place tremendous value on the social group, as for instance the Communists or the Fascists, and thus again give the individual a reflected indirect importance as a group member. But, as we have seen, this is merely the level of the bee and the ant, and is not humanistic in any full sense, since humanism values both the individual and the group in a balanced whole.

It is true that the individual does, in a large number, sink below the level of importance, except as a group member. The individual worth of such group members is less than that of the group simply because their spiritual

purpose is dormant or insensitive, and they can only become of spiritual importance, outside of their group membership, when they become consciously aware of what spiritual purpose is and use their heritage. To do this they must separate themselves somewhat from the group. They can make a modest beginning by instilling a conscious sense of spiritual objective in others, particularly in their families. The marked spiritual value of a mother in human legend and experience is based primarily on the ability of many mothers to make their offspring conscious of spiritual objectives; that is to say, conscious of greater values in the world than the mere satisfaction of instincts, greater powers and possibilities in themselves than the humdrum and grubby daily appeasements of appetite. A teacher or preacher, a leader, an executive, a writer, an artist, as well as those with whom one is only casually in contact, may also rouse people to spiritual consciousness. It is the most vital change that occurs to any human being; and it explains why human beings value so highly and remember so keenly the time of their spiritual awakening. Some people have great gifts for spiritually awakening others.

Even by contact with the most mentally befuddled cults, religions or causes, the personal "miracle" of spiritual awakening may occur. Whatever "ism" or foolish pseudo-scientific movement may obtain converts, it is to be observed that in the making of such converts the central "miracle" can occur; namely the "miracle" of lifting the individual out of pure instinct and animal self to a certain selflessness, a contact with forces greater than the petty, pedestrian, fleshly concentration on the lower man. *No human being is a complete, individual human being until that spiritual awakening has occurred.* There is nothing in life so enormously satisfying or so fulfilling of personality

as the sense of becoming conscious of spirituality and of fixing spiritual objectives. The precise description of that objective is not so important as that it should be a truly spiritual objective. It may constitute devotion to the cause of pure food, or suffrage, or a World Court; it may be merely devotion to a child's or wife's or husband's or friend's welfare; it may be the expression of beauty in art, or it may be the building of a canal, the discovery of new scientific data or a profession or business with a really serviceable idea behind it. It may be an organization, an individual, or an abstract idea; but if it is a concept of high general value set above the personal appetites and instincts, then it is a spiritual objective and definitely changes the individual from a worm to lordly man. The objective may even be mistaken or forlorn or foolish or ignorant—but it may still be spiritual, because it comes from man's higher self and makes man's lower self bow in subjection.

It is not difficult to separate persons who have had a spiritual awakening from those who have not. Those who have had a spiritual awakening are almost certain to be either supernaturalists or humanists, although on the naturistic level there are cults and groups which set up group objectives which have some spiritualizing effects, however stunting of individuality they may be.

62. The Spiritual Awakening of Young People.—These things being true, it is obvious that the fulfillment of personality which is so important should come as early as possible in life, and that it should be made easy rather than difficult. We are in a very grave transitional period. The spiritual awakening of young people was once the function of Sunday School and Church, through "conversion" or religious feeling. Now that supernaturalism is losing its hold, there is no other ready path to spiritual awakening. Young

people have found their parents in most instances incapable of supplying it, and have turned to school and college teachers, writers and publicists. Discovering these also somewhat inadequate, many have turned to humanitarianism—social work, politics and liberal idealism. Finding these unsatisfactory also, many have turned to naturism and free experiment—courses which have naturally no spiritual awakening whatever to offer except a vague utopian group spirit.

Our young people are today realizing their frustration in the search for a source of individual spiritual awakening and are in process of retracing their steps to search more carefully the ground so hastily traversed. They are saying to college and school that they want courses in philosophy of life and social economy which will supply real humanistic guidance in setting spiritual goals. As Harold Laski says in *The Dangers of Obedience:* "The chief danger that must be avoided in modern university education is the danger of making the student either an unphilosophical expert or a 'practical man.' . . . The average student has collected information but not absorbed ideas." Nor, we might add, has he, as a rule, awakened spiritually, which is more important than absorbing ideas. The position of the average young person is that although he is too literate and modern to be able to accept supernaturalism as a source of spiritual awakening, he is offered nothing but the dead sea fruit of science, utilitarianism and naturism, which have nothing to give him. Is it not obviously important that he make contact with humanism so that he will again connect with the great source-stream of human happiness and wholeness which comes from the use of the higher powers and intuitions of man? Man—and youth especially—deeply wishes to use his spirituality; there is

a primordial urge in him to do so; the spiritual secret of the universe appears to have been ordained to unfold through man, for man alone seems to give conscious expression to the fundamental spiritual drive which gives direction to the universe. This spiritual drive is for the purpose of bringing out, as the saying goes, "the statue in the block," the distinctive spiritual personality of the individual.

Dr. Felix Adler, head of the Ethical Culture Society, says to young people, "Try to know life by all means, *but do not mistake death for life.*" Supernaturalism is a kind of mental death, and naturism is a kind of spiritual death. Humanism has the veritable hallmarks of life upon it, because it is built for life. It does not, like supernaturalism, call for death in order to experience full happiness; nor does it, like naturism, thrust human life into the grave here and now, on the plaint of life's utter stupidity and meaninglessness. To the young, life is properly an opportunity, and humanism supplies the most enormous stage for such opportunity—for positive steps forward, for creative adventure in the high name of new revelations of spirituality, holding on to the best that has been developed until new values have been developed and tested. As Harry Emerson Fosdick says, we are freed spiritually, not by what we enslave and use, but by what we admire, appreciate, create and adore. Our spiritual progress arises not from possessions but from loyalties, relationships, constructions and objectives striven for. The striving is of greater spiritual value than the arriving. The erection of the building is of more spiritual value than the ownership of it. The creation of art is of more spiritual value than looking at it. Loving is of far more spiritual significance than being loved. Being is far more spiritual than doing.

The highest possible spirituality—as well as the highest

art—arises from *a significant mind working on significant material.* The first task is to build a significant mind, and this is overwhelmingly the young person's task, because youth is plastic. The significant mind is developed by insatiable curiosity, high sensitivity and rounded emotional development, powerful drives of will, disciplinary application, contact with life, high intuition and selectivity and association, through personal experience and through reading with other significant minds.

It has been said of our young people, as well as our young artists, that they have astounding technical skill but lamentable intellectual vacuity. It might be added that until recently they have shown amazingly low emotional maturity, despite their rather naïve parading of knowledge of every phase of sex. As Mary Colum, the literary critic, says: "As a matter of simple truth, great emotional power both in life and in literature is far rarer than great intellectual power, and far less comprehensible to the ordinary man. When both these powers occur together in the highest degree in one mind, as they have done in half a dozen great classical writers and half a dozen great romantic writers, there is no risk of the world's ever forgetting the happening." Thus we must be quite sure to understand, especially in youth, the enormous importance of emotional maturity in the making of a significant mind and spirituality. Modern youth has rightly done with sentimentality, which obscures and falsifies spirituality. It has done with the humanitarianism which was built upon that sentimentality, and it is now in a far closer harmony with the humanistic philosophy than it is with any other. The spiritual awakening of youth very often and very properly arrives with its emotional awakening and maturity, and it is immensely facilitated if it can at that time have the rich aid of a sound

philosophy of life, such as humanism. Unquestionably, the very intense suffering and distortion of the lives of young people in the past decade or two have been due to the active presence in the world of only the two extremist philosophies, supernaturalism and naturism—very poor seeding ground for youth's nascent spirituality. As Miles H. Krumbine says, "What ails our youth perhaps as much as the green sickness caused by overindulgence of unripe instincts is the ardent seriousness with which they took our preaching of idealism." The supernaturalist, both Fundamentalist and Humanitarian, is responsible for this. The young people of today have found him out, and after wildly kicking at the traces, breaking the harness, and escaping on a gallop into the naturist camp, they are now ready to take the more poised middle position.

XI

Play, Joy, Rhythm and Art

If it be true, as the humanist says, that his philosophy is one which builds a rounded human life, then it is quite certain that humanism encourages a larger, better share of play, joy, rhythm and art than any other philosophy. The supernaturalist notoriously puts powerful dampers upon them; suspects them, and is singularly inept in their presence, as the Puritan was. The naturist, on the other hand—despite the fact that in popular belief he alone gives them a large place in life—in reality robs them of their very basis. If you believe, as many noted naturists do, that cynicism and despair are the only fully sophisticated attitudes toward life, and that futility, aimlessness and human worthlessness are the final outcome of life—then what play, what joy, what rhythm and what art can give any satisfaction? They become voices in a void, motion in a vacuum. Leon Samson, one of the violent anti-humanists, and (fittingly) an anarchist, believes that when his mythical utopia arrives every one will be so saturated with fulfilled desire

and happiness that art and literature will no longer be needed—will indeed be meaningless. The naturist's gullet will be so gorged with luxuries that he will be too drowsy to play or to enjoy art.

63. Humanism; Play and Joy and Rhythm.—The humanist avoids entirely the stiff, inhuman asceticism of the supernaturalist as well as the materialistic, stark, disillusioned inertia of the naturist. Joy, play, rhythm and art are obviously good means to good ends. Joy is indeed a form of natural wealth, but joy is an extremely delicate art. The humanist can make of joy, play and rhythm far more than those who live by any other philosophy. He is restrained by no "sin complex"; he is deflated by no sense of human futility. Joy can mean genuine joy; play can occupy the whole man, rhythm can be both noble and exhilarating. If the "good life" of the humanist lifts man to a level of high meaning, it correspondingly lifts those means by which man heartens himself on the road to his spiritual objectives. Play, joy, rhythm and art are creative forces of long-proved power for man, as the Greek humanists so gloriously demonstrated. That they require the application of measure and proportion for their highest value and enjoyment only makes them the more natural allies of the humanist, whose cardinal principle is measure and proportion.

The naturist's attitude toward these forces of play, joy and rhythm is typical, and wholly un-Greek. His attitude has been to wallow in them rather than to use them; to make them into ends rather than means; to steep himself in them intemperately until overburdened nerves and senses are tortured, drugged and drowned. The naturist's philosophy calls precisely for such "experimentalism" as "free love" and other orgiastic, perverse indulgences of the naturists in recent years have illustrated. The naturist de-

fends them as necessary "experience" for each individual to loosen the cramping bonds of tradition and to make "explorations" which give birth to genuine new data. "Why take anything at second hand?" the naturist asks. Joy must be "unconfined," and the full cup of life must be drunk, including the dregs, if life is to be known at first hand. Joy and play must not be taken in mincing, regulated steps like a minuet; they must be a tango, a wild and fearless pressing of the grapes to the very lees.

What has the humanist to say to this version of play and joy and rhythm? It is indeed a crucial point, for critics are saying that humanism is a doctrine of mere caution; a middle-aged, staled, safety-seeking attitude of restraint which the young, the eager, the adventurous and the richly-natured must normally disdain. Professor Babbitt's severity toward Baudelaire, Blake, Coleridge, Verlaine and other loose-living poets has made critics like Mary Colum ask whether humanists are insensible to the qualities of mind and emotion which make up a great literature or art. She refers to the fact that a considerable number of artists, poets and musicians have been dissolute and indulgent naturists, and she considers it narrow to criticize such looseness. There is a mutual misunderstanding here owing to failure to round out the point in argument. The humanist has perhaps overlooked the fact that in arts such as poetry and music, in which emotion is the supreme requirement and the mental concentration required is fairly small, it has been possible for exceedingly dissolute and indulgent creators to succeed. But the record for writers and philosophers, or for those in the higher arts and sciences is by no means the same. Far more rigid intellectual discipline and far less emotion are called for, and the great men in these fields have had to use far more re-

straint and measure in their private lives. The two types are by no means comparable. At the same time it is as false to condone looseness for genius' sake as it is to be too critical. Actually the issue becomes rather pointless. It is obvious that lyrical poets and musicians may have rather disorganized minds and emotions and still (some of them) be capable of genius in their work. But not a Milton or a Shakespeare, or a Darwin and a Dickens or a Thackeray! The implied idea that the looseness and low indulgences of a writer of emotional sonnets must be valuable because he produced some works of genius is of course highly illogical. Others who lived a life of measure and restraint produced equally good works of genius, even in this lyrical field where emotion is admittedly the prime requirement (Browning, Keats, Brooke, Frost, Robinson, Wagner, Masefield, McDowell).

Therefore the humanist says that play, joy, rhythm are means, not ends, and that they are all the better means if they are used with a sense of measure. They can be savored more completely, and their values ingested more delightfully if they are not gluttonized. To extract the maximum joy out of life the sensibilities must be maintained at their best. Drug them, overwork them, continuously satiate and stuff them, and you rob them of their maximum sensitivity, you induce a neurosis and psychophysical illness which distorts values and jaundices the outlook. The truth is that some writers and artists deliberately seek the strange phantasmagoria of distortion which arises in the mind like the hallucinations of a fever. They weave out of sickness a strange land of images and ideas which are the obvious products of a disordered state of body and mind. They seek it through drink and drugs and exotic, sodden, extravagant conduct and habits. That a few such create out of

this unreal, tortured world material which shows genius is not surprising, since we are attracted, as a result of the attraction of opposites, to the strange, the gruesome and the fantastically beautiful. Poe is a classic example. Fear, impotence and abnormal living gave him his morbid fantasies, unquestionably, and some of these he wrought into undeniable beauty for which we are most grateful. But it should never be overlooked that as a philosophy of life the habits and thoughts of Poe are utterly, terribly inadequate. Poe's personal life was a complete failure, sad and somber, however golden was a portion of its literary fruit. It is a sound philosophy of life that we are discussing, not some of the accidents, idiosyncrasies and misfortunes of art creation.

64. The Source Springs of Play, Joy and Rhythm.—To the supernaturalists the sources of joy and rhythm are God, worship and heaven. To the naturist their sources usually are extreme excess of indulgence and elimination of all restraint. To the humanist neither of these sources is satisfactory. The sources favored by the supernaturalists seem like the fairy stories and the "land of counterpane"—sources of mere childish joy, except when filtered through a highly selective mind; while the naturist's methods seem like the flagellations of the old Middle Ages when men whipped themselves into high frenzied excitement. The humanist sources of play, joy and rhythm are *the healthy body and mind*, the spirit working upon and through the senses, attaining the maximum from them because they are neither overworked, as in the case of the naturists, nor suppressed by binding them to the wheel of some other mythical person's will, as in the case of the supernaturalists.

"The love of play and the search for it," says Elie Faure, "and the ardent curiosity which is a condition of

play, *create civilization.*" This is what the mellow humanist knows. Joy is an outcome of happiness, and happiness is an outcome of balance and harmony. If approximate balance and harmony do not exist (they can never of course, be complete), then there is no joy. The supernaturalists have tried to make joy out of an imagined state of bliss after death or the following of some mythical person's will. The naturists have frankly stopped seeking for joy, except occasionally in wild, deluded excess or in powerful stimulants and perversities, or in pure dreamland fantasy, despairing of any joy through normal human sources. Naturism has been a great breeder of melancholy, as Professor Babbitt accurately notes; but the supernaturalists have also tended profoundly toward melancholy. It is the humanist alone who has any real grip on joy and play. The other two philosophies appear to specialize in wretchedness! Both "run the full gamut of gloom." While the supernaturalists went to such excess that they segregated the sexes, slept on wooden blocks for pillows and eliminated music, colors, dancing and laughter, the naturists, for their part, went (as Professor Babbitt expresses it) "on an exasperated quest of novelty," in pursuit of violent and abnormal sensation, until all meaning and all value were drained to a relentlessly bitter sediment in the cup of pleasure. Life was exhausted down to meaninglessness.

The truth is, as the humanist knows it, that both naturist and supernaturalist give away their birthright of joy and play for a mess of pottage composed of extremism. This extremism is plainly the result of feeling run riot, emotion without discipline, instinct without the guidance of the higher will and consciousness. As Horace Walpole once put it, "Life is a comedy for those who think, and a tragedy for those who feel." It becomes a comedy for those who

only think because they do not loosen their thought with emotion; and a tragedy to those who only feel, because they do not tighten their emotions with thought. The humanist once more insists upon the disciplined balance of both. Joy and play then become some of the facets of a rounded life, as they were intended.

Ninon de Lenclos (who was, it is true, a "lady of joy," but of mental as well as emotional joy) said, "The joy of the spirit measures its force." She meant that the greater the spirit and character, the greater the capacity for joy. This is well illustrated in Lincoln and other great men whose capacity for play and simple joy were in direct relation to their greatness of spirit. Napoleon and Goethe marked this of each other when they met. Joy and play depend on harmonies and rhythms, and few can become great without some measure of harmony and rhythm. The finest quality of play and joy also requires the coöperation of imagination with the senses; the finer a man's imagination, the greater the number of possibilities he has for delight—provided he has loosened his thought with emotion and maintains a close communion with healthy senses. The botanist who goes out on the mountains with no other interest than the Latin classifications and names of the flowers, ignoring the general beauty and stimulative value of the scene as a whole, is a failure as a humanist and a man with a defective capacity for joy. But so is the man who only feels a vague general emotional sense of pleasure at the scene, and secures no pleasure through his brain in the facts of botany, geology or zoölogy.

Civilized man should constantly be enhancing his pleasures by means of a constantly increasing knowledge, a constantly increasing scale of emotions, and a constantly increasing humanistic harmony between both. Instead, he

has often distorted his whole life by reason of his persistent extremism and disbalance.

65. Ecstasy and Intoxication.—The naturists hate measure and love intoxication. The supernaturalists have applied such rigid discipline that the human spirit, in agony and revenge, has reached toward a masked, holy kind of intoxication and frenzy such as were well known in the Middle Ages and have persisted in certain forms of religion until today.

The humanist is generally understood to be opposed to ecstasy as being unmeasured and undisciplined. Some young hotbloods, therefore, will have nothing to do with humanism. "The idea is absurd of loving anything measuredly," they say. "The notion is ridiculous of being neatly, calculatedly enthusiastic about a great cause. To get results, one must give one's self unreservedly. History is made by those who do not measure, do not calculate; by those who apply ecstasy and abandonment to their purpose."

What does the humanist say to this? Is humanism an old man's paradise, where caution, fear, mincing steps and niggardliness of passion are practised? The humanist is not afraid of the test, which is another one of the "verbalisms" of the extremists. The humanist not only favors ecstasy, stimulation and intoxication (using these words in the general and not in any specialized sense), but he insists upon them as necessary to balance. The humanist, bear in mind, is a realist and not a romanticist. He cannot be swept off his feet by any typical naturistic desire to seek happiness in a great exhausting outpouring of emotion. He is not misled by those who would stuff themselves with sensation, "feed on honey dew and drink the milk of paradise." Nor is he unhealthily attracted by those hyperaesthetic persons who, as Vigny expressed it, have a sensibility

so excruciating that it has "plunged them from childhood into involuntary ecstasies, interminable reveries, infinite inventions." He is not confused by the attempt to consider the artificial paradise and emotional brainstorm in the same class with humanistic rhythm and the harmonious ebb and flow of life.

The ecstasy of the naturist usually consists largely of libertinism; deriving a part if not all of its joy from the egoistic feeling of breaking out of the bounds of discipline. It is the psychology of the small boy stealing an apple; the joy of the apple is little, but the joy of stealing is great. It is a phase in the growth toward adulthood, and it represents a lack of harmony. If the ecstasy of the naturist is not defiant revelry and libertinism, it is often sheer neurotic adventuresomeness, or abnormal appetite blindly indulged, or a reflex action from overlong inhibition. The ecstasy of the naturist is notorious for turning into a nightmare, as Tennyson and Huysmans have depicted, and as our modern naturists amply demonstrate.

Ecstasy as the humanist savors it is a rhythmic catharsis of the spirit; an ebb and flow, like a musical measure and beat, between low and high tides of feeling, but feeling always compounded with thought and spirit, and in that sense—and in that sense only—disciplined. It is a ludicrous error to picture the humanist as a plodding Dobbin, heavy-laden with the harness of restraint. The full, harmonized self is far more likely to be like *Man O' War*, the century's greatest horse, than like a meek and plodding dray horse. When *Man O' War* was first first ridden he did not spend himself in a mad fury, in an ecstasy of blind anger. He made several very powerful efforts, showing, so his trainer claims, great coolness and a particularly sportsmanlike regard for fair play. Then, shortly, his mind and his emo-

tions fusing into a balance, he decided to adjust himself to life without any further ill-placed orgies of emotion, reserving his powers of temperament for what was ahead of him. The great horse showed decided powers of synthesizing thought and feeling. His ecstasies became normal and rhythmic, not neurotic.

It is not a "berserk" rage or a violent intensity which constitutes the true ecstasy. The raging tyrant or the vision-seeing saint, both indulging in what psychologists have called ecstasies, but which are in reality half-insane brain-storms, do not give delight to their whole selves. One part of themselves crucifies the rest; and a physical and mental sickness follows after, if not a breakdown. The ecstasy of the humanist is a quite different thing. The restraint and the control only add to the pleasure, as the curve adds to the beauty of a bird's flight. If the restraint and the control were pushed further, they would impede the flight; and conversely, if the emotion were crowded harder, it would also disorganize the flight, the real success of which depends on an aesthetic, harmonizing balance between the two.

This principle is to be observed wherever ecstasy can be experienced by man—in love, in the arts, in nature, in play, in music, in dancing. The finest joy in these is never "unconfined," it is invariably *measured*. Every maid knows better than to yield completely to her man; every artist knows that he must put distance between his audience and his subject, use intellectual selectivity in composing his subject; every musician and every dancer knows that measure and rhythm are the only ways by which music can be made. Ecstasy is reached most surely and most enjoyably if there is preparation for it; if fulfillment is delayed by restraint, by anticipation and the intuition of rhythm. All

happiness moves on the same principle; it must be earned, waited for, approached over a mounting series of peaks and valleys, like that last still-to-be consummated peak, Mt. Everest (to reach which *suddenly* would, of course, kill any human being).

Ecstasy is vastly important for human beings, because it brings about a relaxation of tensions and taut nerves; and no human being is emotionally educated or adult who has not a hand upon the throttle of emotional control, who does not know the right spacing and acceptance of ecstasy. The humanist sets up the principle that life's instruments must be made to produce value and happiness; that they can and will produce happiness in most instances if the humanistic philosophy is followed. He believes that life's instruments may be orchestrated for each individual into a fair degree of harmony, both inward and outward; but if not outward, then surely inward. It is the task of the humanist to work upon this orchestration; to tune up his instruments, practise them, lead them and reach measured ecstasy with them. To give the brass instruments free rein will never make genuine ecstasy; nor to give the string instruments the right to silence the brasses.

Nor, the humanist says, is it anything but insanity to expect to produce ecstasy continuously with the orchestra. It would soon blunt the nerves and drug the senses—or result in the orchestra being smashed indignantly! Pleasure and pain are too closely related; our continued high sensitivity depends upon plenty of light and shade and variety of tone-color and contrast. Intoxicated senses quickly blunt and are cloyed, and the point of orgiastic ecstasy is a livid flame which consumes us. Too frequent, too easy, too one-sided ecstasy sears and warps us. Ecstasy to be the finest experienceable, must be ecstasy in which the whole

nature partakes, including the spiritual nature. All ecstasy other than this is lesser ecstasy, and like the moth which desires the star, we must seek this final ecstasy if we would heed the intuition of our higher selves. It can be approximated but never wholly experienced, and a balance between satisfaction with such whole-natured ecstasy as we are able to achieve, and that which we intuitively sense that we are capable of, is one of the aims of the humanist. He wishes to hold to the middle course between sodden satisfaction with ecstasy on lower planes, on the one hand, and neurosis over inability to achieve ecstasy on fantastically imagined higher planes, on the other hand. Either course spells unhappiness and stalemate, and the humanist means to be subject to neither such cruel tyrannies.

67. The Problem of Stimulation.—Man has always stimulated himself, and always will. His life has always been a series of prods, some inflicted by nature and some inflicted by himself, individually or in groups. The mechanism of the human psyche is one of adaptation to conditions as they are. Man lounged where he was until either the forces of nature or that higher self within him drove him onward. At the dawn of history, this higher self was very faint in him, and natural forces shaped him most. Today, although still powerfully in the grip of natural forces, the will and consciousness of man are intensely real inner forces which he can increasingly use *to stimulate himself*.

Here enters the problem of human stimulation: how to stimulate, what to stimulate. Early man was stimulated automatically by his emotional, instinctive nature, but very little by his will and consciousness. His practical mastery over his environment was at a low point, whereas man in modern times has fashioned an infinite variety of stimulations for himself. One of the earliest of these was a wider

variety of food and drink and ornament. To stimulate his senses man has now carried these forward to an almost fantastic extent. There are 2,500 separate brands of perfume alone sold in America, and average American families eat food daily from nearly all corners of the world. Alcoholic stimulation has been the universal discovery of man from early times, and he has perennially drugged his senses with it.

What is a sane point of view regarding any and all kinds of stimulation? The supernaturalist has nearly always frowned on most stimulations, sensing that they are often direct enemies of the finer values, as of course most stimulations of the senses are, when but more than slightly indulged in. The naturist has always clasped all forms of stimulation to his bosom as friends in need. After all, the supernaturalist used religion with which to intoxicate himself, and found it far less easy to satiate himself than the naturist who gorged on food, alcohol and other appeasements of appetite. The body is more swiftly satiated than the mind. The medieval church, however, was very liberal as to stimulations, using incense to appeal to the sense of smell, cathedrals to appeal to sight, music, bells and voice to appeal to the ear. The medieval monks were noted for their eating and drinking without much sense of measure.

What is the humanist attitude toward stimulation? It condemns nothing that is not obviously and directly destructive of human values, but it does urge the vital importance of "the will to refrain" from intemperate use of any stimulation. Knowing America's temperamental inclination to extremism, and seeing America's spendable surplus in the hands of ordinary people rising constantly, the humanist sees that an overindulgence in stimulations of the senses is one of our gravest dangers. Food, drink, clothes, posses-

sions, ornament, and various other common material preoccupations are intense stimulants to Americans, and have been so much used that they have blunted sensitivity to more subtle and more valuable stimulations. These become more and more active and important as we reach a spiritual adulthood. What are they specifically?

(1) *Love*—in its finer, more mental and spiritual manifestations;

(2) *Friendship*—in its more genuine sense of contact of mind upon mind, and spirit upon spirit, and in the urge for mutual helpfulness;

(3) *Imagination*—in its rarer flights, more trained and disciplined in the arts and sciences, even in industry; and vicariously through good literature and art appreciation;

(4) *Leisure*—in the sense of "hobbies," wide interests, special delights and curiosities; and also solitude, quiet, and self-communion;

(5) *Social Service*—in the sense of a zest in social progress, group welfare reform and constructive change;

(6) *Religion, Ethics*—in the sense of keen interest in the spiritual welfare of oneself and others;

(7) *Nature*—in contact with or contemplation of it;

(8) *Art, Music*—either a personal desire for expression in one or more art forms, or for developing appreciation;

(9) *Work*—in the sense of securing active spur and stimulus from construction, or from pursuit of a particular vocation;

(10) *Science, Analysis, Thought*—in the sense of stimulation from the exercise of the critical faculty, the faculty of investigation, the pursuit of truth, the unknown and undiscovered;

(11) *Power, Place, Authority*—in the sense of being stimulated by the attainment of special leadership, political or other authority and honored place;

(12) *Handicraft*—in the sense of finding some form of hobby with tools and hand-work; a deep stimulation and delight;

(13) *Exploration, Daring*—exploits in fields of danger and innovation, springing from a sense of pioneering and search for new values;

(14) *Collection*—the assembling of antiques or special rare values, keeping alive the values that tend to scatter and disappear;

(15) *Combat, Challenge, Competition, Struggle*—active resistance, fighting for a cause, determined thrusts against evils and forces of error;

(16) *Sport, Athletics, Dancing*—active participation or observation of various selected types of physical activity, securing from them something of the Greek sense of mental poise through physical grace;

(17) *Travel*—the stimulation of seeing many kinds of life and settings, the comparison of many philosophies and points of view.

Here are seventeen first-rate, powerful stimulations, any one of them capable of giving rich meaning to life if humanistically savored and used; and any combination of them developing a deeply satisfying texture of life if used as constant stimulants in a humanistically balanced manner. The humanist knows well that there are but two possible sources of happiness in life. One springs from the harmonious, gently disciplined expression of the instincts, the lower self; and the other springs from the use of the stimulations of the higher self, as represented in the main by the above seventeen stimulations, which proceed out of the mental and spiritual nature.

Stimulation should not be held down to the level of the physical, on pain of certain blunting of finer values and possibilities. Just as the human being is effective only between certain very narrow extremes of temperature, so the physical organism functions effectively only within a narrow range of stimulations both of kind and degree. When whipped abnormally it brings a corresponding reaction which cancels the value of the whip, and also blunts it further so that an ever-increasing dosage of such abnormal stimulation becomes necessary to achieve an effect. Meanwhile an adaptation takes place which makes the normal reactions dependent upon the abnormal stimulations—and we have thus the "addict" psychology, which breaks the

bonds of connection between the normal and creates a fantasy world of its own, leading toward insanity and disintegration. To be humanistically valuable, bodily stimulations must be gentle and occasional, just as musical tones to be delightful must not be monotonously continuous or violent. In particular the bodily stimulations should always remain means, not ends; the human being must never be subject to them. All bodily stimulations persistently over-indulged in have an equally harmful effect, whether they are alcohol, food, exercise, coffee, sex, or what not. They deteriorate higher values.

68. **The Vital Rhythms of Humanistic Life.**—Psychologically speaking, the two philosophies opposing humanism (supernaturalism and naturism) can be expressed in degrees of "tightness" or "looseness." The supernaturalist has notoriously been "tight"; that is to say, sternly inhibited, painfully taut with the tension of his struggle to confine and suppress the "Adam" in him to conform to other-worldly ideas of what a human being should be and do. The naturist, on the other hand, has been as "loose" as a rope tossed on the ground. We might effectively use the illustration of a piano wire. Entirely loose on its frame it is merely so much wire without meaning in a musical scale. Tightened up near to the breaking point it may be equally useless for the orchestration of music. But when neither over-slack nor over-taut, it may make a splendid, harmonious note on a scale, and vibrate in due rhythm to produce a perfect tone.

Human beings are similar to the piano wire in the matter of rhythm. There is no more pathetic sight than a human being suffering from too much tension. Psychologists know the serious results of such high tensions; the wire snaps and a serious breakdown occurs. At the other end

are those utterly without tension—mere helpless human hulks, adrift.

The high tensions in people are, of course, due to very sharp and vigorous reactions of the spirit. A religious "fanatic," or a "fanatic" about any subject, is likely to be so taut that his entire body expresses it. His muscles never relax and his nervous system is in a constant state of overstimulation. The high tension may be due to various causes, such as internal conflict, a sense of defeat, of fear, of inferiority, of anger, jealousy, or hatred. In any case, the vital rhythms of humanistic life are stopped, and the person moves onward to his inevitable "cracking point" unless he can regain a humanistic philosophy of life and a humanistic rhythm. Such a person is marked by restlessness, by inability to lounge or play, by irritability and quick temper, by weeping or whining, by emotional storms, by periods of depression or headaches or illness, by desire for strong bodily stimulations.

This is the picture of over-tightness, and it is fairly common among those who do not live a thoroughly humanistic life. The typical problem of the naturist, on the contrary, is *looseness*. He is expanded to such an extent in his indulgence of every impulse that he suffers the opposite disadvantages and dangers. He is aimless, spiritless, disillusioned, cynical, almost lifeless in his slackened spirit. Instead of the staccato rhythm of the supernaturalist with high tension, the naturist is almost pulseless. Rhythm has almost ceased in him; or more accurately there is no rhythm, just a series of barbaric beats and yawps, rhythmless. It is of no small significance that the naturist poet usually sneers at rhythm for his poetry, as the naturist artist of any kind sneers at all the counterparts of rhythm. Thus we have the poetry of E. E. Cummings, the prose of

James Joyce or Gertrude Stein, the painting of the cubists, without the threads of rhythm by which they can be related to life.

Rhythm is un-naturistic, therefore the naturist instinctively eschews it. He senses in it *order*, which is anathema to him. Rhythm represents design, and design is senseless to him. As tightness leads to unbearable nervous strain, so looseness leads to flaccidity and a kind of living death. The only choice between these extremes is that tightness produces a great deal more of works than looseness does. Utter indolence is the hallmark of the very loose naturist; tremendous activity, on the other hand, is the hallmark of the very tight supernaturalist. It is a fair surmise that America's intense industrial activity has arisen from its Puritanical origins, which foster tightness. An America made up mostly of naturists would very swiftly reduce our tempo to an astonishing degree.

There is a remarkable relationship between human rhythm and effectiveness. Athletes have discovered it. The great Finnish runner, Nurmi, "runs on rhythm"; that is to say, he has worked out a harmonious relationship between the various parts of his body when he runs. Prize-fighters too have discovered the usefulness of such rhythm. It establishes greater power because it engages the unconscious self, which uses rhythm almost exclusively as its principle of action. Far greater ease of effort results from working "on rhythm," as even the stolid men who pull the ropes drawing the boats along the Volga or the Yangtse know, as they rhythmically sing out their standard chant, with which their muscles work in easeful unison. The subconscious takes over the task in this way and does away with conscious strain, using the absolute minimum of vitality for the task. All real manual dexterity represents

training of the subconscious, and even in music and the arts the subconscious enters and has a rhythmic part to play. A free-swinging, unlabored spontaneity tempered with discipline represents a true rhythmic marriage of conscious discipline to subconscious power.

Rhythmic action is the communicating language between the conscious and the subconscious; indeed it is the communicating bond between nature and man; between the far-off star and the falling leaf; between the spiritual and the natural. As John Warrack said of the Greeks, "Strength, beauty, wisdom, skill and energy; these, not singly but harmoniously coördinated, were the beacons that led them on." The naturalness which the naturist believes he seeks, and the control and guidance toward good ends which the supernaturalist seeks (both ineffectually), the humanist *really* finds when he attains the rhythmic synthesis here described. The humanist who lives the full humanistic philosophy is thus bound to swing freely in poised relation to life, with the minimum of tension necessary to control. He is bound to be broad and tolerant, wide in his range of interest, healthy in his appetites, high in sensitivity, but not hypersensitive, and effective in action. He is bound to love laughter and joy and be generous in his intuitive strength toward those of lesser strength; and he is bound also to have a rich sense of wholeness, of clay as well as stars, of matter and of spirit. It is such a man who ideally is best fitted to break dead rhythms and create new ones; to feel intuitively "the grand rhythm," as Elie Faure calls it, of the adaptations yet to come. But of course the humanist knows well that beauty and genius in "grand rhythm" may arise anywhere, sometimes from the most unlikely sources, and often under the most tortuous pressure and disbalance. Still he believes that more of it will arise from a race of

humanists—*as it did in Greece*—than from a people holding any other philosophy of life. The Greeks set a mark of human development which it has since been the despair of all civilizations to equal.

69. The Humanist and Art.—We are thus brought to the relationship of the humanist to art and its compulsions upon the liberation of the human spirit. Art is at the very core of philosophy, for if we want to know what we are we must understand what is art. Humanistic man is himself art, for he has shaped himself creatively with his will and consciousness. As Elie Faure, author of *The History of Art,* says: "Art initiates us into certain profound realities whose actual possession would enable humanity to bring about, within and around itself, the supreme harmony which is the fugitive goal of its endeavor. . . . (It is) born of the association of our sensibility and our experience, formed in order that we may be masters of ourselves. The work of art attracts us only because we recognize in it the formulation of our desire. . . . We know our dream to be unperishable, since we shall never attain that realization of ourselves which we pursue unceasingly. . . . Our idealism is no other than the reality of our mind. . . . From the impact of the spirit that animates the form with the spirit that animates us, life springs forth. We shall never be able to utilize it unless it responds wholly to those obscure movements which dictate our own actions. We give the name of a god to the form which best interprets our desire—sensual, moral, individual, social, no matter what—our vague desire to comprehend, to utilize life, ceaselessly to extend the limits of the intelligence and the heart. . . . And he whom we call the artist is the one among living beings who, in the presence of universal life, maintains the state of love in his heart. Rodin sees quivering in the block

of marble a man and a woman knotted together by their arms and their legs, but we shall never understand the tragic necessity for such an embrace if we do not feel that an inner force, desire, mingles the hearts and the flesh of the bodies thus welded together. When Carrière wrests from the matter of the universe a mother giving the breast to her child, we shall not understand the value of that union if we do not feel that an inner force, love, dictates the bending of the torso and the curve of the mother's arm, and that another inner force, hunger, buries the infant in her bosom. The image that expresses nothing is not beautiful, and the finest sentiment escapes us if it does not directly determine the image which shall translate it. The pediments, frescoes, and epics, the symphonies, the loftiest architectures, all the sweep of liberty, the glory and the irresistible power of the infinite and living temple which we erect to ourselves, are in this mysterious accord. . . . the goal of life is living, and it is to ever-moving and ever-renewing life that our ideal leads us. . . . Art is the lightning flash of harmony that a people or a man conquers from the darkness or the chaos which precede him, follow him and necessarily surround him.

"To realize unity in the mind and to transmit it to the work is to obey that need of general and durable order which our universe imposes on us. The scientist expresses this order by the law of continuity, the artist by the law of harmony, the just man by the law of solidarity. These three essential instruments of our human adaptation—science, which defines the relations of fact with fact; art, which suggests the relations of the fact with man; and morality, which seeks the relations of man with man—establish for our use, from one end of the material and spiritual world to the other, a system of relations whose

permanence and utility demonstrate its logic to us. They teach us what serves us, what harms us. Nothing else matters very greatly. There is neither error nor truth, neither ugliness nor beauty, neither evil nor good outside of the use in human problems which we give to our three instruments. The mission of our sensibility, of our personal intelligence, is to establish the value of them, through searching out, from one to the other, the mysterious passages which will permit us to grasp the continuity of our effort, in order to comprehend and accept it as a whole. By so doing we shall, little by little, utilize what we call error, ugliness, and evil, as means to a higher education and realize harmony in ourselves, that we may extend it about us.

"Harmony is a profound law, which goes back to primitive unity, and the desire for it is imposed on us by the most general and the most imperious of all the realities. The artist comes, seizes the universal law, and renders us a world complete, whose elements, characterized by their principal relations, all participate in the harmonious accomplishment of the ensemble of its functions. . . . All action in time, all action in space have their goal in his action. It is his place to affirm the agreement of the thought of Jesus, of the thought of Newton, and of the thought of Lamarck. And it is on that account that Phidias and Rembrandt must recognize each other and that we must recognize ourselves in them."

It is surely clear from Faure's brilliant intuitive sense of the place of the artist in life that aesthetics has a high place in the humanistic life, the link between being the seeking of harmony. The humanist is the great reconciler, the adapter, the artist, bringing the meanings of life to their true focus and perspective. "Every man, every act, every work is a musician or an instrument in an orchestra," Faure

has also said; and this is the poetic heart of humanism as a philosophy. When he says also that "art is not only useful, but it is, without the least doubt, the only thing that is, after bread, really useful to us all," we may amend the statement and say that, after bread, art and a philosophy of life, making an inner harmony, are the most useful. This seeking of inner harmony is the very soul of the human struggle, its play, its art, its religion and its philosophies. It is what was dimly sought in every attempt at artistry, from the primitive lakeman's necklace of bones, the silhouette of the aurochs dug in the wall of the grotto in Périgord, the ikon before which the Russian mujik keeps his lamp burning, the war dance of the Sioux Indians, the temples on the hills of Greece, the Pyramids on the sands of the Sahara, the great frescoes on the walls of Venetian palaces—even to the daubs of the half-drunken artists of Greenwich Village.

The humanist philosophy—so its critics say—strikes a snag, just as supernaturalism does, on the question of the morality of the artist. For a long time naturism has seemed the most logical philosophy for the artist, because it set up no "verboten" signs for him anywhere, leaving him perfectly free to transgress all codes and all standards in the holy cause of seeking for material for art. The artist has always furiously resented any restrictions upon his experimentation with life, and far more than any other educated class has violated all codes and standards. Famous humanists like Professors Babbitt and More have been very critical of this, not because they had no appreciation of art, but because they were in logic bound to attack the philosophy of naturism, by whomever held. Since artists and writers of a type have notoriously held this philosophy, if not actually propagated it, it is not unnatural that artists

and writers of this type should be made to bear the brunt of the attack. Professor Babbitt calls the typical naturistic philosophy of the artists mere emotional intoxication, when it is not actually a romantic pose or a sensual gourmandising.

In any event, the humanist must face the question squarely, and he has probably been a little too severe. After all it is a difficult and delicate question. Since the idea of naturism as a universal philosophy is obviously pure chaos, the other alternative would be to admit two standards, one for the artist and another for the rest of us. This is repugnant also, and therefore it seems that a more mellow interpretation of humanism is called for. The outlines of this are furnished by Mary Colum, a noted literary critic, who says, "Life in its workings is governed by two codes of spiritual values"; first the well-known ethical one, and the second, equally natural, though without fixed boundaries, which "represents the values by which we appreciate the width and profundity, the richness and intensity of life and human relations." It is no wrench to the intrinsic basis of humanism to accept this "second dimension," for as Mrs. Colum says, "Every intelligent and richly endowed human being not only wants to live ethically, but wants to live profoundly and intensely." She admits that this second dimension "leads him frequently into tragic situations," and with this admission the mellow humanist is content to rest his claims. A philosophy which "leads frequently into tragic situations" is obviously not a philosophy for the ordinary man, and in accepting this second dimension the humanist would simply pin upon it a plain notice in Mrs. Colum's own words, and hope that the adventuring artist will place equal emphasis upon the first dimension. The humanist, we repeat, frankly questions whether the

free expressionism, the emotional intoxication and libertinism of a certain fringe of naturist artists bear any genuine relationship to art, since equally fine art is produced by more humanistic artists. The humanist certainly denies that in order to live intensely or richly or profoundly it is necessary to live like Baudelaire or Poe or Villon, or even like Byron or Shelley. He would squarely deny that these men lived richly or profoundly, even though they undoubtedly lived intensely. Here lies the humanistic heart of the matter. If only men *would* live "intensely, richly and profoundly," ethics and standards would take care of themselves, for they are inextricably bound up in richness and profundity. It is the concentration upon one narrow phase of this second dimension of Mrs. Colum's—upon intensity alone—which has given rise to humanistic querulousness. The humanist seeks balance and harmony, and while he must fully accustom himself to the accidents and twists of fate which produce some beauty from muck and some artists from sheer one-sided intensity, nevertheless the humanist sees no reason to dim the lustre of the harmony standard. Leonardo da Vinci is to the humanist still the prince among artists, because of his resplendent, rounded humanism. Beside his galaxy of disciplines, the undisciplined narrow artist looks puny. Leonardo "remained a primitive despite his incalculable power," as Faure says of him; and yet he "took a section of life, followed it in its accidents, its relation with surrounding life, and its course through space, and never lost sight of the line that described the projections, the hollows, and the undulations which were born of his pursuit of that line. . . . With this astounding man who founded or foresaw all the future sciences together, to whom the arts of sculpture and painting seem to be no more than human applications of the abstract ideas which he had drawn from

the study of geometry, perspective, mechanics, alchemy, geology, hydraulics, anatomy and botany, experimentation was of equal importance with the intuition that he possessed to the highest degree. His intuition was of the kind that creates life. He is perhaps the only man in whom science and art were merged through their means of expressing thought, since they tend to unite, in their common need, to establish the continuity of the laws of nature in the domain of the mind. . . . He accepted the world. He divined great things. In an epoch when Platonic idealism, which he ceaselessly combated, had misled intelligence, he had the sense of real life which alone leads to the grandest abstractions. He had the gentleness of vision and had acquired it at a time when the life of impulse was loosed upon the world. . . . He perceived the common sources and the eternal circle of things. . . . 'The more one knows, the more one loves,' he said."

70. Life Itself as an Art.—It springs naturally and logically from the humanistic premise of the importance of man's shaping of life with his will and consciousness, that life is definitely an art. As Havelock Ellis says in *The Dance of Life,* "We cannot help seeking to measure, quantitatively if not qualitatively, our mode of life." Supernaturalism is bitterly opposed to any such view, because it desires to make little of life except a duty, an obeying not of creative impulse but of imposed law. The naturist is opposed to life as an art, because art is design and design is futile to most naturists. They desire life to be formless.

The humanist, on the other hand, is committed very basically to design and balance, and therefore he necessarily looks upon man as artist and the instincts and the materials of life as raw materials and tools, as marble and chisel, as

paint and canvas, from which to create life according to the conceptions of his reason and his intuitions. Indeed the humanist insists that only if life is lived as an art is human dignity achieved. He can create out of himself a group member, or a type individual or a full individual, according to his desires; but create he will if he is not impeded by one of the extremist philosophies of life, or if he is not below the normal level of awareness.

"Man is the measure of all things," said Protagoras; and this is a thoroughly humanistic pronunciamento. If so it is the primary duty of man to set all values in a frame according to his own sense of harmony and interpretation. As Bertrand Russell says in his *Principles of Social Reconstruction,* "It is the creative impulse in which real life consists, and the typical creative impulse is that of the artist." Even Tolstoy said, "Art, in the large sense, impregnates our whole life."

The humanist hopes for the day when we shall, like the Greeks, have the sense of art as well as the sense of ethics more intuitively operative, as a result of the disciplines of the will and consciousness. The Greeks were ethical and aesthetic with the same ease with which a good musician plays the piano and thinks or talks at the same time. The fingers and the music sense are so well disciplined that they can perform intricate patterns and harmonies without the conscious mind needing to pay close attention, as the beginner must. The subconscious mind is a marvelous habit mechanism, a complex tool for just this discipline of artistry in many fields—in conduct, in feeling, in work. It will literally "work while you sleep." The instincts and the subconscious will be obedient, trained servants—but of course *as masters* they are treacherously incompetent.

When we say "instinctive courtesy," "natural friendli-

ness," "innate generosity," or "inborn culture," what we really mean is that the will, the higher self, has been at work long and patiently and artistically to discipline the subconscious so that without conscious thought it follows the path the higher reason and intuition marked out for it. This is a very vital aspect of the art of life, to train the subconscious to reactions which are not merely loosely animal, but humanistically patterned and shaped to the preferred design.

Croce, the great Italian philosopher, in his *Aesthetics as Science of Expression,* calls art "the deliverer, the process through which we overcome the stress of inner experiences by objectifying them." Thus in a genuine sense we cure the "drive," the pain and suffering we have as a result of desiring and willing and wishing, by the act of carving our lives to a pattern and a design; and if we are balked in this we still ease our desire and pain by doing it *symbolically*—that is to say through art forms instead of real life. In this way the artist who paints, writes or sculptures is intimately related to the artist who shapes his own life; they are brother artists, the only difference being that the artist who shapes life uses himself and his environment as plastic material, while his brother artist uses paper, clay, canvas or what not and speaks in symbols of life.

Precisely the same principles which govern the one artist can govern the other. If they are genuine artists, each will seek for selective meanings and significances, each will discipline and train his faculties, each will use the rules of artistic composition, of mass and color and line, background and foreground and tone-color in his actions. The eternal remark of Shakespeare that "all the world's a stage" is only a comparison using another art-form. The individual cannot help himself; even Thoreau seeking Walden Pond in

seclusion was dramatizing himself. Every act and every decision is a part of the tapestry pattern which a life represents. "Every natural faculty—and every organic function is such a faculty—by means of exercise, evolution and inheritance, can become an art," said Vaihinger in his *The Philosophy of As-If*. Thus life, even in its physical functioning, becomes, like the dance, a series of arts.

71. The Twelve Specific Arts of Living.—There can be the following divisions of the art of living; each a technique in itself:

(1) *the art of posture and carriage*—rhythmic, spring-stepped, disciplined, graceful, healthy walking, carriage and position;

(2) *the art of conversation*—a properly placed voice, cadenced on a full scale of tones, with pleasing inflections, clear enunciation, good vocabulary, graceful gesture, vivacity of spirit, adaptability to company, sustained subject, courtesy in argument, humor and repartee, interest and curiosity, diplomacy and insight;

(3) *the art of dress*—individual study of color and line, cleanliness, discipline, personality expression, care of clothes;

(4) *the art of friendship and sociability*—pleasure in company, consideration for others, thoughtful manners, meticulousness in social obligations, reciprocity, leadership, loyalty, faith, amiability, hospitality, helpfulness and affection;

(5) *the art of dining*—table manners, appreciation of food and cookery, discipline of appetite, grace in service and social hospitality, gastronomic adventure and understanding;

(6) *the art of love*—comprehension and enhancement of sex difference and sex attraction, personal hygiene, physical, mental and spiritual magnetism, emotional expression, emotional approach, emotional variety, emotional control, emotional maturity, emotional strategy, sexual literacy and normality;

(7) *the art of health*—understanding of and adaptation to individual physiology and personal hygiene, discipline in diet, exercise, expenditure and conservation of vitality, mental hygiene, emotional stability;

(8) *the art of effectiveness*—understanding of self, stimulation,

"drive," avoidance of subconscious conflict, mastery of moods and emotions, concentration of powers;

(9) *the art of play*—rhythmic, measured but spontaneous enjoyment, versatility of mood and adaptation, skill at leisure arts, special hobbies, athletic games, measured relish of idleness and solitude;

(10) *the art of thinking*—development of general capacity, information, discipline of reading, thinking things through, independence of thought, skepticism, curiosity, analysis, logic, interest, argument, speaking, writing;

(11) *the art of family life*—adaptability in marriage, creation of fine family atmosphere and spirit, adequate discipline of domestic hierarchy, domestic leadership and diplomacy, comradeliness with children;

(12) *the art of wholeness*—rounding the personality, rounding knowledge, rounding the emotions, rounding experience, rounding spirituality, rounding philosophy of life, avoidance of all narrowness.

The development of these twelve arts of living is intimately related to happiness and well-being, and, humanistically speaking, they are all vital to human dignity and worth. To deal with life and with things according to an individual note of style, according to a disciplined technique, according to a set of principles which represent the core of one's philosophy, is to be as near to godlikeness as we have any right to hope for. It is genuine creation. If, as Havelock Ellis says, "Art is the active practical exercise of a single discipline"; if, as Gaultier said, "Beauty is an attitude of sensibility"; and if, as Guyan says, "Art, in a word, is life," then we may be sure that living life and describing life are at bottom the same things, and it is the opportunity of all of us to be artists.

Franz Liszt, great musician, was fond of saying, "Art is easy, life is difficult." This is of course profoundly true, and sets the measure of worth of genuine accomplishment in the art of living. It is broadly true that the world has

lived too much by symbol in the past, lived too much by "romance" and other-worldliness. The untidy, unaccomplished wife, neglectful of the arts of life, but avidly reading romantic stories, is a significant illustration of an unhumanistic person. The business man, able to make money but restless in leisure, poverty-stricken of rounded interests and not a companion to his family, is another such instance. The humanist is a realist, but not a naturist; the difference must be carefully understood. The humanist has a genuine interest and belief in human values, human arts, human happiness, and, like Leonardo da Vinci, is interested in technique, in skills and in disciplines; and has an utter distrust of the "impulse" and "spontaneity" standard of the romanticist. The humanist knows that fine values do not "happen," are not "stumbled upon" by the "trial and error" method alone, and that dreaming and wishing and emotional intoxication are no substitutes for conscious art, the making of value.

The art of life is the supreme end of man, for man is the supreme end of life.

XII

The Sex Urges, Used and Balanced

It appears to the humanist that this is the precise time in modern life to achieve a healthy sex balance. It could not well have been achieved before, because the supernaturalist had so violently forced sex into secret places and into obscured, unhealthy reactions. At the same time, the rebound from this repressive brutality and ignorance brought about (as it always does) a holiday for the naturists with their complete expressionism, libertinism and lack of measures and responsible standards.

Thus people of middle age today have actually lived in three distinct eras in regard to sex. They have lived in the age of stupid sex repression which persisted until the turn of the century; they have lived in the era of every form of undisciplined eroticism and sex-obsession, and they are now living in an era when the more humanistic philosophy of sex balance is beginning to salvage the situation

and bidding fair to harvest a fuller, richer life in consequence.

72. **A True Humanistic Attitude Toward Sex.**—When we recall, as we must, that among the humanists of the past were men like Rabelais and Leonardo da Vinci as well as the Greeks (even though their humanism was not precisely the "new" humanism of today), it becomes evident at once that for the humanist a fairly radical change in our attitude toward sex is imperative. No ideas we have are more beclouded with emotion and bias than our ideas of sex, and it will be no aid at all if we come to our task with prejudices, rooted beliefs and antagonisms. It is to be assumed at the outset that reason and intuition shall have the chairmanship of the inquiry; that neither sheer emotion and instinct nor arbitrary repression and dogma shall rule. *Man* shall be served, and not gods or animal urges.

In this true humanistic spirit, without sentimentality, without fear and without disbalance, a true appraisal of sex in life is not a difficult task. The naturists have been perfectly correct in scorning the furtive, tortured attitude toward sex which has been current for several centuries. They have been right also in crediting joyous sex feeling with being related to the genesis of art and music and literature and high endeavor. They have been right even in their claim that sex feeling transcends the bounds of convention and the common rules of society. Sex feeling obviously originates beyond the will of man, but this is far from saying that it shall be unreined and unbridled. It is perfectly easy to see why the supernaturalist laid such heavy iron chains upon it, in his fear, for the excesses of sex, when not restrained, strike at the very root of life and human dignity. There is no society, however savage, which does not set up boundaries to the free expression of sex, and in

many savage societies adultery is severely punished. The regulation of sex expression, to some degree, is to be assumed as a primary condition of civilization. It also has a basis in man's own nature and needs, for his own physical and psychic reactions drive him toward moderation.

But this does not go to the heart of the humanistic view of sex. The corrective needed in modern times to make it humanistic is not so much social regulation as individual expression *on a wider scale of values*. The great mass of Anglo-Saxon people today are actually *sick*, in greater or less degree, from the long-continued neurosis of sex-repression, accompanied by the resulting immaturity of emotional life and meagerness of emotional expression (all of which are closely inter-related). A vital factor in the richness of feeling and happiness of human relationships possible by human beings has thus been stunted and stultified. That particularly humanistic value, harmony, has been turned into pronounced discord in the field of sex relationships, and has marked all modern life with a particularly dangerous, disintegrating set of forces, sex perversity, sex antagonism and auto-eroticism.

The first necessity, as the humanist sees it, is to *begin the puncturing of the artificial strains and stresses of the sex subject*. These have been developed over many centuries past as a result of the sinister color cast upon sex by the supernaturalist. Beginning originally as a protest against old pagan sex revelry and ritual, the supernaturalists placed the mark of sin upon all sex expression; the Christian even inventing "immaculate conception" and ascetic life for the priesthood as special symbols of shame for sex expression. These, together with the perfectly logical and perfectly human reticence and modesty about sex, combined to build into western civilized peoples a remarkably persistent bias,

fear and inhibition. Never for long, since pagan days, and not always then, has sex been given its full dignity, its fair place, its possible scope or its fitting rhythm, measure and proportion.

By puncturing the artificial strains and stresses we mean the normalizing of function, the deflation of obsession over sex, the relieving of the pressures which accumulate in body and mind when the emotional nature is not permitted to function with prophylactic simplicity and ease under the guidance of the higher will and intuition. These are certainly no simple tasks, however. The requirements are, first, more enlightened public opinion, which until now has resided in two very hostile extreme camps, (supernaturalism and naturism). The increase of acceptance of the humanistic philosophy is the simplest way to bring this about, since direct sex reform only stirs antagonisms. The second need is more humanistic education, at school and at home, with particularized emphasis on emotional expression. Sex instruction as such is more humanistically achieved in a rounded curriculum of emotional education. Far too many of our young people grow up stuffed with a great deal of information, including sex information, but entirely without training of their emotional natures. Their "mental age" may be 18, and their "emotional age" only 12.* They may have the brains of an adult but still the emotions of a child in knickers.

This lack of sex information is the key cause of most of our difficulties with undisciplined young people. The humanist urges very sharply that more humanistic courses and activities be planned in high schools and colleges, leading toward emotional literacy and maturity. As nothing

* See "What is your Emotional Age?" by J. George Frederick; Business Bourse, New York, $2.25.

else these will puncture the strains and stresses of sex, or rather prevent them from arising. There are few arts so needful to complete human happiness as the arts of general emotional expression, sex approach, sex expression, sex balance. Yet a most astounding tacit conspiracy appears to exist in western civilization to keep young people emotionally immature and to plan their education as if they were constituted nine-tenths of brain matter. It is typical of American parents and teachers to swell with pride at the information a child has been stuffed with, while entirely ignoring the fact that this child may be pitifully crippled and limited in its emotional development; being still, psychologically, the counterpart of a mere suckling babe. The modern scene holds no more pathetic and ludicrous and damning an exhibit than that of a young man of twenty-four, who looks like a man, takes high honors in a university, and starts out in life on his own efforts—whereas, in point of fact, he is arrested in his emotional development at the level of about 12 or 14 years, and is still his mother's infant in arms, possibly forever ruined as a lover and a husband because of such emotional atrophy. Primarily this is a disaster which supernaturalism is responsible for, since it fostered the system of emotional sheltering, sentimentality and sex sublimation to the danger point. Naturism, it is true, might have sent him from his mother into the arms of other women, and scarred him with some undesirable sex experience, but he would not have become fatally bogged in sex repression. Nevertheless, naturism has its own serious forms of danger, equally vicious, and between the two systems there is not much to choose.

The desolate and extremist character of both of these systems of thought, and the sterile *impassé* they create in life are well illustrated by the typical attitude toward

women by western civilized men of a certain very numerous type. These men can conceive of only two types of women: (1) the austere, rather sexually frigid, highly repressed woman to whom "morality" centers almost completely around sexual conventionality, and whom the man considers spiritually angelic and above him; and (2) the prostitute, very distinctly below him. He is bewildered by any other type of woman than these two. Once again we see here the familiar *extremism;* the stultifying contrast between the supernaturalist and the naturist points of view. These men know no middle ground between the supernaturalist type of severely inhibited, cold, perennially virginal women, and the "loose" naturistic women; one with too much restraint, and the other with none.

The consequences of such a sex situation are precisely like the consequences of the same situation elsewhere in life. The extremism breeds disorder and neurosis, antagonisms and confusion. Great numbers of men who use these rigid classifications of women marry the supernaturalist woman and idealistically worship at her feet, but in actual practice consort with the naturistic women. Their minds are split in twain as a result; made two-compartmented, with ensuing internal conflict and the decay of fine sex relationship. This, distinctly, is a state of sex disbalance; a markedly unhealthy and degenerative condition. It greatly needs the prophylaxis of humanism, which will view sex more humanly, but no less high-mindedly. It will absolutely insist on the elimination of any sacerdotal idea of sex, so destructive of normality; but it will equally forcibly insist on aesthetic and sportsmanlike restraints and proportion. Both the "sin complex" regarding sex and the "free love" and promiscuity ideas must go—not because humanism sets up another arbitrary fiat to take the place of the

fiat of supernaturalism, but because it is demonstrated by all the responsible research of the subject, and by intuition, that human need is not served by either standard.

A higher per capita of sex joy and stimulation with all the valuable attendant results on general human happiness, is attainable by means of the humanistic view of sex, than by the route of either naturism or supernaturalism. Joseph Wood Krutch, a naturist, testifies in his *The Modern Temper*, to the decline and even the snuffing out of love in modern life, under the naturist philosophy. In their callous trampling upon humanistic values in regard to sex both naturist and supernaturalist have been choking love to death. Thus Bertrand Russell can say in his new book *Marriage and Morals:* "Love has its own proper ideals and its own intrinsic moral standards. These are obscured both in Christian teaching and in the indiscriminate revolt against all sexual morality which has sprung up among considerable sections of the younger generation. . . . Of this sort of thing Aldous Huxley's novels afford the best illustration. His characters, like St. Paul, view sex intercourse merely as a physiological outlet."

A better demonstration that the humanistic view of sex is needed, is probably impossible to find. Of such a view of sex love in all its wide gamut of possible manifestations it may be said, in the poet's words, "these riches are possessed but not enjoyed."

In specific detail, what may be said to be genuinely humanistic standards of sex conduct? It is a bold undertaking to codify a set of humanistic sex standards, but we will be bold and undertake it, encouraged by the fact that they are not really new, but have been discovered by intuition and deduction by many people who do not realize that such

standards represent a sound humanistic philosophy. They may be summarized as follows:

73. Standard One, as to Self-Understanding.—Every individual should appraise and understand his or her particular emotional and sexual nature as soon as possible after puberty, in order that actions may not be blind and ignorant. This is to be accomplished in these ways: (1) frank, friendly talks with parents, teachers and physicians (but not companions of one's own age of the opposite sex); (2) reading of competent books of sexual guidance; (3) plenty of play, study and social companionship with the opposite sex of the same age; (4) happy, free-speaking, affectionate relationship with *both* parents; (5) some early, but casual "petting," and some normal youthful "moon-calf" love experimentation of an idealistic type. If such a humanistic, simple course is followed, there will come easily an acquaintanceship with one's emotional reactions and sex impulses, and an ability to govern or manage them. They will not so readily govern the individual and warp him if this acquaintanceship is achieved. Most of the grave sex errors in early life are the result of an over-rigid emotional control which is suddenly overwhelmed, the impulses running wild because of no experience at management.

To seal up the emotional nature hermetically tight may be far simpler but is far more dangerous than to give it free flow under wise government by the higher will. It is a little like the sluice gate of a dam. It is easier to keep it shut altogether than to open it and regulate the flow to a nicety. To keep it entirely closed however merely postpones an ominous pressure which will break the dam, whereas regulation under reasoned, measured control of the pressing waters is the sound humanistic, common sense method to apply. To learn to operate with measure and

proportion the sluice gates of one's emotions (of all kinds, including sex feeling) is one of the primary requirements for a happy sex life. It calls distinctly for thorough self-understanding, so that one's emotions may function gracefully, freely and finely. Incredibly "tight" and awkward natures are to be found in great plenty; some who cannot kiss their own mothers without hesitations, agony and blushes, and then only perfunctorily; some who cannot express anything at anytime but a dull, colorless monotone of feeling, which is never cadenced on an up-and-down scale with many varying notes of light and shade, gayety, sentiment, gratitude, fervor, warmth, ecstasy, as well as unashamed moods of disappointment, sorrow, concern, pity, etc. To give expression to such a scale of emotion is a part of emotional education, and has a great deal to do with sex happiness, for the "tight" person, always hanging upon a single, cramped monotonous note of emotion, neither gives nor receives the full gamut of values of the sex emotion. A true humanistic philosophy calls for making of ourselves a splendidly tuned instrument for the expression of a rich scale of tonal values in emotion, including subtle over-tones; all to be as free, resonant and as clearly defined as the notes of a Stradivarius violin. We too are instruments of great wonder and moving beauty of tone, if we apply ourselves like artists to bringing ourselves to the point of expression.

74. Standard Two, as to "Sublimation" of Sex.—The naturists have always derided all sex sublimation, because any check upon or diversion of the sex impulse is against their doctrine of free and easy following of impulse. The supernaturalists have used sublimation to such an extreme that actual distorted mentality has resulted. The humanist understands that a degree of sex sublimation is positively

necessary—but only a degree of it. Quite by preference and intuition young people sublimate their strong sex feeling into idealism and great physical and mental activity. They are not yet psychically ready for complete sex expression, and in such cases where bad influences or perversity result in very early sex expression, a great deal of that fine period of youthful questing, idealism and spiritual ripening is lost; a loss which can never be repaired and will always be regretted.

It is a fruitful period of value-creation and dream-creation which like the period of ground cultivation and fertilizing before the harvest, determines the size and beauty of the fruit. It is a play and make-believe period, a stretch of time when all possibilities are canvassed and anticipated but in which complete and premature realization would rob all the years of their lovely period of budding and becoming. Normally full experience is rejected in this period, as Frank Theiss, well known German author of the modern younger generation, so well illustrates in his novel *The Gateway of Life*. Sex is savored and enjoyed *in anticipation,* in its approaches, in its preliminary sensations, with all their important, slowly unfolding connotations and repercussions in the psychic life. The human stalk is gathering its sap and its strength to bear the blossom when the humanistically right time for blossoming shall arrive. This youthful adolescent or semi-adult period of sex sublimation is a civilized human need, befitting the complex mental and spiritual nature of man, with his long period of childhood and preparation for adulthood. To endeavor, naturistically, to encourage the young to plunge into very early full sex experience is to push man back upon the animal plane. Thus sex sublimation for young people is perfectly natural and desirable. Music, athletics, dancing, flirtation, study

and hard work are the normally preferred sublimations and the humanistically right ones.

The genuine problem of sex sublimation arises when full adulthood comes and the normal processes of sex preparation are completed, both physically and psychically. If then full sex expression is not attained, sublimation becomes a serious matter, at least for some natures. There are cooler, less vital or emotional natures which never feel the pressure of this problem; and there are others so generally inhibited that by habit sex inhibition is actually more agreeable than sex expression. The truth about these types is that they live too constricted lives. Some of them, around middle life, suddenly throw off these constrictions and become real problems to themselves and to others. The supernaturalist has always been in a tortuous position in this regard, giving rise to what is now frankly characterized as hypocrisy. Tolstoi is the classic example of the sensual supernaturalist, one day breaking his bonds and indulging himself widely, and the next day down on his knees in abject prayer for forgiveness. The whole supernaturalist philosophy is tattered and soiled by this sin-and-forgiveness, indulgence-and-salvation psychology. It illustrates the destructive duel which an excess of sex restraint can produce in human beings. The naturist's scorn of all sublimation merely raises another set of problems equally grave; merely the other side of the coin, but still the same coin.

The humanist uses sex sublimation as a practical instrument in keeping with his principle of "the will to refrain," but also in keeping with his code of balance, of "nothing too much," and its converse, "of nothing too little." Sex sublimation, even in adulthood, is as normal as sex indulgence, if it is not overdone. Explorers and travelers and others in all times have so immersed them-

selves in activities that, for a period even of years, sex was under quite successful sublimation. There are few indeed of enlightened physicians or sexologists who would claim that this is either harmful or impossible. The harm comes from permanent or long continued sublimation, until the condition of such sublimation became an integral part of character, and until the sex urges have channeled their way out in other ways, as they invariably do. Such a condition distorts and betrays true human character and is distinctly to be shunned if possible. That it sometimes channels its way out as poetry or literature, as in the case of Poe, Dante, Emily Dickinson, Keats, etc., is no recommendation for it in principle, since it far more often channels its way out in ridiculous and low ways than in sublime ways. A human being should take effective steps to secure normal sex expression, attendant with all possible high values of spirit and emotion, and use sex sublimation as only an occasional instrument when necessary for the maintenance of an aesthetic, selective personal standard.

75. Standard Three, as to Sexual Responsibility.—The supernaturalist is almost neurotic on the subject of sex responsibility, while the naturist is usually devoid of ânу. The humanist has a very definite sense of sex responsibility, but he insists that the code of responsibility be shaped to the human facts and not to an other-worldly dogma. Since even animals have a well-marked sense of sexual responsibility, it needs no argument that man should have an especially enlightened one. There are groups of naturists who show no more sense of sexual responsibility, no more after-interest than the bee shows to the flower whose pollen it takes. There are, on the other hand, supernaturalists who would bind in wedlock until they die young people wholly unfitted, because of a single sex embrace forced upon an unwilling

girl. These are horrendous extremes; unhuman cruelties scarcely matched even in the animal world.

Sexual contact entails genuine responsibility; this is what the humanist knows, from his understanding of human need and fact. The sexual emotion is a wide-spreading web of inter-related feelings, especially in woman. These feelings first of all have vitally to do with her status in life, which so inevitably hinges upon her sexual relationship to man. Her footing in this world of human affairs is not grounded upon her work and mental ability, as is man's to so large a degree. It is grounded upon her relationship to a man. Men do not have prefixes to their names indicating whether or not they are married; women have. Very extensive differences exist in a woman's character and outlook based on whether she is a virgin or not a virgin; an unmarried woman or a married woman. Secondly, women cannot for biological reasons alone dissociate their higher selves from sex expression as men can. More or less spiritual love is almost of necessity bound up in it. Nor can they extricate themselves from the web of sex emotion as easily or as quickly as men, nor indeed, enter into the web as easily or quickly. Their emotionality is more intense than man's, and they are as a rule less able than man to take a disinterested view of their emotional selves, and are thus to a greater degree controlled and bound by their sex emotions. As a consequence women have a logical high sensitivity to the character of any emotional relationship to a man. This sensitivity is so great that it readily touches upon hysteria and failure of control. Many more women go insane or commit suicide as a result of sex complications than men.

Factors such as these, together with traditional or religious inhibitions, social pressures or traditional attitudes, and physical risks, combine to give a high symbolic

and tremulously real importance to sex expression by women. The inevitable result is the placing upon any man who engenders sex feeling in a woman a vital responsibility, from the point of view of sportsmanship and fairness if not of chivalry. This is entirely aside from the physical and legal responsibilities arising. The easy assumption by naturists that women as well as men can be casual in sex relationships, or that they should assume equal responsibility, is not borne out by human nature. This is no argument for a "double standard" of morality, but for a doubled sense of responsibility on the part of men. This responsibility inevitably reaches into the economic field, because most women have too precarious an economic status outside the fold of a sex relationship to man.

It should be clear from these rapidly sketched items of consideration that man cannot in honor avoid responsibilities in his sexual relationship with woman; and this human fact indeed is the elemental basis for the marriage relationship. The sense of need for permanent feeling, of mutual obligation, the necessity of long-continued nurture of children, during which woman is at a physical disadvantage—these are considerations of human need with which sex expression must necessarily be surrounded. Casual sex expression is not humanistic, nor is the view of the sex act as a mere physiological function. The humanist therefore finds it fundamental that a strong sense of male responsibility be present even in flirtation and the approaches to sex expression. It is unsportsmanlike and unhuman to begin what one cannot or will not finish. *Amiel's Journal* is a remarkable human document certifying to this. Amiel's cowardly, indecisive attitudes toward the woman he loved were far less humanistic or sound than the downright, numerous, but satisfying loves of Casanova.

76. Standard Four, as to Sex Sincerity.—Closely related to sex responsibility is the matter of sincerity. It would be regrettable if the idealism which led the naturists to strike out, in theory, after more sexual honesty should prove to have been lost in the resulting libertinism of the naturists in practice. The scornful rejection of the anomalies and hypocrisies of the supernaturalist's view of sex was quite justified, even though an opposite extreme is not. Therefore the humanist sets up a standard which retains some of the forthrightness and honesty with which the naturist approached sex. He believes there is real need for a finer sincerity in sex expression. By sincerity he does not mean the public advertising of private emotions or the infliction of cruelty in the name of "frankness." He means *inner* sincerity.

It is an intensely human and difficult situation. The naturists themselves, in applying their directness and honesty in sex matters, discovered (and were disillusioned by) the overwhelming power of human emotions which topple over the ideas of the brain and belie them. Theoretical ideas about sex freedom and sex frankness have a way of being brushed entirely aside under the intense power of sex feeling, as Alfred Sutro ably demonstrated in his *Freedom*, a story describing the complete reversal in practice of the ideas so loftily held in theory by a group of "moderns." Despite their promises to each other to grant full sex freedom in marriage, they strenuously objected when the test came. Noble resolutions as to what one should do under certain circumstances of sex relationship came to naught. For this reason Bertrand Russell's easy assumption of the right to sex adventure after marriage, both by wife and husband, is open to grave question. It was a hard blow to the earlier idealistic naturists to realize

that the absolute freedom and sincerity they advocated made for chaos and even tragedy. Neither men nor women hand over their partners to others with high-minded, calm gestures of free granting of rights.

The humanist sees that the error of the idealistic naturists has been not in advocating sex sincerity, but in granting impulse and emotion free sway. The difficulty arises from regarding impulse and emotion as rulers of self, as the highest considerations. This has also been the error in Judge Ben Lindsay's idea of "companionate marriage." If one of the partners in such a marriage desires to end the "experiment" and the other intensely desires *not* to end it, there is usually little calm, high-minded sex sincerity, even if there has been an agreement to that effect. There is a natural violent protest against the vagaries and uncertainties of mere impulse and emotion, and a natural desire for their subjugation to measure and control. Mere sincerity does not help. The man who falls out of love, but not out of affection, with his wife, may debate very humanistically whether one hundred percent sincerity is called for. The basis of life cannot be changed with every wind of impulse. It would appear that moderation even in frankness may be a sounder philosophy of life, if the end sought is humanistically good, and if elemental sincerity is served. It has truly been said that mental infidelity for brief spaces of time is almost universal in any love relationship; such are the vagaries and strayings of temperament. But the controls of reason and intuition are perfectly competent humanistically to discipline impulse and emotion, and to reduce the maladjustments of the love relationships. The humanist asks for sex relationship based on *more maturity;* meaning by maturity a better balance between reason and emotion

before undertaking the obligations of complete sex relationship, and therefore less whimsical desire for change.

The supernaturalistic standard of sincerity is rather low for the simple reason that it insists upon utter rigidity of form, and the complete crucifixion of human feeling upon the cross of that form and that rigidity; meanwhile calling for a hypocritical denial and hiding of the truth. The humanist is more flexible in his attitude, caring less for the outward form than for a genuine inner sincerity and responsibility. He would not keep people bound together in marriage when love, affection and friendship have departed, but knowing how cleverly mere impulse masques as love, he is certainly not impressed every time he hears the impetuous cry of "love, love!"

77. **Standard Five, as to the Meaning of Love.**—The humanist sets an extraordinarily high value upon love; a value in full keeping with the high value he places upon the human spirit. This high value is in distinct contrast with the views of both the naturist and the supernaturalist. To the naturist, if he is also a romantic, love is, as we have noted, sheer rapturous undisciplined impulse and emotion. If he is a realistic naturist, he has already said goodbye to love except as a physical appetite. The supernaturalist has several serious embarrassments about the love of the sexes. In the first place Christianity originated in a period when woman was valued rather lowly, and neither Christ nor St. Paul had personally much interest in sex love. "It is better to marry than to burn," said St. Paul; an admittedly scandalously low estimate of the love relation between man and woman. Even sex love for propagation was deemed too unholy for Christ, so the good church fathers presented the device of "immaculate conception." Furthermore, with the heavy emphasis upon a future life, for which life on earth

is merely a hallway, it was natural that love, along with all human activity and worth on earth, should be slurred and minimized.

The supernaturalist is thus at best compelled to etherealize sex love almost to a vanishing point, and limit the sex act to propagation only. It is true that "moderns" among supernaturalists soften this hard view, and that the English bishops have now hesitatingly condoned birth control; but it is not unfair to supernaturalists to say that they are intensely distrustful and in a terrific conflict over sex love. They have never defined it in a manner that could be lived without hypocrisy or mental disorder, nor have they valued it properly, even from a purely spiritual point of view.

The humanist has none of these handicaps. He begins his valuation of love by examining the needs of the finest human life. He is aware of the fact that the sex urges are very deeply inter-twined with imagination and completeness of human feeling, with mental and spiritual power and even with downright physical and mental hygiene. Therefore his philosophy calls for full complete, rhythmic sex expression, as free from self-consciousness and from the sin complex or fear as it was with the Greeks. He can see no difference in spirituality or beauty between a fine spiritually moving speech, the painting of a good picture, a joyous dance or the sex act with a loved one in which spirit, mind and body partake.

The humanist finds love a great instrumentality of the spirit, but only love which is a compound of the whole nature of man. Such love is intense feeling, given power by the body, given direction by the controls of the mind and the human will, and given spirituality by human intuition and imagination. Compounded in this manner it has terrific force, but force that appears to be in basic alliance and

harmony with the deep purposes of the universe. It preserves and heightens human values and aspirations and, better than either naturism or supernaturalism, rounds out man's wholeness and affects a fruitful union between matter and spirit.

The normal product of the whole man is love; love not only of mate but of family, society and mankind generally. Love also of beauty, love of spiritual values, love of truth, love of growth, love of harmony. When the humanistic rounding of the love of the sexes is interfered with, either by ignorance, perversity or false philosophy, a disproportion develops which adulterates love with other and disruptive elements. Most of us fall short of a complete whole, and therefore perfection in love is a rarity.

The humanist considers that to love one of the opposite sex is a human necessity. He has an intuitive sense, partly verified in science, that man and woman are halves of an electrical whole; positive and negative. Having a very special affinity for wholeness, the humanist therefore does not consider man or woman whole without love—a love which is in itself a whole, inclusive of physical, mental and spiritual values. There is no permanence to any feeling which is markedly defective in any of these three aspects; and while such a defective love can be naturistic, as were Lafcadio Hearn's and Walt Whitman's loves for their negro consorts; or ethereally supernatural as was Dante's love for Beatrice or the ecstasies of the saints for heavenly personages, *it cannot be humanistic love,* because it cannot serve human need.

Genuine humanistic love of the other sex is at one and the same time as rhythmically naturistic as was the love of Lysistrata's women for their absent warrior husbands, and yet as mentally comradely as was Pericles with Aspasia; but

also as spiritually stimulating as was the love of Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Browning. That this high standard is not reached by every humanist does not destroy its value as a standard. The authority of this standard is not the mere call of impulse, nor the fiat of a heavenly law-giver; it is a measure of man's need and possibility, and this is for the humanist the highest authority.

78. Standard Six, as to Sex Play.—Possibly the most serious sex loss, next to the bedraggling of spiritual values, which naturism and supernaturalism have brought upon us, is the loss of *sex play*. By this the humanist means, first, stimulative, unhampered social contact between the sexes before and after marriage; second, the development of a delayed, more elaborate approach to sex emotion; third, the use in sex relationship of all the full gamut of joy, mutuality, variety, humor, make believe; passion as well as reverence, spiritual as well as physical emotion. In addition, the humanist means by sex play the whole wide scale of secondary sexual manifestations—music, art, gaiety, flirtation, small talk, *reparteé* and a hundred other emanations of the human spirit which, humanly speaking, add to the savor of life and which flow indirectly from sex stimulation through human inter-mingling of the sexes of all ages.

One of the most arid and desolate aspects of American life is undoubtedly the incredibly narrow moralistic conventions and social traditions which, in all but the large cities, hem in the sexes. There exist thousands of towns in the U. S. in which no man may be seen walking on the street beside another man's wife without that woman's reputation being endangered. As for the privilege of entertaining a man at tea alone in the afternoon at her home, which the Englishwoman has possessed for centuries, few American married women dare risk it, except in limited

circles in the larger cities. Most American men themselves would misinterpret it. Married couples coming together at dinner parties invariably soon segregate into the safety of strictly male and female groups, and there are leers and raised eyebrows as soon as any man or woman in the group shows a perfectly natural and desirable special interest in the conversation of one of the group of the opposite sex. A shudder of moral horror would greet, in many circles, the entirely sane, humanistic statement that John would be both a better husband and a broader, abler man if he should learn how to make himself agreeable at lunch or at tea alone with Mrs. Jones, who is now no more to him than some vague female of his acquaintance. John's married stodginess, the decline of his flexibility of mind, and his disappearing sense of personal neatness are directly traceable to his own (or his wife's) stupid idea that a man after marriage must never again find any interest whatsoever in any other woman than his wife. The situation is quite as deadly for his wife, who disintegrates even more rapidly under such a sodden standard of sex.

Responsibility for such a state of affairs must be laid upon supernaturalism, for it carries grimly into every nook and cranny of man-woman relationships, even to the tea table and the dinner party, the insinuation of sexual sin. It leers behind the chairs of every married man and woman conducting a conversation that is more than perfunctory with another married man or woman. It makes marriage something of an intellectual prison cell, and is very deadening to the spirit. Little wonder that a reaction has occurred tending toward an opposite extreme; setting the widespread seal of approval, in sophisticated circles, upon the naturistic philosophy, which removes all rules or standards

and has produced some rather hideous examples among "country club sets" of looseness among married people.

The humanist has little use for the standards of either group. Keeping human need and growth of human spirit as his chief ends, he sees that the social and "moral" customs which cramp life are unworthy. He desires to enrich life by retaining throughout the years the values of stimulative contact between the sexes; the free play of a mind and spirit the graces of good conversation, humor and manners. The customs and forms of social life which enhance these values are humanistic and those which restrict them are extreme and below the high dignity of the human spirit. At the same time, of course, the humanist points out that in all play of the sexes application of the law of measure and restraint is fundamentally essential. He does not share the supernaturalist's prurient idea that to permit greater freedom of social intercourse means that there will be increased immorality. More divorces are engendered by intolerable married jealousies and restrictions of social intercourse than by a humanistic liberality and play.

The truth is that the persons who do not cultivate sex play as a general social grace, rarely if ever use it in their private relationship to a loved one, and the human sex relationship thereby loses one of its most civilized and lovely attributes. The man who is stodgy to all women is almost certain to be stodgy to his wife. The man who is a charming dinner companion to another woman is very likely to be a delightful dinner companion to his wife. It is entirely within the lexicon of humanism that men and women be able to extract from all the varied relationships of the sexes, social and individual, all the many essences and savors which they are capable of producing; and that their enjoy-

ment be prolonged and extended as much as possible. The incredible poverty of the sex relationship of a great many people today is an enormous social and individual loss, and is distinctly unhumanistic, for it represents human waste and even defamation of human dignity. Sex play, in the spirit of mutual respect and joy, stimulation of mind and the relish of human personality, is one of the most significant and valuable of the arts of man.

79. Standard Seven, as to the Arts of Love.—Both the naturist and the supernaturalist find any "art of love" supremely distasteful. The naturist has a idyllic notion of all love as "spontaneous." Love expression and love harmony "happen" as simply as grass grows; love adjustments are made by "instinct." If not this, then the naturist believes love to be a snare and a delusion. The supernaturalist, on the other hand, views love as "sacred," and therefore a "divine afflatus" ordered from above. Any "art" of love would be an affront to heaven where matches are made.

The humanist knows otherwise. His whole philosophy, being built upon the mastery and the shaping of nature, feeling and instinct by the human will and spirit, the humanist accepts as a matter of course his responsibility for dignifying and perfecting love by conscious effort. He knows that, left to the lower self, man will descend to the pure animalistic level, and make of love almost solely a biological function. He knows that if man uses his reason as well as his emotion; uses in fact all his powers upon the vital matter of love, he will build something beautiful and satisfying. He does not mean romantic air-castles or etherealized concepts; he means something beautiful and satisfying to the whole nature of man.

When Dr. John Haynes Holmes of the Community Church several years ago, in a series of sermons on love and

marriage, began with the flat humanistic statement that a successful marriage depends primarily upon physical sexual compatibility, he definitely and bravely broke with the old romantic religious ideas by which for centuries both the romantic naturists and the supernaturalists had obscured the subject of love. Marriage, above all other human matters, calls loudly for a humanistic philosophy, for the single and sole reason that it demands discipline and an "art" of love which will construct a relationship of beauty and satisfaction out of the abilities of man, for the use of man. It is thus no accident that love and marriage in modern times have failed in precise proportion to the prevalence or lack of a humanistic philosophy. Naturism and its spontaneity principle are helpless and ineffective to achieve love on a high sustained plane; while supernaturalism uses delusion or sham as a "front," since marriages "made in heaven" seem as defective as others, if not more so.

Anything which must be constructed calls for artisanship, and nothing is more certain than that a love which will endure and satisfy must be constructed with art. A well known woman recently laid squarely upon the shoulders of parents and educators the responsibility for widespread divorce, mismating and immorality. She said that if children are brought up under the philosophy of naturistic expressionism, or "temperamental overflow" as Professor Babbitt would say, heeding no authority, accepting no disciplines and applying none to themselves; expecting everything good to be supplied to them or to happen "spontaneously," and if they are merely stuffed with information and trained in none of the arts of emotional expression and restraint,—then obviously they will fail in marriage and love, since these are supremely humanistic arts, demanding above all else art and measure and proportion.

Still another writer in the *Forum* several years ago, a teacher, made a considerable stir by saying that girls in particular should be taught in the public schools those humanistic arts by means of which, above all other kinds of education, they could insure their happiness. Starting with the sound humanistic premise that the great majority of girls both desired and were destined to be wives, mothers and home-makers, and that their crucial problem of success in life was to be attractive to a good man, this writer proposed that they be trained to walk and talk well, to dress attractively, to have good table manners, to understand well their emotional natures, their health, to be rhythmic and expressive, to be good mothers and homemakers. An immense amount of fundamental humanistic truth resides in these recommendations. The arts of love, unfortunately, are too often known and practised by the least desirable rather than the most desirable men and women.

The "arts of love" constitute no standardized or mechanized technique, but are simply the use of a larger keyboard of love, on which more complicated and more interesting compositions can be played. These added keys are knowledge of the emotions, more sex play, more patience and variety and spiritual quality in the approaches to sex, more specific technical knowledge of the physiology of sex, a greater and deeper interest in the psychology of the opposite sex, better knowledge of emotional tactics, more control and discipline of feeling, more understanding of renewal and perpetuation of love interest, more complementing of the other's moods, more delight in the exploration of personality, more flexibility and mutuality, more creation and development of common interests; more respect for individuality, more sensibility to a broader range of feeling, more imaginative grasp of spiritual wholeness.

Here are summarized in quick succession a wide range of arts upon which successful love absolutely depend. When the "arts of love" are discussed they are usually taken to mean merely a technique of love conquest on the part of "designing" men or women. The arts of love have a far higher and more important place than this. They are the alphabet of man's literacy of emotion.

XIII

The Right to Adventure and Independence

As John Erskine says in *The Heart of the Adventure*, "Death would be awful if we met it with the conviction that we had never completely lived, never exhausted our possibilities."

There are other types of men, truth hunters, creators, leaders of the herd and lovers of humanity, who have still more potent reasons for such a feeling: they would hate to die because they have not accomplished more toward reaching these *impersonal* goals. Like Schopenhauer, some of them believe that "we can look behind the veil of Maya." Others, like the martyr Noguchi, are willing to die with their eyes intent upon the laboratory microscope, if they may but be permitted to adventure further into their chosen scientific adventure-ground. All of them claim passionately the right to independent, untrammeled adventure. They recall Professor William James' famous statement that none of us lives up to one-fifth of his possibilities.

80. The Right and Duty to Adventure.—Such being the situation, it would be suicidal folly for any philosophy to place the slightest real obstacle in the way of individual adventure. As President Arthur E. Morgan of Antioch College has said: "Perhaps the highest duty of man is to undertake adventures. When he has mastered his immediate environment and has insured reasonable comfort and safety—when he would like to settle quietly by his own fireside and cultivate his own garden—the call comes to leave his security and venture out beyond the frontier. With most men today the command to adventure calls for pioneering in the social or personal, rather than in the geographical, world."

The spirit of adventure has always in the past borne good fruit, and if it has produced also some purely roustabout adventures instead of genuine adventures, that is what might be called a "barnacle price." We do not leave a good oyster in the sea because it is encrusted with barnacles; we cast aside the barnacle and relish the oyster. In the same humanistic spirit we are content to let individuals adventure as they will and as they must, even without thought of the group. A humanist knows well that there are some valuable individuals who are unable to take the group into their consciousness. They create with a purely egoistic motive of expression. Some are arbitrary, antagonistic and defiant; some sick, warped and perverse, yet others are quite preciously inspired. Other fully rounded personalities produce even more inspired returns from their adventuring. What matters to the humanist is the treasure that results from the adventuring and its value either to the group or to the smaller circles within the group which can appreciate it. The kind of adventuring which the humanist challenges is the effort of some of the more warped and egoistic adven-

turers to go out of their sphere and attempt to set up a philosophy for the world at large, based upon their own narrowly individualistic outlook.

The adventurer may ignore the group but the philosopher cannot. A Lindbergh who would use his prestige to urge every one of us to grab a few sandwiches and fly alone across the Atlantic would rightly be restrained as verging on lunacy. A De Quincey who would advocate that we all become opium addicts because he found it compatible with his life and writing would be in the same class. Yet such is, in principle, the desire of some of our adventurers in the world of ideas. They have no marked sense of proportion—but quite understandably so. Even Lindbergh insists upon making an aviatrix out of his wife, and taking his 30-day-old baby into the air! It is in the blood of the individualistic adventurer to try to make the whole world over to his pattern; to hold firm as death to his individualistic matrix and to rate it tremendously high. It is his shield and buckler against the herd pattern, which he is destined to alter somewhat by his insistent adventurings. It is of no real consequence that his alteration may be infinitesimally slight, or that all his adventuring may be absolutely of no value. *He* must believe it very important, even if a humanist knows or suspects it to be of little or no consequence. The individualist is no more certain to be able to bear the truth about himself than the herd member; both would need to be humanistic philosophers to admit their very small importance in the world and still keep their courage.

All too often the unsuccessful individualist adventurer adopts either the naturistic philosophy of egoistic pessimism, with derision for the group for being indifferent to him, or else he adopts the resignation which the supernatural

philosophy supplies. It is only the humanist who might well say to such a disillusioned adventurer: "You *have succeeded*—only *measurably*, it is true, but your adventuring has certainly not been in vain. Your aims were very high, and it is true that you are far from reaching them; but you entirely fail to consider the actual value of what you have accomplished. You must use a scale of measurement for your work which is in proportion to life. 'Setting the world on fire,' 'bringing the world to your feet,' are grandiloquent results which are denied even to many great men, who often as not die neglected."

The individual of the type which relishes lone adventuring and chooses to explore the heights and depths, far from the normal spheres of group life and feeling, must accept the terrific dangers of his rôle. There is even scientific basis for his defiance of all law of order. As Heisenberg's and other experiments with light particles show, a few atoms out of a great mass of them always defy the supposedly rigid "laws of nature," and adventure forth quite uncontrolledly. They come to grief as a rule, for an unattached atom, cut away from its general mass relationship, is probably in the most precarious position that can be imagined. But still these adventurous atoms, like adventurous individuals, are rich with meaning and significance, although it would be folly to advocate that the philosophy of these adventuring atoms or individuals should become the philosophy of all life; that lawlessness and disorder should displace law and order. It is altogether likely that the adventurous atoms are part of the system of law-creation; that the evolving body of law and order needs the adventurous atoms for constant re-creation and readjustment. Professor Alfred N. Whitehead, famous philosopher, says in *Symbolism: its Meaning and Effect:* "The art of free society

consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code serves those purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason."

The humanist—contrary to the belief of some critics—does not inflexibly insist upon traditional or hard-and-fast systems of order, but is entirely aware of the need for fearless revision. He does insist, however, upon *orderly* revision, and lays particular stress upon "purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason." As Professor Babbitt phrases it in *Rousseau and Romanticism,* "Insisting that reason and imagination may pull together in the service of insight," instead of the "delirium, vertigo and intoxication for their own sake," or trying to "satisfy all ethical elements by simply letting himself go," which the naturist believes in as the guiding spirit of adventure. Thus Byron, an excellent example of the adventurer, can say, "The best of life is but intoxication." He is one of the "votaries of the god Whirl"—adventurers who believe that adventure consists in mere motion and change. There are also the votaries of the gods of flux and romance, who seek adventure in the regions of dream; who can say with *La Nouvelle Héloise,* "The land of chimeras is alone worthy of habitation."

The humanist, remembering that Coleridge produced *Kubla Khan* in an opium dream, and remembering many other shining adventures in far lands by bold spirits, does not mean to be censorious, but he does put a curb on the overvaluation of adventuring as a general philosophy, as the means by which general good ends are attained. He values *Kubla Khan* but not opium. He values such good results of adventure as are attained, and he values very highly adventure as a principle; but he refuses to deify the gods Whirl, Intoxication, Flux or Romance. He knows that they produce chaos and disintegration far more often

than they produce value, and that they bear no real relation to value.

Tempered reason and imagination produce by far the best adventuring, the humanist believes. Merely following impulse in adventuring cannot lead anywhere except by mere chance. Wilkins, planning to reach the North pole in a submarine is not heeding a whim but an idea born of both reason and emotion, strictly disciplined. Nature and her impulses are utterly incapable as leaders of valuable adventure. As Taine says: "What we call nature is this brood of secret passions, often maleficent, generally vulgar, always blind, which tremble and fret within us, ill covered by the cloak of decency and reason under which we try to disguise them. We think we lead them, and they lead us; we think our actions our own; they are theirs."

The humanist cuts into this treacherous situation with the sharp edge of his philosophy. He is a dualist; he distrusts nature and impulse, and disciplines them by means of something above nature, namely his intuitive will and consciousness, which are independent of nature. The "irresponsible quest for thrills," which is the idea of adventuring widely held by naturists, is thus of a low and meaningless order. Worth-while adventuring is adventuring with the whole man, not with the lower man alone.

81. The Right to Individual Independence.—A terrific struggle has been going on for thirty years in America to win more independence for individuality. The group pressure, under the reign of the supernaturalists or religionists, was enormous so long as the country consisted largely of small towns and rural districts. The rise of the large cities and the breakdown of the old religious holds brought great changes. Individuality in the large cities is remarkably independent—with much still to be desired, however.

Should any curb be placed on individuality? Here is the crux of humanism. Here is its Rubicon. Much of the violent feeling aroused in the breasts of the naturists against humanism has been owing to the rather sharp, schoolmastering tone which Professor Babbitt has used in calling to order the unruly individualists who claim a sacred right to adventure anywhere, to taste everything, to despise the herd, to engage in every foray that impulse suggests and to partake in every dissipation, regardless of social consequences. Like the schoolmaster's sharp rap for decorum in a bedlam of devil-may-care, I'll-do-what-I-like-regardless, Professor Babbitt's rapping was perhaps necessarily over-loud. Doubtless he would otherwise never have been heard at all! In effect he said: "*Order,* please! We are a group, not a species of hermit baboons, each intent on nothing but ourselves and our own narrow appetites and desires. This pandemonium of individualistic screeching is getting on everybody's nerves, and you are yourselves becoming more sick every minute. You are all trying to shout each other down, if not choke each other to death in cold blood, happy only if your own ego is unfettered. You are gleefully breaking all the furniture and traditions, which are irreplaceable and vital to us. Let us sit down and examine this thing called life and see if there isn't a way for everybody to get what he wants, in harmony and coöperation. You who want to do nothing but what you please may have to modify your position; but so may you who want to make other people do what you think they should do. Such extreme views as that of the naturists, who say, 'I'm the only thing that counts!' 'Don't touch me with one tiny jot of authority, or I'll strike!' and that of the supernaturalists who say, 'You must submit your entire ego to a particular mystical authority—you count for nothing by yourself,' are not what

the humanist believes in. Why not let us examine carefully whether the individual or the group is the most important? Why not examine the humanist philosophy which aims to make a middle way we all can travel to far greater benefit? Perhaps we can find more interest in humanistic adventure than in any other!"

The humanist has but slight patience with the individualist who recognizes no values but his own narcissistic impulses, who lives entirely upon his adoration of himself; nor has he patience with the herd mind which does not comprehend the superb things which the individual can share with the herd. He disdains to claim superior importance for either. The very need for repeating this obvious truth indicates how out of balance are the thoughts of many people at present. The neurotic, herd-hating intellectuals, as well as the flaccid herd members afraid even of their own wise leaders, are equally "out of plumb."

At the same time, the forces pushing the individualists too far into the herd are still exceedingly powerful, and growing more so. It appears to be the fact that life is becoming more socialistic, in the sense of a more closely knit group. The humanist has therefore a wide tolerance with the perhaps over-loud assertiveness of individualists. The humanist's ideal group is that of fully rounded individualists, voluntarily socializing themselves for the values of the group, but at the same time also maintaining a genuine individuality. This is far too delicate a poise for most of us as yet. Doubtless the human race is destined in time to achieve this goal. At present there must necessarily be much strain and misfit, friction and waste. But we surely cannot hope to make progress toward this goal without a genuinely humanistic philosophy.

82. Which Is More Important—the Group or the

Individual?—The humanist says that neither is more important, or rather that both are equally important. He is sharply against an extreme view on either side. As an example of such extremes we have already referred to the unhappy, violent oscillations of Count Leo Tolstoy. Almost to the end of his life he shuttled back and forth between the call of adventure with his lower impulses and the call of his religion, the call of self against the call of the group, the call of passion against the call of asceticism; satyr, gambler, drunkard today, praying penitent saint tomorrow. As a result his mind was a disordered battle ground, and he was always weak in his directions. He could not even write about much else than this destructive conflict. *Anna Karenina* is the drama of Levin and Vronsky, representing Tolstoy's two natures in combat. This is fatal vacillation, and Tolstoy correspondingly failed to make any serious religious impression. Until old age made him permanently religious and his passions calmed down, he was under excruciating tensions which constantly broke, because of his defective controls. He adventured wildly and then experienced terrific remorse. For this our modern adventurers despise him—quite properly, for the modern adventurers make a downright philosophy out of adventure, and hold to it.

Obviously, then, the old familiar "oscillating" idea is ridiculous, undignified and meaningless, because it represents not only the breakdown of controls but also a cringing fear. It is on a par with old Bowery sinners' benches, scenes of tearful reform and repeated falls from grace. Tolstoy was distinctly not a credit to the human race as a philosopher, because the first requirement of a philosopher is that he construct a system of controls, giving both the group and

his individuality their due. Only as the novelist describing the familiar warring forces in man has Tolstoy a place.

Man deserves and will have a philosophy tougher-minded and more upstanding than this. Adventure is on a low plane without a consistent philosophy. The naturist tries to put it on a higher plane by insisting that the individual is a law unto himself. The question cannot be dodged—it is the heart of any philosophy. Frank Notch in *King Mob,* a bitter book disdaining all herds (and therefore typical of the "intellectuals" of modern times), says: "*An individual has the right to be for his own sake.* He learns things in order to enjoy them, and not in order to serve others. There is a large area of himself (and it must become larger) which belongs to no one but himself, and the intrusion of others is an intolerable usurpation. . . . The self-sufficiency and self-reliance of the individual soul must be made the foundation of education. A respect for the sanctity of all life springs only from a feeling of sanctity in our own. The richer a man's inner being, the more reluctant will he be to maim or circumscribe the inner being of another."

Charles Sumner, one of New England's great men, said many years ago, "The true greatness of nations is in those qualities which constitute the greatness of individuals." Henry James spoke of being in favor of "the eternal forces which always work in the individual."

The humanist has no quarrel with this. Mr. Notch himself qualified his first statement by admitting that *some area* of the individual belongs to the group. This is precisely what the humanist insists we must not forget. There are many today in total and absolute defiance of the group, but their position is very precarious, like Thoreau's. Affecting to despise the group, they cannot, as a matter of

fact, be happy out of it. There are no more confirmed groupists than these herd-baiting individualists. The humanist does not, as Walter Lippmann fears, take the arbitrary, irrational position "that the best life for man would be some other kind of life than that which satisfies his nature." Far from it: the humanist insists that man should live a life which thoroughly satisfies his nature—but he does point out to any careless person who may have forgotten it that man's nature *includes* a primary instinct to be with the herd, and to derive very important values from it. These values entail also responsibilities.

The humanist has no idea of clipping the wings of eagles desiring to soar; he only keeps a middle position of balance and points out that, as a matter of philosophy, the individual will soar higher and to more important purposes and with more resulting happiness if he soars without attempting to cut away his ties with the herd. Many of our would-be eaglets have attitudes which do not bear examination. They soar in contempt of the herd, and then if the herd is indifferent to their flight, they become angry and bitter. Ambrose Bierce, a brilliant but erratic writer, had no such inconsistency. "Nobody compels us to make things that the world does not want. We merely choose to." His choice could not have been very happy, for he was called "bitter Bierce" and one day disappeared from the face of the earth, no man knows how or where. The egoist must not forget that without the herd, the group, there is no reference point left by which he can be judged—except by himself!

83. The Grave Error of Undervaluing the Group.—From the vast amount of contempt so freely poured out upon "the herd" one would gather that God made individualists out of gold and precious stones and herd-members

out of mere mud. There is an astoundingly widespread failure to appreciate relative values in the human scene; i.e., the respective rôles of individual and herd-member.

The true concept of society is that of a torso with limbs. The herd is the torso, rather helpless and misshapen, it is true, without the testing, reaching, locomoting abilities of the limbs. But one must always bear equally in mind how utterly trivial and meaningless are limbs without a torso!

The average person who rests perfectly content in the bosom of the herd deserves no brickbats for being "dumb" and "sheep-like." No thing in modern times is more unintelligent and sadistic than the constant berating which the "mob" receives at the hands of so-called "intellectuals" and innovators. Every person with an idea which did not win him fame and fortune assumes that the public is a pack of silly fools blind to its own interest. Every twisted brain and exaggerated ego which has an idea regarded as new expects the public to open its beak to receive it like an obedient fledgling in a nest when the parent bird returns with a worm. At least four-fifths of the inventions patented are, it is well known, worth less than the cost of patenting them; while the number of cults, theories, panaceas, utopias and mental nostrums peddled in the United States is indeed legion, and their inventors are all convinced that they should be crowned as public benefactors. The truth is that with the spread of education and the increase of the "white collar" classes, we have a very large number of people whose confidence in their intellectual importance as individuals is decidedly out of accord with the facts. Many of these develop a veritable passion for making the public accept their dogmas and queer ideas. They start cults or organizations or magazines, write books and articles, publish pamphlets, make speeches and in general develop a frenzy

of propaganda. An excellent example, among the more simple-minded, is the man who at the cost of several millions produced his own play on Broadway and gave away tickets to it for a year or more.

But even among the more intelligent the same disease stalks unchecked. Propaganda is an American passion; and it is usually represented by an individual who has a Great Truth which the Stupid Mob had better accept before it is too late! This is individualism run wild; harmless, perhaps, but after all a rather nauseating display of undisciplined human egotism. We should look at it indulgently but none the less critically.

It is time that the rampant individualist realized that the herd is not a despicably craven and contemptible mass of groundlings without spiritual or intellectual value. It is, on the contrary, a complex and uncannily wise group which has many times displayed wisdom superior to that of the individuals who tried to lead it. To treat the herd contemptuously and focus attention only on its follies and not on its wisdom is a very childish performance, a cheap kind of vaunting of self—a desire to acquire merit by crushing other people. It seems difficult for such critics to understand nature's counterbalancing distribution of values. The flat-chested, near-sighted, squeamish, nervous and sheltered bookworm who screams out his contempt for the unimaginative, slogan-repeating, herd-minded real estate salesman is only advertising his own lack of title to the name of intellectual, for he fails to make an accurate intellectual appraisal of their respective positions on the scale of human values.

The herd member has a different function from the genuine intellectual individual. His is the function to *follow*, not to lead. It is only in some ridiculous *opera*

bouffe republic that all soldiers are generals! It seems difficult for most persons with any intellectual pretensions whatsoever to grasp this. Few of these have aught but sneers for the masses of people whose competence (and it is a competence second to none) is to *accept and apply* principles, and to *live and exemplify* them. There is need for but a limited number to lead the herd, to formulate principles, to entice the herd out of old policies and principles and educate it into new ones. There being few who take the trouble to bring proof of the incompetence of self-styled leaders and intellectuals, and the rôle of leader being so attractive and easy, the result is that the herd is bewildered by vastly conflicting counsels, compulsions and stampeding mechanism which make the herd member's mental life a turmoil. Whatever pitiful helplessness and moronic qualities the herd may display are equally matched by the appalling lack of agreement among intellectuals themselves on any point whatever. They cannot (as has been demonstrated in the furore raised by the subject of humanism) even hold a debate on the subject of a philosophy of life without screeching at each other and becoming personal, like so many fishwives.

To the humanist it is not at all evident which shows the greater wisdom, in the final analysis—the herd or the clamorous would-be leaders of the herd. He suspects that they both, in their own ways, grope rather crudely toward a vaguely good end. The humanist believes in humanism as a philosophy precisely because in this general blind groping the middle point between the extremes appears to offer the surest hope for truth. He cannot offer humanism as the great, final, absolute, heaven-sent or scientifically irrefutable philosophy of life (as the extremists on either side of him do), but at least he can rest assured that it is a com-

petent consensus of all; the combined wisdom of both individuals and the group. It belongs to both, and was developed by both; it has no autocratic leaders or high priests and it desires none; it has no ritual and no rigid boundaries. It is only a way of life representing a wisdom compounded of many elements. It does not repel the simple herd member by an esoteric intellectualism, for many of the herd now live the humanistic philosophy without knowing its name, following the same intuitive insight which many of the most learned men have followed. No great philosophy can build for permanence unless it is as livable by the herd as by the scholar. That Confucius and Buddha and Jesus were mindful of this should give us pause in our desire to teach humanity.

84. **A Creative View of the Individual and the Herd.**—It seems to the humanist that the ever-present tension between the herd and the individual is only another evidence of the basic duality which is everywhere necessary for creative results. This duality is an elemental truth of life, and a very wise and productive one. Professor Whitehead, professor of philosophy at Harvard, says in *Process and Reality:* "Opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement. . . . God and the World are contrasted opposites in terms of which creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diversities in contrast. . . . The World is the multiplicity of finites, actualities seeking a perfected unity." This seeking of perfected unity, this pull between two ends toward a middle which shall constitute a unity, is the very heart of the philosophy of humanism, and as such it is in deeply rhythmic relation to reality—far more surely, the humanist believes, than any other philosophy as yet developed.

Inside the individual there are the same "opposed elements"—the higher and the lower, the instincts as against the human will and insight—as there are in society—the herd as against the individual. The herd stays close to instinct, the individual soars daringly by intuition. A creative harmony between the two sets of opposites—in the individual, as in society—is the real goal of life. Man and nature are themselves "opposed elements," for man is more than nature; he has crawled far enough out of the naturistic slime and flux to lay hold with his consciousness, his will, his intuition, upon the rungs of the ladder of a higher reality and permanence. As Professor Whitehead says, "Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness, the apotheosis of the world." It is precisely this end of creation which the humanist has the insight to see and to strive for, refusing to be content with flux, firmly holding out for values which have permanence. It represents the "wisdom of subjective aim" of which Professor Whitehead further speaks, "woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of the universal feeling, which is always immediate, always many, always one, always with novel advance, moving onward and never perishing."

Such a subjective aim is the genuinely creative view for the individual and the herd, and not in any sense beyond the herd's comprehension. The dangers to it are greater from perverse individuals than from the herd. Man himself must accomplish this creative view with his will. Nature, to repeat the familiar line, is careless of the individual, and ever intent only upon the group. Man in his artistry *is reshaping the group so that it includes more and more individuals who keep a measured, humanistic distance ahead of the group in order to lead it.* Even the blind

"driver ants" of the tropics have their "soldiers" who scout the ground three or four feet ahead of the moving ant column, proving that the device is not unknown to nature. But in the field of ideas the possible distances are enormous for human individuals who would go ahead of the herd, and the chances for losing or confusing themselves are infinite. And when they go ahead of the herd, not for the herd's sake but purely for their own vanity of exploration and self-assertion, the pain of the separation and tension increases until it approaches neurosis and sometimes insanity—especially when the individuals can agree upon no elements of leadership for the herd, and the herd receives a babel of counsel.

So irresponsible has become much of the counsel of individuals to the herd that everybody is being urged to despise the group and go off into the wide spaces alone. This is like urging all atoms to explode and thus reduce all forms of matter to original gaseous nebula. Such a thing would naturally be the end of humanity. The naturist is not happy, and he usually sneers and snarls at the group because it is fairly happy. He fails to realize that only a narrow proportion of individuals is fitted for or cares for the loneliness and pain of being even a moderate distance from the herd. He wilfully refuses to visualize humanity *as a whole,* and disdains to identify himself with it, or refuses to regard his individuality properly as a mere function of the whole, *the only justification of his own individuality being the welfare of the whole.*

The humanist, if he is too individual to be one of the herd, both assuages his pain and enhances his value by maintaining a *measured* distance from the herd, so that the herd may secure maximum value from his individuality, while he insures the value of his individuality by relating it propor-

tionately to the herd. In prehistoric days a Lincoln would have been not only impossible, but worthless even if possible; just as an Edison among the pigmies of middle Africa would be worthless today, and also impossible. Measure even in the matter of individuality is wise for most of us, even if it is not for the rare genius. There are masochistic individuals who actually enjoy the pain of the utmost distance from the herd, their enjoyment arising from the corresponding inflation of their ego. This is again a disbalance and an extreme, producing little or no value. It is pain enough for a human being to be humanistically individual; that is to say, to maintain a proportioned distance from the herd and endeavor to lead it. More pain is always suspect as pose and arbitrary lack of wholeness; unless, as in a few cases, it springs from physical and psychic defects which are unavoidable. There are freaks of human nature just as there are freaks of nature, and they must be appraised with understanding.

Greatness, indeed, is very often confused with values purely and exclusively individual, utterly contemptuous of the herd. This is an error. As Owen Meredith put it, "That man is great, and he alone, who serves a greatness not his own; who is whole in himself." Humanistically interpreting this, true greatness is a greatness for the benefit of the whole, to which the great man is sensitive in his own spirit. This is another way of saying that the great man is great only when he stays in clear communication with the herd. Much of the kicking by individuals against what is regarded as the oppression of the herd is, we are now aware, only a neurotic sense of persecution on the part of unbalanced individuals, who are strong and mature in some directions and weak and immature in others, or who find all adjustments painful. They develop painful neuroses, and

suffer delusions of persecution, warping their personalities dangerously. Others merely confuse the issue, not realizing that *within the herd* there are confusing compulsions in our complex modern society. Even the herd members thus become neurotic and suffer pain because of the contrary pulls. As President Morgan of Antioch College says: "The present confusion of social standards among young people, a result of conflicting social compulsions, is often miscalled a fight for personal liberty. If modesty and reserve become 'old-fashioned' in a community of young people, any young woman who persists in these traits is considered queer and uninteresting, and is shunned in social affairs. To many a young woman the issue seems tragically real.

"Continually we see conflicts between the compulsions of recognized moral and social codes on the one hand, and the more subtle compulsions of vogues and folk-ways which determine herd action on the other. The present vogue cries for 'personal liberty' at any interference with herd action, but the tyranny of herd compulsion is no less real than the compulsion of deliberate effort to achieve freedom for fine living.

"In general, social habits are socially and not individually determined. Many so-called battles for personal liberty are really contests between opposing compulsions. The prohibition issue is an example. In early America, to refrain from group drinking was unsocial, and there was pressure to compel conformity. The writer has lived where abstinence made him almost a social outcast. Personal freedom to abstain without embarrassment has been won only by a long, bitter fight. Recently a man of character and independence said he drank socially because all his friends did, and for him to decline made him a nuisance. The prohibition issue is less a fight for personal liberty than a contest between two types of compulsion."

XIV

Humanism in a Machine Age

Let it be boldly and clearly proclaimed that humanism does not belittle science or the good fruit of science. Critics of humanism often try to place humanism in the position of disparaging scientists and frowning on the wonders of modern discovery and invention. How could humanists do this, remembering the vivid interest in science of the great humanist Leonardo da Vinci? The courageous attack of the humanist is distinctly upon the modern obsession with science and the corresponding neglect of things human. Naturally, in such an attack the overweighting of matters scientific, both by scientists and by the public, is criticized by the humanist; and this criticism is easily twisted by dishonest or careless anti-humanists into a general attack on science, than which nothing could be more absurd. Professor Babbitt has distinctly said, in *Rousseau and Romanticism,* "I have no quarrel, it is scarcely necessary to add, either with the man of science or the romanticist when they keep in their proper place."

85. The Defects of Our Scientific Era.—First of all we must see the spirit of the day in a clear-eyed manner, and then appraise it. Few besides the humanist leaders have done so except in a superficial manner. This is not surprising, for to take a calm, wide-ranging perspective of our "era" requires not only independence, wide learning, highly trained critical faculties, but also *ripe age*. In the person of the two great humanist leaders, Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard and Professor Paul Elmer More of Princeton, we have *par excellence* precisely these faculties. Few men in America have their wide learning, and Europe concedes that they are absolutely first-grade critics. Their independence is everywhere admitted, and they are both men of ripe age and undiminished intellectual vigor. Most of the younger critics of note today sat in their classes many years ago. Babbitt and More are actually far more critical and modern than the young men, like H. L. Mencken and others, who have shocked America out of its complacency. These young men merely whipped up the surface of the waters; Babbitt and More are plumbing to the depths of the evils of today. They are men high up in crow's-nests, armed with the powerful glasses of broad learning, who can see the wide expanse on all sides and can impartially map the location of our present era in true relation to everything else.

What is it they see? They see that we are a people so wrapped up in the wonders of our new mastery of nature (science) that we are decidedly lopsided—indeed dangerously so, as the World War revealed. We are practically hypnotized with our mechanical toys, and have seriously neglected to develop a broader, more wholesome and balanced human self. "Astoundingly efficient technically, but vacuous intellectually and undisciplined emotionally"—this

is a description of us which almost every thinking person knows is true. Professor Babbitt in *Rousseau and Romanticism* shows his deep-going understanding of the situation: "The very conditions of modern life require an almost tyrannical concentration on natural law. The problems that have been engaging more and more the attention of the Occident, since the rise of the great Baconian movement, have been *the problems of power, speed and utility.* The enormous mass of machinery that has been accumulated in the pursuit of these ends requires the closest attention and concentration if it is to be worked efficiently. At the same time that the man of the West is not willing to admit that he is growing in power alone, he likes to think that he is growing also in wisdom. Only by keeping this situation in mind can we hope to understand how emotional romanticism has been able to develop into a vast system of sham spirituality. . . . The Nineteenth Century may very well prove to have been the most wonderful and the least wise of centuries. The men of this period—and I am speaking of course of the main drift—were so busy being wonderful that they had no time, apparently, to be wise. Yet their extreme absorption in wonder and the manifoldness of things can scarcely be recommended unless it can be shown that happiness also results from this revelling in the element of change. . . . It is hard to avoid concluding that we are living in a world which has gone wrong on first principles."

Note the even, broad-minded temper of such a statement which cuts so deep. Professor Babbitt is not, like younger critics, trying to disparage America and glorify Europe; he knows that the machine age started in Europe, and that America is simply the fullest expression of the scientific era, having had no humanist background at all to

modify it. Professor Babbitt frankly concedes the wonderfulness of the scientific era. Who could fail to do so? Indeed, this is the central difficulty: man today is a science-intoxicated being, as Spinoza centuries ago was said to be a "God-intoxicated" man. This has led him also, as Professor Babbitt says to "intoxication with material success," in which, of course there can be no lasting happiness.

It is perfectly easy to see all around us the evidences that we live in a science-intoxicated era, at the expense of humanistic balance and breadth. The idea of nearly every American boy is to be an engineer or a rich manufacturer or an inventor or an explorer; a Hoover, an Edison, a Ford, a Lindbergh, a Byrd. All of these use science and mechanics primarily. There are practically no other national heroes. The whole "introvert" side of life—inwardness and thought and art, gentle living, rounded personality and unobtrusive culture—as well as the twelve arts of life described elsewhere in this book, are shockingly slurred and undervalued, in contrast with mechanics and science. The daily newspapers all find articles on science eagerly read. Anything mechanical instantly fascinates us and draws a crowd. For five years after radio sets were first sold, there were always people, two and three deep, looking into the windows of radio stores in deep fascination, even though there was nothing new to look at! Automobiles, airplanes and the radio have stirred popular scientific passion almost to a frenzy. The radio supplements to newspapers have always carried more advertising and elicited more interest than the literary supplements, despite the fact that the radio represents but one single item out of a vast number of mechanical things, whereas literary supplements cover the whole field of books, tapping every possible interest there is in the world of thought. Capitalists and

business men spend large sums promoting some new mechanical device or chemical "discovery," even if it has but small or problematic value; whereas cultural values and merchandise are not correspondingly pushed. Philanthropists constantly endow laboratories and scientific projects with millions, but ignore the crying lack of capitalization of the arts and humanities.

One could go on endlessly piling up evidence of our eager, enormous interest in mechanics and science and material things, accompanied by a very slack interest indeed in spiritual, artistic and higher values. The accusation is very familiar to all of us. Quite obviously we are thoroughly out of balance; the overweight being distinctly in the direction of a passion for machinery, construction and scientific wizardry with the materials of the earth. Let us now imagine that we are looking down on ourselves, as from a height—Professors Babbitt's and More's height, for instance (even after making some allowance for their special aloofness and disinterestedness). We shall see with new eyes; see that science is not less worthy and wonderful, but that human beings are *more* worthy and wonderful, and that the rounding out of the personality and the life of the human being for general, lasting happiness is the really important end to seek in life.

The defects of our "scientific era" are the defects of an adolescent boy who plays with mechanical toys long after the age when he should do other things than take watches apart and build forts; when he should learn that full manhood has to do with many other values than wheels. Many of our scientists, engineers and business men who are so typical of the machine age are men of great ability in their specialized fields, but are notoriously devoid of general human balance. The terrific specialization they

have applied has told upon their general development. They have committed the great humanistic sin of losing their human identity and pawning their human birthright, for the sake of sheer material and motion.

It is necessary to true happiness to realize that the human spirit is more important than all material and motion. It is far more than a tool; it is an end in itself, and not a means. It is a selective will and consciousness whose happiness cannot be measured by the number of wheels it makes go round, or the speed with which it can travel, or the number of chemical discoveries it makes, or the material wealth with which it can surround itself. It must lay hold upon other sources for its happiness or it is lost. It must press science into its fair place in a happiness mold, and at all times keep it in its place, like every other aspect of life. In a word, it must apply the humanistic principles of measure and proportion, assert the supremacy of the human selective will and spirit, and rule itself with a properly oriented sense of direction. One might compare our modern scientific era to a ship whose captain has become obsessed with the idea of trying to sail his vessel around and around in a ten-mile circle, to see what record he can make as to the highest speed and the least fuel. He is so excited and absorbed in his "scientific" effort—and so are the crew and passengers—that they all forget why they ever came on board the ship, what country they came from or are going to; forget that they are all hypnotized with a special idea and that there are really a number of very pressing tasks in other parts of the world for them to do, which they are grossly neglecting to their own ultimate discomfort and pain.

Those who should be leading the science-intoxicated people of this era are (as usual) to be found rhapsodizing

about it and defending it. They find it difficult, if not impossible, to step outside of this charmed circle, outside this wondrous scientific merry-go-round. Professor Robert A. Millikan, for instance, in *Science and the New Civilization,* in which he sings the praises of science, says, "In science truth once discovered always remains truth," whereas as never before we have been finding that so-called "scientific truth" is constantly obliged to make way for contradictory truth. Thus we see science's overweening attitude in action. Such exulting worship of science as an end in itself has penetrated very far into modern minds, and done much harm. Millikan—a very brilliant scientist—himself begins to realize this. Apparently he is in process of becoming a humanist, for he admits, with a troubled mind, that the real question is whether the public of today "has the moral qualities that make it safe to trust it with the immensely increased knowledge, and the correspondingly increased power which has come into its possession; a mechanical power such as no generation of the past has ever known. . . . I am not disturbed by expanding knowledge or increasing power, but I begin to be disturbed when this comes coincidently with a decrease in the sense of moral values. . . . There are certain disturbing indications in America just now . . . the obvious effort at the deflation of idealism, the ridiculing of the existing of a sense of duty or of social responsibility."

This is precisely what the humanist is saying insistently, and Professor Millikan and other scientists and machine-age hypnotic subjects should swiftly awaken to the seriousness of our moral, spiritual and cultural hollowness and distortion. As Seward Collins, militant humanist and editor of *The Bookman,* says: "The eternal cry of the half-baked modernist is: the morals and the philosophy of the

past are no longer valid; judgment must wait on 'the facts'; the facts are not all in; let 'experiment' go on, and judgment be suspended. Against that kind of thinking the humanists are implacably opposed: for it is under the sway of such speciousness and confusion that the forces that, without knowing it, make for barbarism are riding roughshod over the world, while the defendants of civilization are only slowly getting into effective action against them."

The humanist, it should be clear, faces the scientific era *awakened from the hypnotic trance over science and mechanism and material wealth.* He now values it properly instead of improperly; soundly instead of unsoundly. He believes that training young people to be engineers or scientists or business men without the rounding of their personalities and culture is barbarous. He believes that the accomplishment of more speed, power and utility is not the reason why we should be born, live, love and die. To move faster, to have more food and clothes, to own bigger houses and more possessions is not above the animal level, not what brings real satisfaction to human beings. The defects of our scientific era are now in process of being corrected, and many of those laboring in the midst of it are helping. It is the significant movement of the Twentieth Century, as the coming of the scientific era was the significant movement of the Nineteenth Century.

86. The Humanist Adjustment to the Machine Age.—Unquestionably the humanist must, and does, accept the machine age. But it is a humanistic principle to accept nothing without impressing upon it forcibly the character and aims of the human spirit. This, and this alone, is the humanist's quarrel with those who would let the machine age ride unchecked, like a wild horse with man tied and

bound to his back. Man can ride his machines, because man made them; and man can also destroy them, because man is always greater than his machines.

The humanist wants only that men be trained to be masters instead of slaves of machines; trained to love machines next to broad human values, and not above them. He wants only that science should deflate its megalomania, which has been encouraged by an adoring public, and go back to the humility of which Lord Lytton sang:

"O be very sure
That no man will learn anything at all
Unless he first will learn humility."

This humility every really great scientist has possessed in abundance, although, as Sir Humphrey Davey once remarked, "There are very few persons who pursue science with true dignity." The true scientific spirit is a discipline of very great and noble exactitude. So is the best modern tradition of engineering and industrialism, and there is no reason, aside from the tendency to utterly inhuman specialization and narrowness, why a scientist, an engineer or a businessman should not be master instead of slave to the machine age which he serves. There are specific signs (we have seen them even in Professor Millikan) that the men of the machine age now mean to put the machine in its true perspective. As Professor Babbitt says, "In the long run not merely spiritual success or happiness but material prosperity depend on an entirely different working." Thus there is an appeal in the language of the machine age itself to the machine-obsessed man.

The new breed of scientist, engineer and industrialist is emerging and is using this link to sway the machine-bound millions. He is saying, "*Let us have more leisure,* for there

will not only be more happiness and culture in an era of greater leisure, but there will also be more opportunity to use the fruit of the machines, now so complex and refined that only an age of leisure can employ them fully." He is saying, "*let us have more broadened education and culture* so that we may have men who can move upward in our organizations, and not, as now, find that men are so narrowly specialized that they have no grasp of the broad scope of knowledge called for by modern high executive positions." Nor, he finds, have they knowledge of the other functions of the organizations, and therefore cannot advance to higher responsibility. He is saying, "*Let us have more interest in art,* so that as a result of greater appreciation of beauty we may have more rapid obsolescence, since 65 per cent or more of homes today are hopelessly inartistic." He is saying, "*Let us have more interest in literature,* for it is proven that only those people who read habitually are effectively influenced by the aims of the machine age." He is saying, "*Let us teach people to think,* because it is only the flexible, open mind, amenable to logic, that modern machine-age science can touch with its revolutionizing formulae." He is even saying, "*Let us have higher ideals and higher spirituality and moral values,* for the people of culture and taste, broader education and fine, balanced spirituality are more responsible and cause less friction, risk, loss and uncertainty in a highly organized world."

The humanist thus sees the machine age moving by force of its own logic toward humanism. Naturism being a slack and temperamental system of thought, the machine age finds it almost useless and hostile, with the exception of the strong contact which naturistic science makes with the machine age. There is no room in the machine age, how-

ever (outside the laboratories which have their own unnaturistic disciplines) for the typical naturist who works on impulse and flux and an indeterminate course of experimentation, and who is all too often an anarchist and a rebel against capitalism besides. The Fundamentalist has other deficiences in a machine age because he inclines to be something of a fatalist. On the whole, then, humanism is emerging as the best possible philosophy for a renovated machine age which is ready to broaden its perspective humanistically.

The well-educated, well-balanced industrialist of today is one of the most important hopes for really bringing about a humanistic era. Indeed without him it would be fairly hopeless, for this is not Greece, where slaves worked to support a class, nor Rome, which lived on war, nor Europe, which has lived on the feudal, imperialistic basis. In America peaceful industry and trade are wisely man's main preoccupations, and the leaders of these activities belong among the logical leaders for the development of all other values of life. The humanist does not abate one jot of his hostility to machine domination; indeed he welcomes cooperation with industrialists who also seek to broaden life, in order that he may victoriously help to dominate the machine, instead of being dominated by it. The humanist spirit is rising more or less simultaneously from the minds of many men in many places, because its logical premises are solidly based on facts to be observed almost anywhere by first-class minds.

87. Humanism and the New Breed of Industrialists.—As we have seen elsewhere, American industrialists moved up from Fundamentalism as a philosophy (illustration: John D. Rockefeller), to humanitarianism (illustration: John D. Rockefeller, Jr.), and are now showing genuine signs of becoming humanistic in philosophy (illustrations:

Owen Young, Daniel Willard, Walter Gifford, etc.). This has come about because men of breadth and roundness of personality have demonstrated themselves to be superior for the new day in industrialism. It is not always realized that huge industrial organizations such as the General Electric Company, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, or the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (to select examples) are in reality *large empires requiring very wise and highly cultivated leadership*. Europe has had many empires smaller in population than the empires of industry represented by some of our giant corporations. These huge organizations have a startlingly wide variety of problems to solve, and must use all the branches of human knowledge, all human faculties, arts, sciences and disciplines. A president of such a great corporation may be giving his time one moment to a great financing problem, and the next moment to the question of artistry, architecture, design or color in connection with a new building or product. He may at one moment be analyzing mass psychology in the firm's advertising appeals, and the next moment considering the problem of a sports contest between the employees of regional plants on a holiday. He may at one moment be considering the question of international politics as exemplified in the firm's foreign trade problems, and the next moment considering the social relationships between the sexes among his employees. He may at one moment be weighing the economics of a high wage policy and its effect not alone upon his firm's but upon the country's prosperity at large, and the next moment be engaged in the medical details of fatigue in relation to the chairs used by workers. He may one day be addressing the workmen of his plant in overalls, and the next day be addressing a group of foreign diplomats and government representatives in a conference

to end an international dispute. The very next day he may be talking with his farm manager about the butter-fat yield of his prize cows, or playing his violin, painting some landscapes, pushing a plane in his own little carpenter shop, playing with his children or indulging in small talk at his wife's tea.

Such a man is certainly not yet typical of American industrialists, but the important fact is that he is not unfamiliar, *and that he is, perforce, a humanist.* He has to be! The range and scope of qualities called for in a successful leader of a great corporation today are such that no naturist can possibly serve, and no supernaturalist is very likely to possess the combination, because it represents primarily a humanistic synthesis. The complex type of personality representing the combination, in balance, of extravert-introvert qualities, is the only type which can "make good." The old Fundamentalist was over-simple, and he could function well only within the limits of a moderate or small business, so long as he personally was in touch with all detail. There his capacity ended. The humanitarian was a good executive, believing in his subordinates and relaxing his hold on authority (as Carnegie did), but the humanitarian was not sufficiently introvert and analytical, nor broad enough in his culture. The complexity of modern economic conditions overwhelmed him (as it did J. Ogden Armour and John Wanamaker and W. H. Durant). Both the supernaturalist and the humanitarian (closely related), and certainly the naturist, are finding the modern machine age, the era of large-scale enterprise, narrow margins, intricate economic technique and the delicate poise between profit and loss, too exacting in its demands upon their ability. There are, of course, many large concerns headed by men of medium or even fairly narrow abilities, but they are

steadily losing their place in our new era, which is dominated by rapid technological change, a very fast pace, and the introduction of many arts and subtleties. Thus in recent years men heading large corporations which did not sense the swift increase in aesthetic sensibility on the part of the public, and who did not quickly make artistic advances in design and color, found themselves left behind in the race. Those industrialists whose humanistic breadth included aesthetic insight were promptly able to move forward.

Deeper than this has been the demand for that flexibility of mind, that awareness, that insight, that inwardness which sets values in their true relationship, that sense of balance and proportion, even that basic spirituality and moral maturity which marks the really rounded man. It was first to be observed in Carnegie, and then in Judge Gary, but as they were humanitarians, they are "dated." The new breed of industrialists is unlike either of these men. They are mellow humanists, wide in range of both knowledge and human sympathies; fully appreciative of science but making it a servant to the whole man. They are more leisurely, more meticulously honest, more public-spirited, more economically and philosophically literate; in a word, more human.

It is not in the least degree improbable that high place in industry could not have been won fifty years ago, as a rule, except by the miserly, the ruthless, the sophist, the self-deluding, the abnormal. There were too many ambushing forces on the way which only the fanatically tough and coarse man could overcome. The humanist would have been elbowed aside at the very start, and so would even the humanitarian. Only in the more enlightened atmosphere of today can humanism as a philosophy produce industrial

leaders, and even yet not freely. As humanism further mellows the industrial, social and political scene, the new breed of humanist industrialists will become still more numerous by sheer force of greater ability, which is already a powerful spear head for humanism's greater advance. The rigors and the inhumanisms of the machine age will be softened as a matter of course by these humanists, and they will join hands in the superior education of our youth (as is already occurring) toward rounded personality.

The renovated machine age needs more good leaders; more Owen Youngs, Daniel Willards, Otto Kahns, Henry Dennisons, Walter Giffords. Our great corporations cannot be operated without them. These men heartily approve of the humanist ideals of emphasis upon quality rather than upon quantity; reform of overspecialization, measure and proportion in industry, avoidance of extremism, higher moral and spiritual standards, rounded personality. Naturism is almost by necessity alien and abhorrent to them. Great organizations fall to pieces like houses of cards at the very touch of naturism.

88. The "Younger Generation" of Industrialists.—There is a still newer group of industrialists from which much may be expected. It is the "younger generation" of unusually humanistic young men 27 to 40 years of age, who are selected with astute intelligence by the new breed of older industrialists and groomed for high positions. They are selected without favoritism, for their flexibility of mind and their unusually broad and complete training in graduate schools of business, or in unusually alert business organizations. They are humanistically broad in their attainments at an early age, through wise preparation. The two principles which put them in high positions so young are these: first, their high general humanistic culture and rhythmic

adaptation to the world of men and affairs; and second their entire freedom from the palsying effects of "experience," which is now a somewhat discredited commodity. They do not function in the old manner of industrialism. They are first of all, *general executives*, not specialists. They are hired, not because they have trained themselves to know a lot about one technical function of industry, but because they are competent to apply up-to-date executive management principles to any situation with which they may be faced (and before which the specialist would be helpless). But, more, they are hired because they will apply basic principles and will not confuse policy with principle; because they understand that principles should *never be changed*, but policies must constantly be changed as conditions demand. We are here face to face with the Aristotelean (and humanist) principle of holding the ends to be more important than the means, and of using all instrumentalities measuredly to achieve the good ends, but never confusing means with ends. Experience is deflated and set in its proper place by the new breed of industrialists, just as the humanist insists that science be set in its proper place. The old order of industrialist insisted that a certain business policy was wrong because in his experience it had proved to be wrong. The new breed of industrialist does not want men with this overweighted "experience." To him it is an actual handicap, an obstruction. He wants men who can think, who are independent, who are open-minded, who have grounded themselves in fundamental principles, arising not from one man's experience alone but from the distilled experience of many, plus general logic, philosophy, science and culture. In business, as in life, *everything revolves around men.* As Owen Young has said, if the great General Electric laboratories, factories,

mills and equipment were suddenly destroyed they could be duplicated; but if the personnel composing the brains of the company were suddenly destroyed, the loss would really be irreparable.

That experience ordinarily does not teach is the realistic truth which the new breed of industrialist has discovered. Instead, the logic of experience often betrays. When Richard T. Grant first organized the Delco-Lighting Company, every fact of fourteen years of experience in the industry of making and selling farm lighting plants warned against the enterprise. All other companies had failed, and even the farm papers which would profit from the advertising of a new company were honest enough to warn that failure would ensue. But Mr. Grant was of the new breed who discounted mere "experience." He proceeded from the premises of logic and philosophy and intuition, coupled with high-grade mechanical skill. He knew there was a genuine human need on the farm for lighting—a *very* human need, when we realize the incredible hardships of farm women who in the dead of winter had no water supply inside the house until the Delco plant pumped it for them! With reason and intuition, and against all the dictates of experience, he constructed the sound plan which in one year placed more plants on farms than had been sold in all the previous fourteen years!

It takes young men to override experience—or humanists who have mellowed the fixities of mind which creep upon man with the years; and so the younger generation of industrialists is beginning its career under fairer auspices than those under which young men have ever begun before. Provided, of course, that they have a qualitative, rounded education and have had the intuition and good sense to set for themselves the humanistic ideal, rather than the ruin-

ously narrow ideal of the inhuman specialist. The specialist himself has a very fine place in the machine age, but not unless he is rounded, for not only is the unrounded specialist in danger of not being advanced because of his narrowness, but also, in our rapid technological era of change, his specialty may suddenly become obsolete and useless. Great technical colleges like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are now endeavoring to broaden and humanize the training of their students.

89. "Trial and Error" and Experiment Outmoded.—The entire naturistic philosophy as applied to industry is thoroughly bankrupt in a machine age. Industry and trade until the beginning of the machine era pursued precisely the naturistic philosophy of free expansion, flux, pragmatic experiment and "trial and error"—even though in their personal lives men were usually supernaturalists. In trade and industry the accustomed method was free competition, "starting on a shoe-string," to "see if we can make a go of it"—an almost childlike readiness to "try anything." The gambling spirit inherited from Western pioneer days deeply permeated American trade and industry, and has led to a very expensive series of cycles of boom and depression, the frequency and violence of which are peculiar to America.

An absolute lack of the disciplines, the preparations, the conservatisms and the application of careful measure and proportion has prevailed until recent times in American industry. It explains why for many years 40 to 46 per cent of the corporations of the country showed deficits instead of profits. It explains why (as was disclosed in a Government survey of Louisville, Kentucky) thirty retailers discouragedly go out of business every month, and thirty-one new ones hopefully enter into business! The "rate of mortality" in business is stupendous in America, and is the

logical result of "free and easy experimentalism," "trial and error"—an enormous waste of billions of dollars, signifying nothing, proving nothing that is not already known, that could not intuitively have been forecast. *Undisciplined effort cannot achieve good results;* the "trial and error method" teaches nothing except the same wastefulness that can be observed in any jungle. Naturism in industry is a shambles, and the insistence on demonstrating all over again what has long been calculated by principle is a wanton destruction of resources and a misuse of human energy. This is the reason why the principle of coöperation, the development of research, the increase of consolidation, Federal regulation, the setting up of codes of practice covering entire industries, etc., have made very rapid strides in the last twenty years. Humanistic measure and discipline, proportion, morality, restraint and design have come into industry very pronouncedly as the superior brains of men of the machine age have realized the destructiveness of the naturistic trends.

Experimentalism is *passé* in the machine age. This statement at first blush seems incredible. By experimentalism we mean starting an operation and taking a chance to see what happens; in other words, gambling on business success. The modern spirit of the machine age, as operated by its increasingly humanistic leaders, is to avoid all experimental waste, and apply research to make reasonably sure in advance. Research applies knowledge, principle, deduction, art and intuition, and the instrumentalities of measure. It is a device for the more frequent exercise of the will to refrain when the whole man, the whole body of human understanding, finds it wise to do so. The old-fashioned free-flowing, gambling, hard-riding, undisciplined, devil-may-care business men chafe at the restraints, the

cautions and the limitations which research imposes upon them, but the new breed of humanistic machine-age men find it perfectly agreeable to use restraint and measure and reasoned conservatism. They are personally guided by a humanistic philosophy and they do not find it irksome to apply it to their work as well. The machine age, contrary to Professor Dewey's assumptions, is not (at its top) engaged in a naturistic experimentalism. Quite the contrary, the 1,100 large corporations which make four-fifths of all the profit made in the United States (to a large extent on sheer economic merit in open competition) are applying a very genuine humanistic philosophy and proceed with much restraint, caution and disciplinary measure. The other 450,000 corporations, half of which show losses regularly every year, do not so actively apply a humanistic philosophy. In fact, the majority of the small business men distinctly apply the naturistic philosophy and suffer accordingly.

Most of the chaos in industry is created by the small, narrow business men who have no sense of measure, proportion or discipline; who do not know their costs and sell below cost; who will not render dependable values, who will not use restraint or caution in their plans, who will not abide by the accepted and adopted codes of their industries, who continually fail and throw "distress stocks" of goods on the market and disorganize it, who will not hold to the dictates of principle, but follow only opportunism, who do not pay high wages or treat amicably and fairly with their employees. A fringe of large corporations also follow these chaotic practices, but the seeds of destruction are always in them. The renovated machine age hates waste and friction, and is making rapid humanistic strides away from them; away from the incredibly costly policies of experimentalism and flux. Policies are laid for years ahead by

the representative concerns of today; budgets fixed and goals set with the most specific, directioned philosophy of guidance. Only the immature, the industrially illiterate, the narrow and extremist men of industry have any regard for the rocky road of experimentalism and "trial and error," which is the "low road" of business. The "high road" is the humanistic road, and humanism is thus the soundest philosophy for a renovated machine age, as it is and has been for any age.

XV

Definitions of Humanism, and Quotations

That we are entering a humanist era—slowly, perhaps, and despite determined opposition by naturists and many supernaturalists—seems demonstrated in many ways. It is being talked and debated by those who think. It is being *lived* by large numbers of people who, without knowing anything technically as to humanism as a philosophy, have intuitively sensed its soundness. It is making many, many young people think. It is reviving great interest in philosophy as a practical factor in life as never before.

90. **Some Definitions of Humanism.**—Much amusement and satire has been called forth by the sheer matter of the definition of humanism. The public heard the sharp reverberations of the quarrel about it before it was furnished with practical definitions, and the result was somewhat confusing. This confusion was heightened by the fact that the humanists themselves had not conferred carefully in order to standardize a definition.

The *Forum Magazine* ran a contest for the best definition of humanism, and the four winning the prizes read as follows:

1. Humanism is a rationalistic effort to coördinate all of the best concepts of right living, and to formulate a code sufficiently broad and tolerant to enable mankind to attain the maximum of mental satisfactions with the minimum of emotional discomfort. Eliminating the idea of supernatural agencies, but recognizing both the good and evil inherent possibilities in human nature, the aim of humanism is to establish standards and ideals which will stabilize living, but permit the finest development and the highest evolution of the individual and the race. *(Zayda Bartley, Oakland, Calif.)*

2. Humanism is the attempt to develop the individual to the highest point that is compatible with the highest possible development of the mass, and to the best interests of both. This entails the utilization of all ideas of the past and present that have proven themselves to be of value, the trying out of new ideas as new conditions and needs arise and the using of those that prove to be of worth, and the rejection of all ideas and systems whether old or new as they become obsolete and valueless. *(A. G. Trudeau, Colorado Springs, Colo.)*

3. Humanism is a way of life whose ultimate goal is a self-chosen ideal of purely human perfection, to the attainment of which instinct, emotion, reason, imagination, and will are equally indispensable factors. This ideal is most fruitfully conceived under the analogy of a Higher, or Perfect Self, and derives organically from the humanist's own experience in vital coöperation with imaginative insight. Starting from a common-sense recognition of the inner duality of his own nature—vital expansive energy and

and equally vital "will to refrain"—the humanist aims at the practical resolution of this duality in a final integration of character. *(Linton J. Keith, Chicago, Ill.)*

4. Humanism is a philosophy of morals. It is not a religion. Its followers believe in "nothing too much," everything in moderation. The true humanist knows himself and is master of himself, his instincts, emotions, body, mind, and will. *(Ada May Hill, New York, N. Y.)*

What do the dictionaries say? We must expect of course that they will not altogether reflect the meanings of modern humanism, sometimes called "the new humanism."

The New Standard Dictionary says (and it differs from others): "Recently, and less properly, the revival of the doctrine that, since 'man is the measure of all things' there is no existence or truth not relative to human faculties or needs. Agnosticism with regard to the absolute and infinite follows as a necessary logical consequence. A system of thinking in which man, his interests and development, are made central and dominant. Its tendency is to exalt the cultural and practical rather than the scientific and speculative, and to encourage a spirit of revolt against existing opinions."

Websters International says: "A system, mode or attitude of thought or action centering upon distinctively human interests or ideals, especially as contrasted with naturalistic or religious interests."

We will now have definitions by various individuals who have thought carefully about it.

Professor Irving F. Babbitt, one of the two founders of the new humanism, has already been quoted frequently in this book, and we will now add a definition given in an interview and some illuminating passages from one of his

most noted treatments of the subject in *Rousseau and Romanticism.* In an interview Professor Babbitt said "The humanist wants the establishment of an all-round, well-balanced doctrine of life, a philosophy specifically human (hence the name) as was that of the Greek and Latin masters. There is also the psychological definition. A humanist is one who would avoid all excesses, and his motto is the one which was inscribed upon the portal of the Delphic temple 'nothing too much.' The humanist therefore attacks writers who would reduce man to what Dreiser so clumsily calls 'chemisms'; the writers who would deny man the right of moral choice, his freedom of will and treat him from a purely mechanistic standpoint. We attack over-weening science, for science cannot measure the imponderables in human behavior. We attack the psychologists and others of their stripe who would dismiss moral determination as the mere working of conditioned reflexes. We attack the religionists who have abandoned religion for uplift, and all who would make morality a matter of legislation. Genuine humanism does not set up as a substitute for religion. It holds that man should not live like an unchained animal; that man should be sure he is human before he sets out to be superhuman. The specifically human virtue, it maintains, is observance of the law of measure, avoidance of excess, the pursuit of poise and proportion."

Now some sentences from Professor Babbitt:

"Man realizes that immensity of his being of which Joubert speaks only in so far as he ceases to be the thrall of his own ego. This human breadth he achieves not by throwing off but by taking on limitations. . . . The reason why he should strive for a life that is thus increasingly full and complete is simply that it is more delectable, that it is found practically to make for happiness."

"To be sound individualists we must not only make the right distinctions but submit to them until they become habitual."

"If scientific discipline is not supplemented by a truly humanistic or religious discipline the result is unethical science, and unethical science is perhaps the worst monster that has yet been turned loose on the race."

"Humanism should have in it an element of religious insight; it is possible to be a humble and meditative humanist. . . . As Burke pointed out the whole ethical life of man has its root in humility. As humility diminishes, conceit or vain imagining rushes in almost automatically to take its place. Under these circumstances decorum, the supreme virtue of the humanist, is in danger of degenerating into some art of going through the motions."

"Goethe writes in his Journal 'a more definite feeling of limitation and, in consequence, of true broadening.' Goethe here glimpses the truth that lies at the base of both humanism and religion. He saw that the romantic disease was the imaginative and emotional straining towards the unlimited."

"Those who have sought to set up a cult of life or beauty or science or humanity (humanitarianism) or country are open to the same objections as the votaries of nature . . . for the simple reason that they do not involve any adequate conversion or discipline of man's ordinary self to some ethical center."

"The misery that results from unrestraint, from failure to work according to the human law, is something different from mere pain and far more to be dreaded; just as the happiness that results from a right working according to the human law is something different from mere pleasure and far more worthy of pursuit."

"The pantheistic dreamer is passive in every sense. He is not working according to the human or according to the natural law, and so is not gaining either in material or in ethical efficiency. In a world such as that in which we live this seems too much like picnicking in a battlefield."

Professor William Lyon Phelps of Yale University.—"After living in this puzzling world three score and five years I have suddenly discovered that I am a *humanist*. In fact, I woke up one fine spring morning in this year of grace 1930 and found myself a humanist. It is true that last year I saw a picture of myself in a magazine, and under it an inscription 'The Great Humanist': but I thought perhaps that was a typographical error for humorist. All true humanists are humorists, although not all humorists are humanists; Mark Twain certainly was not a humanist. No humanist can by any possibility be a pessimist, and Mark Twain was a one hundred per cent pessimist.

"The *spirit of revolt,* which, in the old humanism of Petrarch and Erasmus, was shown in their breaking away from and their opposition to scholasticism and theology, is an essential element in the new humanism of 1930; and is one of the chief reasons for the present excitement.

"The words humanism and humanist, in the very near future, will be constantly seen in books and in high-grade magazines and reviews, and are going to be heard at dinner-parties where are gathered together university dons and their woman-kind, and also wherever the intelligentsia do congregate. Although a knowledge of the subject is by no means considered a necessary prerequisite for the animated discussion of it, a slight acquaintance with the meaning of the terms used cannot do any permanent harm.

"The chief reason for the excitement over the new humanistic movement is that it is a fight for the most precious

possession of mankind—the Human Soul. The new humanists differ among themselves chiefly on the question of religion. Some, like Paul Elmer More, believe that religious faith is essential; others do not. But they are all agreed on the dignity and value of personality; and they are attacking two modern schools of thought; the mechanistic theory, according to which we are 'cunning casts in clay' and the naturalistic theory, which identifies us with the other animals. Or, in other words, the new humanists are engaged in a battle with Giant Despair.

"The new humanists believe in Mind, Personality, Conscience, Free Will, Sin, Virtue; they believe the natural instincts of man are by no means wholly good, and that, for the formation of character, there must be Restraint and Inhibitions. They believe that the only Holy War is the war that has no ending and no armistice—the war that goes on every day in every human soul. As Browning puts it,

> No, when the fight begins within himself,
> A man's worth something, God stoops o'er his head,
> Satan looks up between his feet—both tug—
> He's left, himself, i' the middle: the soul wakes
> And grows. Prolong that battle through his life!

"This is not a fight between Humanism and Science. The humanists are intellectually mature, and instead of having any fear of scientific discoveries, they rejoice in every advance of truth. But they are opposed to the childish, unthinking credulity of the undisciplined mind, which, because Applied Science has given us the wonders of the radio, imagines that anything that has a flavor of 'science' must be be eternally true. Nor do they believe that scientific truth is all the truth.

"The ancient worlds of Greece and Rome went bankrupt

because they had left only two philosophies open to thinking men—the attitude of tight-lipped endurance, and the attitude of seizing enjoyment whenever possible. Both attitudes are based on despair. Today Mechanism and Naturalism have little more to offer. In a world so full of illusion and change, the new humanism should, I think, insist on two supreme realities—God and the Human Soul."

Walter Lippmann.—"The meaning of humanism has been determined by the usage of six centuries. It is not the name of a doctrine. It is not the name of a school or of a sect. It is not the name of a philosophy or a religion. It is the name of a human attitude which revived in Europe about 1300 and it signifies the intention of men to concern themselves with the discovery of a good life on this planet by the use of human faculties. . . ."

Dr. Charles Francis Potter (founder of the First Humanist Society, a church which makes a specific religious cult out of humanism, but with a specific belief in God)—

"The task before Humanism is to release man's soul from bondage to the fear of God.

"Once man's mind is free, and he dares to create his own religion, we shall have such an advance in civilization as now we hardly dare contemplate.

"We need a new religion for the new day, and Humanism is that religion. Humanism, as I visualize it, contemplates nothing less than a correlation of the agencies for human improvement, both social and individual, and the fusing of them in the fire of religious enthusiasm."

Dr. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, head of department of philosophy at Boston University.—"One thing is sure: whether humanism is true or not, it is a radical change from almost all that religion has meant, as distinguished from morality. If humanism is true, when we pray, 'O God,

help me!' we mean only that we hope for assistance from human society. 'Our Father which art in Heaven' means simply 'Our social group which is on earth.' 'Thy will be done' is no submission to the will of a loving heavenly Father; it is only our indication of a willingness to do what the group wishes us to do. In short, as Dickens would say, everything is taken in a Pickwickian sense. Humanists may use the language of theistic belief, yet they mean it so differently from the dictionary that it is all very confusing.

"But the problem is deeper than the use of words. It comes down to a choice between two different religions, if indeed both are religions. Rev. Charles Francis Potter [an apostle of the new humanism] does well to call humanism a new religion. Of the two religions, one aims to improve human life by mutual helpfulness guided by science and based on the denial of belief in a real personal God and in life after death. This is humanism.

"The other equally aims to improve human life by mutual helpfulness guided by science; but it holds that we can not know what it means to improve or to be helpful unless we seek the best there is. This religion, the religion that Jesus professed and that countless others have followed, holds that God is the best there is and that all our schemes and plans need to be tested by their relation to his will. Hence we may call it the religion of theism."

Dr. John Haynes Holmes, Community Church, New York.—"Humanism is the religion of humanity. That this is a new religion, so far as traditional christianity is concerned, is obvious. . . . As against atheism the Humanist finds it impossible to interpret man in the same impersonal way in which he interprets the material universe. For man is different. There are elements in his thought and life which defy all measurement of rod and compass, scale and

test-tube. Man not only exists, but lives; he not only feels, but thinks; he not only reacts, but initiates. He dreams dreams and sees visions. He does unaccountable things, and glorious things. He is a law unto himself, a creator within his own realm of effort and action. There is something more here than anything the world beneath him and around him can display. A new reality came into the world when man was born. For aeons the evolution of life went on upon this planet. In man, for the first time, life awoke to consciousness. With consciousness came a full awareness of the evolving process, an interest in its meaning, a desire for its control. These facts are qualities of life unknown before. These qualities make man a new creature—a person, a spirit. The *Élan vital,* to quote the famous phrase of Bergson, has reached its goal and produced humanity."

Dr. Henry Seidel Canby, editor of *The Saturday Review.*—"There is a spell in the very name of humanist, as if a revival of that intellectual crusade which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries gave all too human nature once again the center of the stage. It is perhaps a dangerous spell, and not all who call upon the name of humanist will be saved or be capable of saving. Therefore if humanism is what this speed-dizzy, matter-sodden age needs, let us be highly critical of the brand that is offered."

Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, famous clergyman.—"Many of our 'best mind' are plainly humanists; the major positions of the movement accord with current thinking, and already various groups of avowed humanists are bidding for popular recognition and support. . . . Its appearance now is no accident. It focuses a large amount of modern thought. . . . Such humanists are sure of goodness, truth, and beauty; are confident that in the experience and creation

of these spiritual values human life finds its distinctive meaning, and that in any sort of universe, theistic or materialistic, with God or without him, the center and circumference of human worth must lie in the personal exploration of these values and the creation of a society which incarnates them."

Frank Jewett Mather, Jr. of Princeton University.—"Is the new humanism a real philosophy in the Greek sense of being a guide to life? Can one live by it? Or is it still, as it apparently used to be, merely a partial attitude needing the prop and aid of more essential attitudes, say religious? . . . By the eternal truism that, while science and invention multiply our facilities for action, neither is able to give us these values which should guide our actions, the humanist must firmly stand."

Mary Colum, well known literary critic.—"The really important self is another self, the self involved in that highly developed type of human being who knows how to evaluate both the self of impulse and the self of control; the man who can recognize and appreciate the high value of desires and impulses, the high value of emotions and control, the high value of reason and of intellect—the splendor and worthiness of them all. . . . If the humanists do indeed stand for discipline, then they are marching with the most modern advance guard, for the world shows signs that its superior spirits are in the coming age going to worship discipline as in the past they worshiped liberty."

Lewis Mumford, literary critic.—"When the tissue of social relations is knit firmly together and man is in the ascendant, he functions voluntarily: every aspect of life shows the force of his imagination and his purpose: the pattern of his streets, the plants in his garden, the contour of the landscape, the paintings on his wall, the food on his table, all have an orderly reference to that creative will

which brings value and significance into even his most barren or automatic activities. . . .

"The most complete personalities are precisely those that have assimilated the most diverse elements in their cultures and have lived least to themselves. Personality provides not merely our original nucleus of experience: it is also the summit of our social achievement: and the apex of every culture is accordingly neither its technology nor its positive science nor its works of art, but all of these together, and many other parts of the universe besides, as they are concentrated and fulfilled in the highest personality: a Confucius, a Plato, a Dante, a Goethe, an Emerson."

Gorham B. Munson, literary critic.—"The general reader, it is a safe wager, will be more and more stirred as the conflict over humanism continues. The first reason for his growing interest is the comprehension of the field of battle. It spreads not just over literature and art, but covers education, politics, morals, religion, science—the whole course of Western civilization since Bacon gave such a stimulus to dreams of utilitarian triumph over nature. The second reason is that in reality the two parties correspond to two broad permanent types of human beings, the conservative and the progressive.

"In recent years the progressives have been the more numerous and vocal in the field of ideas. They have cried up all the new writers like James Joyce and Gertrude Stein; they have welcomed the new fads in science and economics. The progressives have been admirably open-minded, but—and this is a fair point—they have also very often been putty-minded. The conservative type, in contrast, regards new things lightly but holds firmly to the best of the past. If he does not seem always to be as open-minded as one

could wish, he has mental rigidity which doesn't give way unless it feels a genuinely powerful new idea.

"Now these two, the progressive and the conservative, really need each other. Neither should have the upper hand too easily. Each should be a stimulus and a check on the other, goading the other to his best efforts and checking his extravagances. In education the New Humanists disapprove of the loose elective system, germanic Ph. D. scholarship, the transformation of the college into the university. They think that educational impressionism, as they call it, is a menace, and seek to restore Greek and Latin literature, the classical humanities, to their former prestige. But the progressives rally behind Professor John Dewey. They are for experimental schools, for the scientific discipline as preferable to the literary education, for the dropping of dead languages. The progressive desideratum is socialized education, giving the child a rich sense of himself as belonging to a domestic community. All very well, the Humanist thinkers reply, but how are you going to educate for leadership, the greatest of all problems in a democracy? And to that question the advocates of scientific socialized education have as yet given no convincing answer.

"In politics and economics, as you would expect, the lines are just as clearly drawn. The progressive sympathizes with Soviet Russia and advocates various methods of social experiment."

Walter Pater, famous literary essayist.—"The essence of humanism is the belief that nothing which has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality —no language they have spoken, nor oracle beside which they have hushed their voices, no dreams which have once been entertained by actual human minds, nothing about

which they have ever been passionate, or expended time and zeal."

O. W. Firkins, literary critic.—"When all has been said, the humanist movement contains, I believe, three excellent things which need first of all extrication from cumbering irrelevance, and, secondly, a vitalizing and enkindling touch. All three are attributes of the spirit. The first is independence, the throwing-off of the yoke of the motor-car and the test-tube, the affirmation that the ends of the spirit shall be fixed by the spirit itself, let the alkalis and the chromospores say what they will. The second is inwardness, the assertion that to the mind sunk in its own thought or rapt in its own feeling the resonance of the airplane in the heavens or in the newspapers is as idle as the buzzing of the fly upon the pane. The third of the three traits is discipline. The criticism of Messrs. More and Babbitt is a brave and wise stand against that great literary evil of the last century and a half, which alike in the physical sense of dispersion and the moral sense of wayward self-indulgence, we may represent by the word dissipation. I would myself add that as credo or battle-cry the will to refrain should be held and venerated only as part and agent of the will to be. Of course it remains true that the difficulties in the way of making any such ideals provable, sharable, and transferable are enormous. The simple truth is that the authors of these two volumes [*Humanism and America,* and *The Critique of Humanism*] might learn a great deal from one another. Will any profit by the opportunity? One thing is finally indubitable that the nobler side will be the readiest to learn."

John Dewey.—"There remains intact another Humanism. The problem of integrating science in its bearings upon life, and of rendering it the servant instead of the master of human destiny, has grown only the more pressing

since the days of Francis Bacon. It was then a possibility; it is now a necessity, if the dignity of human life is not to be submerged.

"Social life itself demands this integration, and science invites to the task. A Humanism of this type will endure long after the much advertised 'Humanism' of a present group has found its way into a paragraph in a chapter on early Twentieth Century American letters.

"At all events, what Humanism means to me is *an expansion, not a contraction, of human life, an expansion in which nature and the science of nature are made the willing servants of human good.*"

Rabindranath Tagore, famous Hindu poet.—"The infinite personality of man comprehends the universe. There cannot be anything that cannot be subsumed by the human personality, and this proves that the truth of the universe is human truth. When our universe is in harmony with man, the eternal, we know it as truth, we feel it as beauty. We have to realize it through our emotions and activities. We realize the supreme man, who has no individual limitations, through our limitations. Truth, which is one with the universal being, must be essentially human; otherwise whatever we individuals realize as true, never can be called truth."

J. Middleton Murry, editor *Athenæum* and *Adelphi*, England (writing in 1922).—"It is possible to be cheated by one's eagerness to catch a certain tone; but to me the signs, though small, are manifold of a movement towards what can only be described as a new humanism. . . . What we have is an instinctive attempt to overcome that divorce between complete rationality and the religious sense which Thomas Hardy so clearly discerns and so justly deplores. . . . It may come simply in a new recognition of the order of human values and a loyalty to the highest."

XVI

Some "Ten Commandments" of Humanism

Since all ways of life inevitably reduce themselves to certain simplified precepts, it is possibly not without value to present two sets of "ten commandments" one ten Aristotelian commandments as formulated by William DeWitt Hyde, president of Bowdoin College, in *The Five Great Philosophies of Life*, and the other by the author. The Dialogue is by Gorham B. Munson.

91. Ten Aristotelian Commandments.—

(1) Thou shalt devote thy utmost powers to some section of our common social welfare.

(2) Thou shalt hold this end above all lesser goods, such as pleasure, money, honor.

(3) Thou shalt hold the instruments essential to the service of this end second only to the end itself.

(4) Thou shalt ponder and revere the universal laws that bind ends and means together in the ordered universe.

(5) Thou shalt master and obey the specific laws that govern the relation of means to thy chosen end.

(6) Thou shalt use just so much of the materials and tools of life as the service of thy end requires.

(7) Thou shalt exclude from thy life all that exceeds or falls below this mean, reckless of pleasure lost.

(8) Thou shalt endure whatever hardship and privation the maintenance of this mean in the service of thy end requires, heedless of pain involved.

(9) Thou shalt remain steadfast in this service until habit shall have made it a second nature, and custom shall have transformed it into joy.

(10) Thou shalt find and hold a few like-minded friends, to share with thee this lifelong devotion to that common social welfare which is the task and goal of man.

92. Ten New Humanism Commandments.—

(1) Thou shalt have as thine highest *final* authority not any superior being or historical convention, but *intuition.* Neither reason nor emotion shall usurp this final authority.

(2) Thou shalt ever be aware of the uniquely high estate and high destiny of man, his high possibilities and responsibilities, which are ever at war with the unimaginative, irresponsible and chaotic elements, which are also within him and contend for control.

(3) Thou shalt exercise equally *the will to do and the will to refrain,* in order that of no single thing there will be too much, nor too little; in order that there be no human disbalance.

(4) Thou shalt regard life as plastic material for the will and spirit of man the creative artist, whose task and privilege it is to shape human satisfactions and purposes

into designs and creations according to his own ideas of measure and proportion.

(5) Thou shalt ever maintain thy power of control in the interest of the higher and never in the interest of the lower; making use of the lower, but ever in the direction of the higher.

(6) Thou shalt exalt reason, research and science to the full, as valuable servants for checking and testing the imagination and for extending man's tools and practical powers; but never accept them as masters.

(7) Thou shalt ever labor constructively to build order, quality and value, decorum and form out of the manifold stuff of life.

(8) Thou shalt demand all freedoms, employ all instrumentalities, and use all powers, but thou shalt equally earnestly accept all responsibility and apply all the laws of balance and harmony in a significant orchestration of life.

(9) Thou shalt have faith in action, and in coördination of effort, and thou shalt act courageously and willingly for human advance.

(10) Thou shalt exercise mediation, to commune with the high final authority of intuition and the deep-self; thou shalt exercise tolerance, humility and open-mindedness, to sift and select from the vast variety of human experience, tradition and hope; thou shalt exercise pity and love, to ameliorate the pains of, and give warmth and fellowship in, the exigencies of human living.

93. A Dialogue on Humanism.—What is Humanism?

The study of the principles and practice of happiness.

But doesn't everybody seek happiness?

Yes, but how? Along the path of least resistance. Happiness, said Aristotle, is a kind of working.

What does that mean?

Ethical work. Work on oneself. The strenuous man works on his environment, but he may be ethically passive—like Napoleon. If one man conquer in battle ten thousand times ten thousand men, and another man conquer his own self, he is the greatest of conquerors, says the Buddhist proverb.

But how to go about achieving self-knowledge and self-control?

The supreme way for the Humanist is the Greek law of measure. Nothing too much. He believes with Pascal that the greatness of humanity is shown in keeping to the golden mean. Extremes are barbarous. For example, neither pure restraint nor pure liberty is good. Mediate between them. Temper liberty with restraint. In a word, select!

But is that not immensely difficult? Is there any principle of selection?

It is difficult. But the art of life consists in selection. First, you must acquire knowledge, you must try to assimilate the wisdom of the ages. From it you learn what is central, permanent, normal in human experience over a long stretch of time. Then you use your will in trying to apply the wisdom of the ages to the shifting circumstances of every day. Humanism, you see, is a new-old philosophy of conduct. To sum up: its aim is happiness; its doctrine is somewhat like the Christian dogma of a law for the members and a law for the spirit; its discipline is mediation backed up by meditation on traditional wisdom.

Not very modern, is it?

It is decidedly modern in spirit. The Humanist as a rule avoids theological and metaphysical complications. He wishes to be positive, experimental, critical in spirit. He admires the spirit of Aristotle, who to him is more modern

than are many of the modernists. He opposes to the last trench the modernists, as he calls the apostles of change and novelty.

What are the issues between them?

Free will versus determinism. Self-discipline versus self-expression. Standards versus impressionism. Constitutional republicanism versus direct democracy. Aristotelianism and Platonism versus pragmatism. Rational study of the classics versus the supremacy of scientific education. The rôle of modern science. The doctrine of progress. The value of contemporary literature. And many more, besides. You will hear a great deal about these matters in the next few years.

One more question. Are the Humanists simply new style Puritans?

Far from it. They are worldly conservatives. If you think of old Dr. Samuel Johnson, you should be able to visualize the type of man the Humanists admire—solid in judgment, adult in sentiment, vigorous in common sense. They despise the meddlers whom Mencken calls "wowsers" as much as the Sage of Baltimore does. But they distinguish between "wowser-morality" or humanitarian meddling and the stalwart morality of a man like Dr. Johnson. They are, in fact, restoring morality as a topic of distinguished conversation, as it was in the eighteenth century. (*Gorham B. Munson.*)

XVII

A Brief Historical Chronicle of Humanism

As a name, humanism was not born until the 15th century; but as a philosophy the Greeks were its greatest formulators, and they lived it more splendidly and intelligently than any people before or since. It would be impossible in such a brief space to describe the humanistic life and philosophy of the Greeks, but it arrived after the passing of the Epicurean philosophy (which made pleasure and freedom from pain the only desirable ends of life); and after the discovery of the inadequacy of the Stoical philosophy of self-control and universal law; a half-way step to humanism.

94. Aristotle Defines His Humanism.—The Greeks, however, attained their pinnacle of humanistic expression in Aristotle, who renounced early philosophies and set up his great system based on measure and proportion. He disdained Epicureanism because, as he pointed out, who wants

to live like a child, even if with a maximum of mere pleasure —if one has but the mind of a child? He rejected Stoicism because one might obey universal law and be perfectly self controlled and still have no importance. Plato's "higher and lower realms" of value were all very well, but like two separate things, like a man split in twain.

Aristotle made a reconciliation between higher and lower, and saved the high-minded from becoming ascetics and other-worldly creatures. Aristotle was the first great humanist. The epicure can best get what he wants by living a life which has all its powers in effective and well-proportioned exercise under the human will. The pursuit of large ends and generous interests brings more pleasure than the pursuit of pleasure itself. The human will must work with tools such as he has to achieve those worthy ends, and use them only sufficiently to accomplish the purpose, and never make ends out of the tools themselves. Furthermore, the "happy mean," the principle of "nothing too much," the application of measure and proportion to all things, are the great concepts of Aristotle; unrivaled before or since for their searching appraisal of what constitutes the maximum in life. These concepts colored Greek life very deeply, and made of the later Greeks remarkably rounded personalities.

For fifteen centuries humanism was lost to the world as a philosophy, as were all of the Greek literature, because the Christian popes would permit no "pagan" books or records, such as the Greek classics, to come into Europe.

95. Humanism in the Middle Ages.—Humanism, indeed, began in the Fifteenth Century, as a protest against the continued exclusion of Greek and Roman literature. The intelligent and by this time not so fear-ridden monks deplored openly the suppression of these ancient classics. They were the first out-runners of the coming Renaissance.

They read these ancient classics, experienced a great humanistic broadening, and they insisted that others have the same privilege. These truly broad and cultured monks also reacted against the excesses (always an accompaniment of narrowness) of the middle ages. They saw that to ban the beautiful ancient classics, on grounds of paganism, and yet at the same time commit the treachery and lechery which were all too current even in the high places of the church, was miserably below the high and true dignity of man. They wanted less of supernaturalism and ritualistic mortification of the flesh, and a more all-around well-balanced philosophy of life. The bold truth, recognized by historians, is *that the revolt of the humanists was the parent of all modern developments, intellectual, social and scientific.* It is thus possible to say, and be absolutely accurate, that not only has humanism been the philosophy of the highest peak of the ancient world, the matchless Greeks, but also that until humanism came to Europe, civilization suffered the incredible obliteration of the "dark ages."

Humanism thus has a most magnificent past. It pushed on constantly. Chrysoloras in 1415 and Aretinus in 1444 translated Plato, and in 1438 Greek soldiers after the fall of Constantinople brought Greek treasures to Europe. Plato began to be taught in the Florentine Academy, and by 1531 even a Pope (Leo X) confessed to more pleasure in reading the classics than in Christian literature. Auguste Comte was called a humanist because he insisted on the dignity and perfectibility of humanity, as opposed to the worthlessness of the human soul without salvation previously insisted upon.

Thus the scope of meaning of humanism widened, as the center of interest shifted from supernaturalism. *Humanitas* was the natural opposite term to *divinitas*.

Men like Sir Thomas Moore, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini and Lorenzo the Magnificent applied humanism as a philosophy to public life. Men like Erasmus and Petrarch applied it to abstract, monkish philosophizing and writing. Pico della Mirandola communed humanistically with human intuition alone, whereas Leonardo da Vinci, to whom science appealed most, with art closely second, applied humanism with utter realism; to such an extent that he could sculpture a man and woman in the intimate love embrace. Religiously the humanists varied greatly—from the mystic faith of Marsilio Ficino, to the thorough-going piety of Colet, the skeptical conformity of Montaigne, and the thin allegiance of Rabelais. Some were tolerant and some were intolerant; some were ascetic and others were sensual; some were merry and some were very grave indeed!

96. The Effect of the Humanists.—But immensely varied as were the humanists in their temperaments and outlooks, and contradictory as might seem such men, still their central thread of agreement was, significantly this (as Professor Frank Jewett Mather, Jr. of Princeton points out): "they were all what we should call today practical psychologists, keenly interested in man's motives and behavior, upholders of the dignity of life on the mundane level, free and audacious analysts in disregard of medieval limitations and proscriptions. They hoped to attain a good life by the study of man, past and present."

Humanism then moved on to a scientific phase, all with the motivation of centering interest upon the needs of human life. Bacon and Condorcet were fired by the desire to "ameliorate the human estate." This wing branched off later into naturism because of its obsession with man's environment, rather than with man himself and his inner nature. It was a monumental error of philosophy, since

man's will and consciousness alone are the measure of all things, and the circumstances of his environment, even his emotions and instincts, are secondary instead of primary. It is to this truth that humanism today is aiming to bring us back.

The impact of the humanists upon the darkness of the middle ages was terrific and effective. The pendulum began slowly to swing away in the opposite direction from supernaturalism, and the great philosophical drama of which the "new" humanism of today is the logical climax, was begun.

The skepticism of the humanists, once it had penetrated the heavy supernaturalist armor, slowly created tendencies toward greater human freedom—which inevitably included more freedom for sensualism and all the urges of the lower self. The medieval organism, as Friedell has pointed out in his *Cultural History of the Modern Age*, was atrophied by skepticism and sensualism, and medieval life lost its meaning, after having lived at peace under one rigid philosophy for a thousand years. A sickness, a "traumatic neurosis" settled down upon Europe, until it was carried to its apex of fever and release in the Italian Renaissance, after which humanity's outlook upon the world was permanently and widely altered—bent definitely in the humanist direction, but by no means living up to the humanistic ideals either of Aristotle or of Professor Babbitt. A definite utilitarianism, a definite glorification of appetite emotion and instinct, and a definite "loosening," taking the place of a thousand years of "tightness" now came upon human life in increasing waves, reaching its crest in Jean Jacques Rousseau, who glorified every impulse of man, high and low, and completely discarded all controls.

97. Humanism in the Orient.—Meanwhile we must not

omit reference to the other half of the world. In the usual reverse manner of the Chinese another humanistic drama had been enacted in the Far East. Five hundred years before Christ Confucius set up a very real though limited form of humanism, and thus even before the Greeks millions of Orientals lived the philosophy of humanism. Confucius, despite the fact that he was born into an era of incredible misery, evil and crime, had confidence in human nature, if supplied with disciplines. He was exceedingly literal and practical, and his "religion" is entirely secular. The heart of his philosophy was faith in man. "What the superior man seeks is in himself," he said; "what the inferior man seeks is in others. . . . Man is greater than any system of thought. . . . A man can enlarge his principles; principles do not enlarge the man." His rebuke to supernaturalism is a classic. "While you do not know about life," he asks, "what can you know about death?" The central idea of Confucius and his philosophy is that it is better that men occupy themselves only with human affairs and conservative standards any man might attain. He never spoke of, and had no approval for extraordinary feats of strength or bravery extraordinary objects, rebellion or disorder, and spiritual or other-worldly beings. He was concerned with raising man's level—"giving oneself earnestly to the duties due to men."

China had—at the time of Confucius—its own Rousseau, its prophet of naturism and experimental expressionism,—Lao-tsze. His "Taoism" had a considerable following, and it severely attacked the humanism of Confucius, as Professor Babbitt in reverse order today attacks Rousseauism. Taoists believed in so complete a philosophy of flux and free rudderlessness that they even (says Professor Babbitt) "sang the praises of the unconscious, even when

obtained through intoxication . . . they also went to the point of suppressing the difference between sleeping and waking, life and death."

In India, in still more ancient times, the outlines of a drama of humanism are also discernable. Perhaps it may be said that the original concept of humanism bears the birthmark of India upon it. The *Bhagavad-Gita* is an ancient scripture of India, comparable to the New Testament of the Bible, and precisely as Christ sought to humanize the philosophy of the Essenes, so the Bhagavad-Gita seeks to humanize the old Sankhya philosophy; substituting the *discipline of action* for the "way of knowledge." The Bhagavad Gita, in one part, subtly renounced the old intellectualist school and appealed to the man in the street for controlled action. Knowledge and inactivity, immemorially tied together in India as elsewhere, is shown to be inferior to disciplined activity. Ghandi is a true child of the Bhagavad-Gita; the expression in modern times of the Hindu version of humanism.

98. The Modern Revival of Humanism.—We return now to the development of humanism in the western world. Two professors and famous literary critics—Professor Paul Elmer More of Princeton, author of the famous *Shelburne Essays* and one-time literary critic of the *Nation* before 1918, and Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard, have for twenty odd years struck a strong note of humanism in their philosophy and teachings. Babbitt in particular had delivered, in *Rousseau and Romanticism* (1919) a brilliant and almost overwhelming blow against the entire school of naturists which had become active in America in the nineties with Professor William James' and Professor John Dewey's "pragmatism."

Now however began a remarkable era of intellectual

humanitarianism, with a left wing of absolute naturists. Humanitarianism was represented by endowed publications like *The New Republic*, and the absolute naturists by publications like the *Dial, The Masses, etc.* Coinciding with the humanitarian movement to secularize Christianity as represented by Graham Taylor, and with the rise of socialism and radicalism, a strong sociological cast was given to current thought; particularly when the educational ideas of John Dewey, the disillusionment of Theodore Dreiser and an entire school of satirists of the American scene (nearly all sociological rebels against the present economic order), took the center of the stage. The early twenties saw a remarkable onslaught led by H. L. Mencken and Sinclair Lewis, upon American hidebound supernaturalism, and in lesser degree upon American humanitarianism, with its sloppy sentimentality. This general development coincided in England with—and was doubtless a reflection of—the earlier work of H. G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw.

There was a consequent tug of war between the intellectual naturists and the intellectual humanitarians, and it has not yet come to a decision. Meanwhile, during the period when Professors More and Babbitt were not actively in the foreground with their humanism, the inherent logic of humanism was cropping out in the field of religion, as a logical development of humanitarianism. The Unitarian sect had of course for a number of years subscribed to a limited humanistic philosophy, eliminating a belief in a future life and greatly reducing interest in God. Dietrich, Reese, Slaten, Robinson, Dutton and others fostered this movement; and in more recent years in New York Rev. Charles Francis Potter with his Humanist Church, and Rev. John Haynes Holmes with his Community Church have shaped a humanist religion with varying degrees of interest

in God, but strong emphasis on man. These churches are a success, and the vitality of the basic humanistic idea is well demonstrated.

Other forces have been accumulating to break the hold which an out-looking, "extravert" view of life has had on modern thinking. The obsession over political and economic roads to Utopia (natural products of a naturist point of view) has been declining. The romantic wing of the naturists still cling to it, but the disillusioned wing of the naturists are done with it—are indeed done with everything but the last logical act of suicide, before which they quake. In his *History of Modern Culture* (Vol. 1) Professor Preserved Smith has now begun the great work of valuing history on the more humanistic basis of culture instead of politics or economics, and this of necessity is devastating to the very ground whereon the naturists walk. He shows how the overthrow of "the degrading shackles of religion" really brought about modern advancement. The similar overthrow of the Romanticism which took the place of religion is now at its apex of development, with humanism as its chief foe. The romanticism of the believers in economic or political utopias; the "romantic melancholy" of such writers as Theodore Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson and Sinclair Lewis, *et al;* and the humanitarian sentimentalism of business, all have now had their measure taken and are being cast aside as inadequate; as being a kind of after-glow of supernaturalism and religion. Thus the ground is being cleared of old debris for the erection of a structure which will be a fit philosophical habitation for adults.

In 1928 in the *Forum* Professors Babbitt and More returned to the arena, and ever since then the interest in humanism has mounted remarkably. In rapid succession

many articles were printed, and the contest waxed warmer and warmer. In the spring of 1930 it was related in Paris that even New York night club habitues and newsboys were discussing humanism. Even the columnists of the New York *Graphic* commented upon it. The alarm and anger of the naturists, sociological critics and intellectual humanitarians has been particularly intense. For ten or fifteen years they have manned most of the posts of criticism, held the spotlights of review and discussion and did their best to sway the public toward social and political radicalism and the naturistic philosophy which is an appendage to it. Humanism represents almost everything which these men do not like. It is not for political revolution and overturn; it is *evolutionary*. It is not for loose, free expressionism in literature and criticism; it believes in standards. There are many other antagonisms which humanism aroused.

The contest quickly shifted from magazine to newspaper, and from newspaper to public debating halls, and then to books. A debate between Professor Babbitt, Carl Van Doren and Dr. Henry Seidel Canby in Carnegie Hall, New York, drew the largest crowd ever attending any purely philosophical debate. *Humanism in America,* a symposium of chapters by fourteen humanists edited by Norman Foerster was published, followed a few months later by a symposium of thirteen anti-humanists edited by C. Hartley Grattan. A few other unimportant books followed, and more are in preparation.

The great strength of the humanist philosophy induced many anti-humanists to execute the familiar strategy of claiming themselves to be the real humanists and reading Professors Babbitt and More out of humanism. Thus Harry Elmer Barnes claims that John Dewey and Graham

Wallas are humanists because they replaced theology with the social sciences. Dr. Canby and Lewis Mumford also tried to wrest humanism away from Babbitt and More and substitute their own definitions. The effort has only the more strengthened the humanistic position.

Following then a familiar desperate tactic, the anti-humanists proclaimed humanism "a dead issue," but it is apparently far from dead. Seward Collins, editor of *The Bookman* is aggressively continuing the shelling of the anti-humanist position, while *The Criterion* edited by T. S. Eliot, the *Forum* and *The Hound and Horn* are organs wide open to the discussion. The newspaper magazine supplements are treating the subject and so are even the college magazines, for it now appears that the Mencken hypnosis of college young people is broken, and that everywhere young men and women are now finishing with the "smart-alec" attitude toward life and want a more mature, responsible philosophy of life. Having been weened from the old supernaturalist God, and having subscribed to Science and Flux as God and found them bitter and pointless, American youth is now full ripe for humanism.

AN INCLUSIVE ROSTER OF HUMANISTS

Without attempt at narrow definition, but inclusive of men of fairly definite humanistic tendency despite the presence of some supernaturalism, or some humanitarian, or even some utilitarian tendencies, this list is offered for discussion.

Confucius
Akhnaton
Buddha
Homer
Aristotle
Socrates
Plato
Jesus Christ
St. Paul
Phidias
Virgil
Horace
Dante
Rabelais
Erasmus
Petrarch
Aretinus
Chrysoloras
Helvetius
Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini
Machiavelli
Boccaccio
Shakespeare
Milton
Leonardo da Vinci
Abbe Saint Pierre
August Comte
Colet
Montaigne
Lorenzo the Magnificent
Pico della Mirandello
Dante
Sir Thomas Moore
Francis Bacon
Immanuel Kant
Wolfang Goethe
Dr. Johnson
George Washington
Matthew Arnold
Jeremy Bentham
Ralph Waldo Emerson
Abraham Lincoln

In Recent Years:

Lord Balfour
Havelock Ellis
Walter Rathenau
Paul Elmer More
Irving Babbitt
T. S. Eliot
Robert Frost
Norman Foerster
Albert Einstein
Rabindranath Tagore
Prof. Robert Milliken
Prof. Arthur Compton
Professor Michelson
Prof. Charles A. Beard
Walter Lippmann
Arthur E. Morgan
Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.
William Lyon Phelps
Everett Dean Martin
G. R. Elliott
Gorham B. Munson
Lewis Mumford
Harry Hayden Clark
Alan Reynolds Thompson
Sherlock Bronson Gass
Richard Lindley Brown
Robert Shafer
Bernard Bandler II
Stanley P. Chase
H. G. Wells
Owen Young
J. Middleton Murry
Seward Collins

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